Ursnif (Gozi/ISFB) was delivered via a malicious ISO containing a LNK file, leading to a complex execution flow that included a renamed rundll32 and later persistence. The attackers then deployed Cobalt Strike, performed manual discovery, dumped LSASS memory, and moved laterally to a domain controller before broader network access was gained. #Ursnif #CobaltStrike

Keypoints

  • Ursnif was delivered inside an ISO file, with the LNK in the ISO triggering the execution flow and a hidden folder containing a renamed rundll32 (123.com).
  • Persistence was established via a registry Run key (ManagerText) that executed a LNK to a PowerShell script.
  • About four days after infection, a threat actor used a BITS job to download a Cobalt Strike beacon and perform hands-on keyboard actions.
  • Initial host discovery used built-in Windows utilities (ipconfig, systeminfo, net, ping) followed by credential dumping from LSASS memory.
  • Lateral movement targeted a domain controller with Impacket wmiexec.py to run code remotely and transfer Atera/Splashtop installers and a Cobalt Strike beacon over SMB.
  • Later, the attacker proxied RDP via the Cobalt Strike beacon to the domain controller and then connected to multiple hosts across the network, including a backup server.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1218.005] Mshta – The oneliner launched mshta.exe to create an ActiveX object and read a registry value, effectively feeding the payload: β€˜β€¦the oneliner created a new ActiveX object to eval() the content stored in the registry key in the users registry hive.’
  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – The payload used PowerShell to create new aliases (gp and iex) and execute content, e.g. β€˜PowerShell command created additional aliases of common default PowerShell aliases gp (Get-ItemProperty) and iex (Invoke-Expression).’
  • [T1027.004] Compile After Delivery – The Add-Type path invoked csc.exe to compile a class definition during payload execution: β€˜the C# compiler csc.exe is invoked by PowerShell to compile this class definition, which results in the creation of temporary files in %APPDATA%LocalTemp.’
  • [T1547.001] Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder – Persistence via Run key named ManagerText that executes a LNK to run a PowerShell script.
  • [T1055] Process Injection – The attacker injected into various processes and performed shellcode injection: β€˜QueueUserAPC, GetCurrentThreadId, OpenThread, and VirtualAlloc to perform process injection of shellcode stored in Base64.’
  • [T1021.001] Remote Desktop Protocol – Proxied RDP via the Cobalt Strike beacon to the domain controller and then to other hosts.
  • [T1047] Windows Management Instrumentation – wmiexec.py was used to run commands on remote hosts (semi-interactive shell) and to pivot to the domain controller: β€˜Impacket wmiexec.py to execute commands with a semi-interactive shell.’
  • [T1082] System Information Discovery – Automated discovery using commands like ipconfig and systeminfo: β€˜built-in Windows utilities like ipconfig, systeminfo, net, and ping.’
  • [T1057] Process Discovery – Discovery of running processes during hands-on keyboard activity; e.g., β€˜checking running processes on the accessed hosts via taskmanager.’
  • [T1087.002] Domain Account – Use of a Domain Admin-privileged support account observed during the engagement.
  • [T1219] Remote Access Software – Atera and Splashtop MSI installers were used in the attack path.
  • [T1553.005] Mark-of-the-Web Bypass – The ISO/attachment delivery and execution flow included mechanisms commonly used to bypass how files are treated on arrival (implicit in ISO/LNK execution).
  • [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – C2 communication and data exfiltration observed via HTTP POSTs/HTTPS beacon activity to C2.
  • [T1071.001] Web Protocols – Cobalt Strike beacon and HTTP/S interactions observed (HTTP POSTs and domain lookups to *.top domains).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [Domain] Ursnif/C2 domains – superliner.top, denterdrigx.com, internetlined.com, internetlines.in, superlinez.top
  • [IP] Ursnif/C2 endpoints – 193.201.9.199 (HTTPS C2), 62.173.149.7
  • [File] ISO and LNK artifacts – 3488164.iso, 6570872.lnk
  • [Hash] Ursnif-related binaries and components – f7d85c971e9604cc6d2a2ffcac1ee4a3, c6b605a120e0d3f3cbd146bdbc358834
  • [Hash] Additional payload artifacts (examples in analysis) – 16323b3e56a0cbbba742b8d0af8519f53a78c13f9b3473352fcce2d28660cb37
  • [URL] C2/source download – hxxp://193.201.9.199:80/a
  • [User-Agent] HTTP POST masquerade – Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
  • [URL/Domain] HTTP communications to top-level domains – *.top domains observed in C2 traffic

Read more: https://thedfirreport.com/2023/01/09/unwrapping-ursnifs-gifts/