Zscaler ThreatLabz uncovered a malware campaign from early May 2025 targeting Chinese-speaking users that delivers three RAT families: ValleyRAT, FatalRAT, and a newly identified kkRAT which combines features from Ghost RAT and Big Bad Wolf. The campaign uses phishing pages on GitHub Pages, multi-stage shellcode loaders, BYOVD to disable AV/EDR callbacks, and kkRAT capabilities such as clipboard crypto-hijacking and installing RMM tools like Sunlogin and GotoHTTP. #kkRAT #GhostRAT #BigBadWolf #ValleyRAT #FatalRAT #Sunlogin #GotoHTTP
Keypoints
- Zscaler ThreatLabz observed a campaign since early May 2025 that delivers ValleyRAT, FatalRAT, and a new RAT named kkRAT to Chinese-speaking victims via phishing installer pages hosted on GitHub Pages.
- The attack is multi-stage: initial sandbox/VM evasion and API obfuscation, second-stage AV/EDR disabling (including BYOVD using RTCore64.sys), and a third-stage downloader that selects payloads from structured Base64 data.
- kkRAT blends Ghost RAT-like network protocol (zlib compression plus XOR encryption) with Big Bad Wolf plugin exports and supports extensive plugins and commands for remote control, process/window management, proxying, and persistence.
- The campaign targets specific China-focused security products, disables registered callbacks (ObRegister, MiniFilter, CmRegister) using borrowed RealBlindingEDR code, kills AV/EDR processes, modifies registry keys, and schedules tasks for persistence.
- kkRAT performs device fingerprinting during registration, supports clipboard cryptocurrency address replacement, installs RMM tools (Sunlogin, GotoHTTP), and can relay network traffic via a SOCKS-like proxy plugin.
- Zscaler provided detection names (Win32.RAT.kkRAT, Win32.RAT.ValleyRAT, Win32.Backdoor.FatalRAT) and published IOCs, including host hashes, phishing domains/URLs, and C2 IP:port addresses to aid detection and response.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1566 ] Phishing â Threat actor used GitHub Pages to host phishing sites impersonating popular software installers (âphishing pages impersonating Ding Talk that ultimately delivers various RATsâ).
- [T1204.002 ] User Execution: Malicious File â Installer ZIP archives contain a malicious executable that the victim extracts and runs (âinstaller packages are ZIP archives that contain a malicious executable fileâ).
- [T1497 ] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion â Malware performs time stability checks and hardware checks, and manipulates PEB/Module lists to corrupt sandbox snapshots (âUsing QueryPerformanceCounter⌠alter ProcessParameters->ImagePathName and ProcessParameters->CommandLine⌠traverse InLoadOrderModuleList⌠rewritten to %WINDIR%explorer.exeâ).
- [T1562.001 ] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools â Uses a vulnerable driver (RTCore64.sys) and RealBlindingEDR-derived code to remove registered callbacks and disable AV/EDR functions (âuses a known vulnerable driver (RTCore64.sys) to disable AV/EDR functionalities⌠remove registered system callbacksâ).
- [T1140 ] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information â Malware uses single-byte XOR operations and decryption of next-stage files and shellcodes (âapplies single-byte XOR operations⌠to extract decryption keys for the next-stage filesâ).
- [T1053.005 ] Scheduled Task â Creates a scheduled task running as SYSTEM to execute a batch script on every user logon to repeatedly kill AV/EDR processes (âcreates a scheduled task to run with SYSTEM privileges to execute a batch script on every user logonâ).
- [T1547.001 ] Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder â Achieves persistence via startup folder, autorun registry keys, and logon scripts (âcreate a shortcut for the legitimate executable⌠add this shortcut to the startup folder for persistenceâ and registry modifications described for 360 Total Security).
- [T1037.001 ] Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Logon Script (Windows) â Uses logon scripts for persistence (âAchieve persistence using logon script (HKCUEnvironmentUserInitMprLogonScript)â).
- [T1010 ] Application Window Discovery â kkRAT collects presence of applications such as Telegram and WeChat in registration info (âchar TG[40]; // Is Telegram present on the system? char WC[40]; // Is WeChat present on the system?â).
- [T1057 ] Process Discovery â Commands and plugins provide process listing and termination capabilities (âDllProgress Provides process management capabilities, including listing active processes and terminating themâ).
- [T1082 ] System Information Discovery â kkRAT collects OS, CPU, memory, disk size, uptime, and AV list for fingerprinting (âREGISTRATIONINFO⌠OsVerInfoEx⌠CPUClockMhz⌠MemSize⌠DriverSize⌠char AV[80]; // List of AVâs installedâ).
- [T1083 ] File and Directory Discovery â Plugins enumerate autorun registry and installed applications (âDllQDXGL Enumerates and retrieves the list of values stored in the autorun registry keyâ and DllApp lists installed software).
- [T1056.001 ] Input Capture: Keylogging â kkRAT includes keyboard capture functionality borrowed from Ghost RAT commands (âkkRAT borrows several network commands from Ghost RAT, such as ⌠COMMAND_KEYBOARDâ).
- [T1113 ] Screen Capture â Main plugin exports support screen capture and remote desktop features (âDLLScreenProvides basic remote desktop screen management⌠used for screen capturingâ).
- [T1115 ] Clipboard Data â Implements clipboard scanning and replacement to hijack cryptocurrency addresses (âScans the clipboard for cryptocurrency wallet addresses⌠Identified wallet addresses are replaced with the attackerâs wallet addressesâ).
- [T1219 ] Remote Access Tools â kkRAT is a RAT providing remote shell, desktop, file/process management, and plugin-based extensions (âFacilitates remote command execution via a shell interface⌠remote desktop screen managementâ).
- [T1090 ] Proxy â Provides proxy functionality and SOCKS5 support via PlugProxy.dll and fnProxy export (âPlugProxy.dllConnSocksFunctions as a proxy⌠implements the SOCKS5 protocol using the go-socks5 libraryâ).
- [T1573 ] Encrypted Channel â Network communications use zlib compression followed by XOR encryption with a key embedded in the binary (âoriginal data is first compressed using zlib and then encrypted using an XOR-based algorithm with a key embedded in the malware binaryâ).
- [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel â Data and device fingerprinting are sent to C2 and can be used for exfiltration (âregistration message⌠sent to the C2 serverâ and network commands to send data via proxy).
- [T1529 ] System Shutdown/Reboot â Malware can stop or modify system processes and was observed to disable network adapters temporarily (impacting system state and AV/EDR communications) (âenumerates all active network adapters and temporarily disables them, severing AV/EDR communicationâ).
Indicators of Compromise
- [File Hash ] First-stage EXE and loaders â 02cce1811ed8ac074b211717e404fbadffa91b0881627e090da97769f616c434, 71ca5dd59e90ec83518f9b33b2a8cdb6a0d6ad4c87293b27885fa2a8e8e07f1c
- [File Hash ] Third-stage downloader and malicious DLL â 140426a92c3444d8dc5096c99fa605fd46cb788393c6522c65336d93cb53c6331 (second-stage shellcode), 80b7c8193f287b332b0a3b17369eb7495d737b0e0b4e82c78a69fa587a6bcf91a0f70c9350092b31ae77fc0d66efa007ccacbbc4b9355c877c1f64b29012178c (malicious DLL sideloaded)
- [File Hash ] kkRAT payload â f557a90c1873eeb7f269ae802432f72cc18d5272e13f86784fdc3c38cbaca019
- [Domain/URL ] Phishing and hosting infrastructure â https://github[.]com/sw124456 (phishing pages), https://youdaoselw[.]icu (fake installer page), https://kmhhla[.]top (fake installer page)
- [URL ] Downloader and resource hosting â http://key2025.oss-cn-hongkong.aliyuncs.com/2025.bin, http://key2025.oss-cn-hongkong.aliyuncs.com/output.log, http://key2025.oss-cn-hongkong.aliyuncs.com/trx38.zip
- [IP:Port ] C2 servers â 154.44.30.27:8250 (kkRAT C2), 156.238.238.111:8111 (ValleyRAT C2), 103.199.101.3:8081 (FatalRAT C2)
Read more: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-kkrat