YUREI RANSOMWARE : THE DIGITAL GHOST

YUREI RANSOMWARE : THE DIGITAL GHOST

Yurei Ransomware is a Go-based, professional ransomware family that encrypts files with per-file ChaCha20 keys wrapped by ECIES, appends a .Yurei extension, and implements aggressive anti-forensics (shadow copy and log deletion, secure delete, memory wiping) while spreading via SMB, removable media, and credential-based remote execution. Ransom notes include Tor .onion contact channels and victim tracking for double-extortion; samples and artifacts include YureiRansomware.exe and related PowerShell scripts. #YureiRansomware #YureiSupp

Keypoints

  • Yurei encrypts files using per-file ChaCha20 keys whose symmetric keys are wrapped with an embedded ECIES public key, storing the wrapped key/nonce in the file header separated by 0x7c7c (“||”).
  • The ransomware aggressively disables recovery and forensic options by deleting Volume Shadow Copies and backup catalogs (vssadmin, wbadmin), recursively removing event logs, and timestomping metadata.
  • Propagation methods include SMB network share copying (System32_Backup.exe), removable drive infection disguised as WindowsUpdate.exe, and credential-based lateral execution via PSCredential/CIM/PsExec-style techniques.
  • Anti-forensics and self-cleaning routines perform multi-pass secure deletion of the binary, memory overwrites, console history clearing, and removal of traces to hinder investigation and recovery.
  • Ransom notes (_README_Yurei.txt) provide Tor .onion chat and blog links, Ticket IDs, and YureiSupp tokens for victim tracking and double-extortion negotiations.
  • Static and dynamic analysis show staging in %LOCALAPPDATA%Temp, chunked 2 MiB file encryption to conserve memory, and embedded attacker public key in the binary build metadata.
  • Analysis indicates code reuse from the open-source Prince ransomware (matching encryption scheme, file header layout, symbols), with some inherited flaws and Go-specific concurrency enhancements.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1047 ] Windows Management Instrumentation – Used for remote execution and lateral movement via CIM sessions: “constructs a PSCredential object… opens a CIM session… invokes a remote process … writes the payload to disk and executes it.”
  • [T1059 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter – PowerShell is used to delete backups, purge logs, copy staged payloads, and execute cleanup commands: “PowerShell commands that invoke native Windows utilities to delete backups… Get-ChildItem -Recurse piped to Remove-Item -Force.”
  • [T1106 ] Native API – Calls to native Windows APIs are used for actions such as changing desktop wallpaper via SystemParametersInfo: “SystemParametersInfo(20, 0, path, 3) to change the desktop wallpaper.”
  • [T1129 ] Shared Modules / Get kernel32 base address / PEB access – Binary uses low-level techniques and shared module access patterns during execution and initialization (symbol retention and binary introspection noted in static analysis).
  • [T1543 ] Create or Modify System Process – The malware creates/installs service-like processes and writes masqueraded service binaries (System32_Backup.exe) to support persistence and lateral spread.
  • [T1543.003 ] Windows Service – Writes and attempts to use service-like payloads to maintain execution (creates files in system-like locations and may interact with service mechanisms).
  • [T1006 ] Direct Volume Access – Searches and enumerates available drives for encryption and backup disabling: “getAllDrives to list all local and network drives for encryption.”
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – Uses packing/obfuscation and Go string representation to hinder static analysis and hide embedded strings.
  • [T1027.002 ] Software Packing – Employs packing techniques observed in samples to evade detection and static inspection.
  • [T1036 ] Masquerading – Copies itself to user and root locations using legitimate-looking names such as WindowsUpdate.exe and System32_Backup.exe to blend in: “masquerading as WindowsUpdate.exe.”
  • [T1045 ] Software Packing (local sandbox packer harvesting — unknown) – Local packing observed within samples and YARA rule references to packing patterns.
  • [T1064 ] Scripting – Uses PowerShell scripts for log deletion, backup removal, payload deployment, and lateral movement orchestration.
  • [T1070 ] Indicator Removal – Clears Windows events and logs to remove forensic evidence: “recursively removes Windows event logs and system logs.”
  • [T1070.004 ] File Deletion – Deletes shadow copies and backup catalogs using vssadmin and wbadmin: “vssadmin Delete Shadows /All /Quiet and wbadmin Delete Catalog -Quiet.”
  • [T1070.006 ] Timestomp – Modifies file metadata and creation times to obscure timelines: “modifying file metadata by setting CreationTime (effectively manipulating timestamps).”
  • [T1140 ] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – Performs AES/x86-based deobfuscation routines consistent with decoding packed or obfuscated components.
  • [T1202 ] Indirect Command Execution – Uses legitimate Windows utilities and indirect commands (vssadmin, wbadmin, Get-ChildItem | Remove-Item) to perform destructive actions.
  • [T1562 ] Impair Defenses – Attempts to stop or disable backup and protection services to impede recovery and detection.
  • [T1562.001 ] Disable or Modify Tools – Specifically targets backup and recovery tools and services to disable them.
  • [T1564 ] Hide Artifacts – Uses alternate data streams and hidden file attributes to conceal payloads and artifacts.
  • [T1564.003 ] Hidden Window – Creates processes with hidden windows to run stealthily in the background.
  • [T1564.004 ] NTFS File Attributes – Interacts with NTFS features and ADS to hide or obscure files.
  • [T1003 ] OS Credential Dumping – Harvests credentials and sensitive artifacts from host systems during operations.
  • [T1552 ] Unsecured Credentials – Attempts to harvest mail client data and other stored credentials (Outlook .pst referenced).
  • [T1552.001 ] Credentials in Files – Targets credentials stored in files such as Outlook .pst for collection.
  • [T1012 ] Query Registry – Reads registry values like MachineGuid for fingerprinting and victim identification.
  • [T1016 ] System Network Configuration Discovery – Reads network adapter and configuration information to map the environment.
  • [T1057 ] Process Discovery – Queries running processes to inform lateral movement and evasion logic.
  • [T1082 ] System Information Discovery – Collects memory and volume information prior to encryption.
  • [T1497 ] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion – Uses process count and environment checks to evade analysis environments.
  • [T1005 ] Data from Local System – Collects local data (e.g., Outlook .pst) for potential exfiltration prior to encryption.
  • [T1074 ] Data Staged – Manipulates the recycle bin and staging areas when preparing exfiltration or encryption payloads.
  • [T1114 ] Email Collection – Harvests email-related data for credential or data collection.
  • [T1071 ] Application Layer Protocol – Uses application-layer channels and observed suspicious network indicators for communications and operator interactions.
  • [T1090 ] Proxy – Uses Tor .onion addresses for operator communication and victim negotiation: “Tor .onion chat link… blog .onion.”
  • [T1485 ] Data Destruction – Performs mass deletions and log clearing as destructive impact routines.
  • [T1486 ] Data Encrypted for Impact – Encrypts and renames user files, appending .Yurei to indicate encryption and impact.
  • [T1489 ] Service Stop – Attempts to stop active services to facilitate encryption and disable defenses.
  • [T1490 ] Inhibit System Recovery – Deletes Volume Shadow Copies and disables backups to prevent recovery.

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File Hash ] Malware binaries and scripts – 4f88d3977a24fb160fc3ba69821287a197ae9b04493d705dc2fe939442ba6461 (YureiRansomware.exe), 1263280c916464c2aa755a81b0f947e769c8a735a74a172157257fca340e1cf4 (related sample)
  • <li}[File Name ] Staged scripts/binaries – 3dec9093b6da575c8700a9eb.ps1 (PowerShell staging script), YureiRansomware.exe

  • [File Extension ] Encrypted file marker – .Yurei appended to encrypted files (used across impacted directories)
  • [URL / Onion ] Tor contact and leak sites – fewcriet5rhoy66k6c4cyvb2pqrblxtx4mekj3s5l4jjt4t4kn4vheyd[.]onion (blog) , fewcriet5rhoy66k6c4cyvb2pqrblxtx4mekj3s5l4jjt4t4kn4vheyd[.]onion/chat/777676f8-2313-425f-873a-65c4df8d5def/chat[.]php (chat)
  • [File Header Marker ] Encryption header pattern – 0x7c7c (“||”) delimiter separating wrapped key/nonce from ciphertext (behavioral IOC)
  • [Filename Patterns ] Propagation/persistence artifacts – WindowsUpdate.exe and System32_Backup.exe found on removable drives and SMB shares (and other similarly named drop locations)


Read more: https://www.cyfirma.com/research/yurei-ransomware-the-digital-ghost/