APT36 : Multi-Vector Execution Malware Campaign Targeting Indian Government Entities – CYFIRMA

APT36 : Multi-Vector Execution Malware Campaign Targeting Indian Government Entities – CYFIRMA

CYFIRMA identified a targeted multi-stage malware campaign attributed to Transparent Tribe (APT36) that uses socially engineered ZIP archives, deceptive shortcut files, and a macro-enabled PowerPoint add-in to deliver a remote access trojan and maintain stealth. The final payload hsuzoiaisaacrhy.exe establishes raw TCP C2 to 93.127.130.89 with a fallback domain and supports screenshotting, live screen monitoring, file exfiltration, and persistence mechanisms. #APT36 #hsuzoiaisaacrhy

Keypoints

  • Transparent Tribe (APT36) deployed a socially engineered ZIP archive masquerading as examination documents containing a deceptive .lnk shortcut and a macro-enabled PowerPoint add-in (Brief.ppam) to initiate the infection chain.
  • The .lnk shortcut executes a hidden batch script (myscsd.bat) that stages files in a hidden folder (~), copies decoy PDFs to ProgramData, removes Mark-of-the-Web, creates a hard link in AppData, and launches a linked executable to run the RAT.
  • The PowerPoint add-in’s VBA macro auto-executes (Auto_Open), self-copies, renames the add-in as a ZIP, extracts embedded OLE objects, reconstructs an OS-appropriate PE payload, and deploys a decoy document to mask activity.
  • The final .NET executable (hsuzoiaisaacrhy.exe) contains a hardcoded C2 indicator (IP 93.127.130.89 and fallback domain sharemxme126.net), establishes raw TCP C2, implements persistence via Startup registry, and includes extensive RAT capabilities (file transfer, remote execution, screenshots, live streaming).
  • Attackers used multiple defense-evasion techniques including string and code obfuscation, junk code insertion, randomized names, hidden staging directories, Mark-of-the-Web removal, hard links, and a self-deleting cleanup executable (fimsrwvar.exe) to hinder analysis and forensic recovery.
  • Observed IOCs include multiple file hashes (MD5 and SHA-256), filenames used in lures and payloads, an active C2 IP, and an embedded fallback domain; recommended mitigations include email gateway defenses, macro restrictions, EDR monitoring, and behavioral detection for the described execution chain.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566.001 ] Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment – Initial delivery via a socially engineered ZIP archive masquerading as examination-related documents (‘malicious ZIP archive masquerading as examination-related documents’).
  • [T1204.002 ] User Execution: Malicious File – Victim interaction with deceptive double-extension shortcut files triggers execution (‘deceptive double-extension shortcut file (e.g., Approved Documents 2026.pdf.lnk)’).
  • [T1059 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter – Use of batch scripts and PowerShell to stage and execute payloads (‘%comspec% /c start /MIN ~myscsd.bat.’).
  • [T1059.003 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell – The .lnk invokes cmd to run a minimized batch file to hide activity (‘%comspec% /c start /MIN ~myscsd.bat.’).
  • [T1059.005 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic – VBA macros auto-execute and perform extraction and reconstruction (‘Auto_Open() function when the malicious PowerPoint add-in is opened.’).
  • [T1203 ] Exploitation for Client Execution – Macro-driven extraction and reconstruction of embedded OLE objects into a runnable executable (‘reconstructs the malicious executable’).
  • [T1547.001 ] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys – Malware establishes persistence by adding itself to the user’s startup registry key (‘establishes persistence by adding itself to the current user’s Windows startup registry key.’).
  • [T1546 ] Event Triggered Execution – Use of Office add-in auto-execution and file shortcuts to trigger payload execution (‘Auto_Open() function when the malicious PowerPoint add-in is opened.’).
  • [T1543 ] Create or Modify System Process – Launching linked executables and creating processes to run payload components (‘launches the linked executable using start’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – Use of string obfuscation, randomized names, and junk code insertion to hinder analysis (‘obfuscation and junk code insertion’).
  • [T1564 ] Hide Artifacts – Use of hidden staging directory (“~”) and hidden attributes to conceal files (‘a hidden folder named “~”’).
  • [T1036 ] Masquerading – Deceptive filenames and double extensions used to masquerade malicious files as legitimate documents (‘deceptive double-extension filename, “Approved Documents 2026.pdf.lnk,”’).
  • [T1553.005 ] Mark-of-the-Web Bypass – PowerShell Unblock-File is used to remove Mark-of-the-Web and allow execution without warning (‘PowerShell Unblock-File to remove the “Mark of the Web” security flag’).
  • [T1140 ] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – Macro renames the add-in as a ZIP and extracts embedded objects to reconstruct payloads (‘copies itself and renames the file as a ZIP archive…extracts embedded OLE objects’).
  • [T1070.004 ] File Deletion – Anti-forensic self-deleting behavior via a generated executable that removes .exe files and then deletes itself (‘Self-deleting executable (fimsrwvar.exe) to remove traces’).
  • [T1012 ] Query Registry – Malware checks and updates registry values as part of persistence logic (‘checks the existing value and updates it if necessary’).
  • [T1033 ] System Owner/User Discovery – Use of environment variables and user profile paths to create per-user staging directories (‘uses the %USERPROFILE% environment variable’).
  • [T1057 ] Process Discovery – Ability to enumerate and monitor running processes on the infected host (‘Process enumeration’).
  • [T1082 ] System Information Discovery – Macro checks OS version to select compatible payload variants (‘detect the operating system version’).
  • [T1083 ] File and Directory Discovery – Drive and filesystem enumeration to locate targets and stage files (‘Drive enumeration’ / ‘File system browsing’).
  • [T1087 ] Account Discovery – Capabilities to enumerate accounts for situational awareness (‘Account Discovery’).
  • [T1518 ] Software Discovery – Enumeration of installed software for targeting and evasion (‘Software Discovery’).
  • [T1135 ] Network Share Discovery – Ability to discover network shares within the environment (‘Network Share Discovery’).
  • [T1113 ] Screen Capture – Capability to capture screenshots and send them to the operator (‘Screenshot capture’).
  • [T1005 ] Data from Local System – Remote file exfiltration support (chunked upload) from local file system (‘Remote file exfiltration (chunked upload)’).
  • [T1071 ] Application Layer Protocol – C2 command exchange over network channels with hardcoded commands in the binary (‘Multiple commands are hardcoded within the binary, which are issued by the server to trigger specific actions’).
  • [T1095 ] Non-Application Layer Protocol (Raw TCP) – Malware establishes a raw TCP connection directly to the C2 server for command and control (‘establishes a direct raw TCP connection to the command-and-control (C2) server’).
  • [T1573 ] Encrypted Channel – C2 communication design includes channel protections for command/response (binary lists network indicator and fallback domain ‘93.127.130.89?sharemxme126.net’).
  • [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Exfiltration of data and command results back to operators over the C2 channel (‘execution results are transmitted back over the same channel’ / ‘file upload (chunked exfiltration)’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File Names ] lure and payload names used in the campaign – Approved Documents 2026.pdf.lnk, Brief.ppam (macro-enabled add-in).
  • [Executable Names ] final payload and cleanup binary – hsuzoiaisaacrhy.exe (final RAT), fimsrwvar.exe (self-deleting cleanup executable).
  • [Script Names ] execution scripts used by shortcuts – myscsd.bat (batch script invoked by .lnk).
  • [MD5 Hashes ] MD5 hashes of delivered components – Brief.ppam ff1a302651019277d90c814c2e0940ec, Approved Documents 2026.pdf.lnk 81d97473b2b87310b2caf3376341fba6 (and 1 more MD5 hash).
  • [SHA-256 Hashes ] malware component SHA-256 indicators (blocking/hunting) – 34412e765822cf3fb32a5a5c9866fb29a9b98d627b4d9a3275fd3e754cf8e360, 7b4e1670930ec33a673d9b32454f67f28af73a89958fcaba4b24ac2c799b1af1 (and 2 more hashes).
  • [IP Address ] active command-and-control endpoint – 93.127.130.89 (hardcoded C2 IP observed as active at analysis time).
  • [Domain ] embedded fallback domain for C2 continuity – sharemxme126.net (fallback domain embedded in binary alongside IP).
  • [YARA Rule ] detection signature provided for integration – APT36_Macro_Embedded_Malware_Campaign_IOC (includes hashes and C2 IP for detection and blocking).


Read more: https://www.cyfirma.com/research/apt36-multi-vector-execution-malware-campaign-targeting-indian-government-entities/