Velociraptor incident response tool abused for remote access

Velociraptor incident response tool abused for remote access

CTU researchers analyzed an August 2025 intrusion where an attacker deployed legitimate Velociraptor DFIR tooling to stage and run Visual Studio Code with tunneling enabled, likely to create a tunnel to an attacker-controlled C2 and enable remote code execution. The incident used Cloudflare Workers staging domains to host installers and C2 (files.qaubctgg.workers.dev, velo.qaubctgg.workers.dev) and triggered a Taegis alert that enabled containment before likely ransomware deployment. #Velociraptor #VisualStudioCode

Keypoints

  • Attackers used msiexec to download and install Velociraptor from a Cloudflare Workers staging domain (files.qaubctgg.workers.dev).
  • Velociraptor was configured to communicate with the C2 at velo.qaubctgg.workers.dev.
  • An encoded PowerShell command downloaded Visual Studio Code (code.exe) from the same staging folder and executed it with the tunnel option enabled.
  • Visual Studio Code was installed as a service with output redirected to a log file to maintain persistence and enable remote access.
  • Taegis detected the VS Code tunneling activity, prompting Sophos analysts to advise isolating the affected host and other remediations that prevented further attacker objectives.
  • Analysis indicates the activity was likely a precursor to ransomware deployment; defenders should treat unauthorized DFIR or RMM tool use as high-risk.
  • Sophos protections Troj/Agent-BLMR, Troj/BatDl-PL, and Troj/Mdrop-KDK detect related activity; recommended mitigations include EDR, monitoring unexpected tools, restricting access, and backups.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1071] Application Layer Protocol – Used Visual Studio Code tunneling to create a network channel to an attacker-controlled C2 (β€œβ€¦the tool to download and execute Visual Studio Code with the likely intention of creating a tunnel to an attacker-controlled command and control (C2) server.”)
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – msiexec was used to download installers (v2.msi, sc.msi) from the Cloudflare Workers staging domain (β€œβ€¦used the Windows msiexec utility to download an installer (v2.msi) from a Cloudflare Workers domain”).
  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – An encoded PowerShell command was used to download and execute Visual Studio Code (β€œβ€¦used an encoded PowerShell command to download Visual Studio Code (code.exe) … and executed it with the tunnel option enabled.”).
  • [T1543.003] Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service – Visual Studio Code (code.exe) was installed as a service to maintain persistence (β€œThe threat actor installed code.exe as a service and redirected the output to a log file.”).
  • [T1078] Valid Accounts / Use of Legitimate Tools – Abuse of legitimate Velociraptor DFIR tooling to pivot and minimize malicious payloads (β€œβ€¦attackers pivoting to using incident response tools to gain a foothold in a network and minimize the amount of malware they deploy.”).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [Domain ] Staging and C2 domains used to host installers and C2 – files.qaubctgg.workers.dev, velo.qaubctgg.workers.dev
  • <li=”[File name ] Downloaded installer and executable names observed – v2.msi (Velociraptor installer), sc.msi (additional malware), code.exe (Visual Studio Code binary)

    <li=”[Tool/process ] Utilities and tools used in the intrusion – msiexec (used to download/install .msi files), encoded PowerShell command (used to download and execute code.exe)”

    <li=”[Detection names ] Sophos detections for related activity – Troj/Agent-BLMR, Troj/BatDl-PL, Troj/Mdrop-KDK


Read more: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2025/08/26/velociraptor-incident-response-tool-abused-for-remote-access/