XLoader has returned on macOS as a native C/Objective-C variant masquerading as OfficeNote and signed with an Apple developer signature to bypass trust. It drops a payload, establishes persistence via a Launch Agent, exfiltrates browser and clipboard data, and employs anti-analysis techniques while SentinelOne tracks and protects against this threat. #XLoader #OfficeNote #macOS #SentinelOne #AppleDeveloperSignature
Keypoints
- XLoader re-emerges on macOS in a native build (C/Objective-C) and is signed with an Apple developer signature.
- Masquerades as a legitimate OfficeNote office productivity app distributed via OfficeNote.dmg.
- Drops a payload and installs a persistence agent; uses a Launch Agent to achieve persistence across runs.
- Exfiltrates secrets from browser data (Chrome/Firefox) and reads clipboard content via NSPasteboard APIs.
- Communicates with a C2 using dummy network calls, including DNS resolutions and HTTP requests to multiple hosts/IPs.
- Employs anti-analysis techniques (sleep delays, high-entropy/stripped binaries, and anti-debugging with ptrace PT_DENY_ATTACH).
MITRE Techniques
- [T1116] Code Signing – Signed with an Apple developer signature MAIT JAKHU (54YDV8NU9C) to appear trusted. “The application contained within is signed with the developer signature MAIT JAKHU (54YDV8NU9C).”
- [T1036] Masquerading – Masquerades as an office productivity app called ‘OfficeNote’. “masquerading as an office productivity app called ‘OfficeNote’.”
- [T1543.001] Launch Agent – Persistence via a Launch Agent dropped in the user’s Library folder to differentiate first vs subsequent runs. “a LaunchAgent is dropped in the User’s Library folder. This agent is similar to that used in the previous version of XLoader, providing a start value to the executable.”
- [T1115] Clipboard Data – Steals secrets from the clipboard via NSPasteboard/generalPasteboard. “The malware attempts to steal secrets from the user’s clipboard via the Apple API NSPasteboard and generalPasteboard.”
- [T1555.003] Credentials from Web Browsers – Targets Chrome/Firefox login data to extract credentials. “targeting both Chrome and Firefox browsers, reading the login.json file located in …”
- [T1027] Obfuscated/Compressed Files and Information – Binaries are stripped and exhibit high entropy to thwart static analysis. “The binaries are stripped and exhibit high entropy in an attempt to similarly thwart static analysis.”
- [T1562.001] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools – Anti-debugging by preventing debuggers via ptrace PT_DENY_ATTACH. “prevent debuggers attaching with ptrace’s PT_DENY_ATTACH (0x1f).”
- [T1071.001] Web Protocols – Uses dummy network calls; numerous DNS resolutions and HTTP requests for C2. “XLoader uses a variety of dummy network calls to disguise the real C2. We observed 169 DNS name resolutions and 203 HTTP requests.”
- [T1071.004] DNS – DNS-based C2 lookups to various hosts/IPs. “the malware reaches out to the following suspicious or malicious IP addresses.”
Indicators of Compromise
- [SHA1] Mach-O Payload – 26fd638334c9c1bd111c528745c10d00aa77249d
- [SHA1] Mach-O Dropper – 47cacf7497c92aab6cded8e59d2104215d8fab86
- [SHA1] Disk Image – 5946452d1537cf2a0e28c77fa278554ce631223c
- [SHA1] Mach-O Payload – 958147ab54ee433ac57809b0e8fd94f811d523ba
- [FilePath] ~/73a470tO
- [Developer ID] MAIT JAKHU (54YDV8NU9C)
- [Network] IP Addresses – 23.227.38.74, 62.72.14.220
- [Network] Domains – www.activ-ketodietakjsy620.cloud, www.akrsnamchi.com, and 9 more domains