Ursnif (Gozi/ISFB) was delivered via a malicious ISO containing a LNK file, leading to a complex execution flow that included a renamed rundll32 and later persistence. The attackers then deployed Cobalt Strike, performed manual discovery, dumped LSASS memory, and moved laterally to a domain controller before broader network access was gained. #Ursnif #CobaltStrike
Keypoints
- Ursnif was delivered inside an ISO file, with the LNK in the ISO triggering the execution flow and a hidden folder containing a renamed rundll32 (123.com).
- Persistence was established via a registry Run key (ManagerText) that executed a LNK to a PowerShell script.
- About four days after infection, a threat actor used a BITS job to download a Cobalt Strike beacon and perform hands-on keyboard actions.
- Initial host discovery used built-in Windows utilities (ipconfig, systeminfo, net, ping) followed by credential dumping from LSASS memory.
- Lateral movement targeted a domain controller with Impacket wmiexec.py to run code remotely and transfer Atera/Splashtop installers and a Cobalt Strike beacon over SMB.
- Later, the attacker proxied RDP via the Cobalt Strike beacon to the domain controller and then connected to multiple hosts across the network, including a backup server.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1218.005] Mshta β The oneliner launched mshta.exe to create an ActiveX object and read a registry value, effectively feeding the payload: ββ¦the oneliner created a new ActiveX object to eval() the content stored in the registry key in the users registry hive.β
- [T1059.001] PowerShell β The payload used PowerShell to create new aliases (gp and iex) and execute content, e.g. βPowerShell command created additional aliases of common default PowerShell aliases gp (Get-ItemProperty) and iex (Invoke-Expression).β
- [T1027.004] Compile After Delivery β The Add-Type path invoked csc.exe to compile a class definition during payload execution: βthe C# compiler csc.exe is invoked by PowerShell to compile this class definition, which results in the creation of temporary files in %APPDATA%LocalTemp.β
- [T1547.001] Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder β Persistence via Run key named ManagerText that executes a LNK to run a PowerShell script.
- [T1055] Process Injection β The attacker injected into various processes and performed shellcode injection: βQueueUserAPC, GetCurrentThreadId, OpenThread, and VirtualAlloc to perform process injection of shellcode stored in Base64.β
- [T1021.001] Remote Desktop Protocol β Proxied RDP via the Cobalt Strike beacon to the domain controller and then to other hosts.
- [T1047] Windows Management Instrumentation β wmiexec.py was used to run commands on remote hosts (semi-interactive shell) and to pivot to the domain controller: βImpacket wmiexec.py to execute commands with a semi-interactive shell.β
- [T1082] System Information Discovery β Automated discovery using commands like ipconfig and systeminfo: βbuilt-in Windows utilities like ipconfig, systeminfo, net, and ping.β
- [T1057] Process Discovery β Discovery of running processes during hands-on keyboard activity; e.g., βchecking running processes on the accessed hosts via taskmanager.β
- [T1087.002] Domain Account β Use of a Domain Admin-privileged support account observed during the engagement.
- [T1219] Remote Access Software β Atera and Splashtop MSI installers were used in the attack path.
- [T1553.005] Mark-of-the-Web Bypass β The ISO/attachment delivery and execution flow included mechanisms commonly used to bypass how files are treated on arrival (implicit in ISO/LNK execution).
- [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel β C2 communication and data exfiltration observed via HTTP POSTs/HTTPS beacon activity to C2.
- [T1071.001] Web Protocols β Cobalt Strike beacon and HTTP/S interactions observed (HTTP POSTs and domain lookups to *.top domains).
Indicators of Compromise
- [Domain] Ursnif/C2 domains β superliner.top, denterdrigx.com, internetlined.com, internetlines.in, superlinez.top
- [IP] Ursnif/C2 endpoints β 193.201.9.199 (HTTPS C2), 62.173.149.7
- [File] ISO and LNK artifacts β 3488164.iso, 6570872.lnk
- [Hash] Ursnif-related binaries and components β f7d85c971e9604cc6d2a2ffcac1ee4a3, c6b605a120e0d3f3cbd146bdbc358834
- [Hash] Additional payload artifacts (examples in analysis) β 16323b3e56a0cbbba742b8d0af8519f53a78c13f9b3473352fcce2d28660cb37
- [URL] C2/source download β hxxp://193.201.9.199:80/a
- [User-Agent] HTTP POST masquerade β Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
- [URL/Domain] HTTP communications to top-level domains β *.top domains observed in C2 traffic
Read more: https://thedfirreport.com/2023/01/09/unwrapping-ursnifs-gifts/