Untracked Nightmares: The Threats Hiding Behind Commodity Infrastructure

Untracked Nightmares: The Threats Hiding Behind Commodity Infrastructure
Unit 42 uncovered CL-CRI-1171, a long-running pay-per-install campaign that used OfferLoader to distribute multiple payloads through YouTube gaming videos and SEO-poisoned download pages. The operation delivered Insomnia RAT, ARKTunnel, and Docro Hijacker while hiding behind rotational domains, trojanized installers, and gating checks that filtered out scanners and analysts. #OfferLoader #CL-CRI-1171 #InsomniaRAT #ARKTunnel #DocroHijacker

Keypoints

  • CL-CRI-1171 is a pay-per-install infection marketplace that has operated for at least two years and delivered countless payloads through a shared loader.
  • The campaign used two main delivery funnels: YouTube gaming/optimization channels and SEO-poisoned download pages.
  • At least 11 YouTube channels with large followings were used to lure users into downloading malicious “tools” and “optimization packs.”
  • The shared loader, tracked as OfferLoader, used gating and rotational domains to selectively deliver payloads and evade scanners.
  • Three notable payload families were identified: Insomnia RAT, ARKTunnel, and Docro Hijacker.
  • Insomnia RAT deployed both Node.js and Python backdoors, ARKTunnel used bitmap steganography and WebSocket tunneling, and Docro Hijacker hijacked Chrome search behavior and injected monetization code.
  • More than 10,000 distinct loader samples suggest the campaign distributed many more malware combinations than the three observed in the report.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1204.002 ] User Execution: Malicious File – Victims were induced to download and run trojanized installers and archives (‘downloaded a trojanized windirstat.exe installer’, ‘click a top search result that led to a malicious domain’).
  • [T1036 ] Masquerading – Malicious files and infrastructure impersonated legitimate software and services (‘trojanized software downloads’, ‘masquerading as a windirstat.exe installer’, ‘CrowdStrike-typosquat’).
  • [T1055 ] Process Injection – The article describes malicious stages spawning and loading components into execution chains to carry out payload delivery (‘spawns three child processes’, ‘drops and loads Adblock.dll’).
  • [T1053.005 ] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task – Persistence was established with scheduled tasks mimicking legitimate Windows tasks (‘registers a scheduled task named Maps Performance Task’, ‘OOBETaskScheduler’).
  • [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – Payloads and scripts were downloaded from remote hosts during execution (‘download t.ps1’, ‘downloads and sets up the environment needed to execute both backdoors’).
  • [T1218.011 ] System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 – A DLL was dropped and loaded to execute malicious functionality (‘drops and loads Adblock.dll’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – The campaign used Base64, XOR, and steganography to hide configuration and payloads (‘Base64-encoded fingerprint’, ‘LSB steganography’, ‘Base64-decoding followed by an XOR decryption routine’).
  • [T1090 ] Proxy – The WebSocket tunneling RAT supported TCP and UDP tunneling to relay traffic (‘supports TCP and UDP tunneling’).
  • [T1195.002 ] Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain – The operation distributed trojanized legitimate utilities to infect users (‘Bluetooth driver’, ‘WinDirStat’, ‘legitimate application’).
  • [T1566.002 ] Phishing: Spearphishing Link – Users were lured through links in video descriptions and redirect chains (‘links in the description’, ‘intermediary sites’).
  • [T1112 ] Modify Registry – The malware altered registry values to hide software and support persistence (‘setting SystemComponent=1 in the registry’).
  • [T1057 ] Process Discovery – Collected system identifiers and environment details from victims (‘MachineGuid, hostname and operating system details’).
  • [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Results and telemetry were sent back through the command-and-control channel (‘Results are reported back to the /e endpoint’, ‘Install telemetry is reported’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [SHA256 hashes ] OfferLoader and staged payload samples – 7f792c45de1e28fd42ac44c9444f157a2161742d130bac336c0e991aabbb112c, fc485882626512e7ff82a1d7cd8e8fb3e9751b026d97e682d6908aefff1f2d73, and other 9 hashes.
  • [SHA256 hashes ] Insomnia RAT components – 3052bd320a34e12ee694811ed0578797477dfd480c664491e509ed15ce1a6961, 62d49d0c78207ec2452cc8a30501db771c9edbae89889e41a7dd227551243e8e, and other 4 hashes.
  • [SHA256 hashes ] ARKTunnel components – aaebc8c07de485be6d1bfa956668c5e18aa1ff5588dfe84672e20ae90b4560f1, b367762140ae7f5098230b8a5da738c9241f286281ec9439dd6ca581fc87989c, and other 2 hashes.
  • [SHA256 hashes ] Docro Hijacker components – 2c6e11027b011042c9a118fc20728f8f4ebb6be8795cc84cc9a45622c297d354, fdcc95b7791c0d6590dcf1a412dc9fcc92ad2095818d1b78368b31efad012007, and other 1 hash.
  • [Domains and URLs ] C2, update, and delivery infrastructure – stryper[.]info, aa.amazingshield[.]xyz, crowdstri[.]com, reg.pcsdkflyer[.]ca, vendralo[.]info, drelto[.]info, mqsearch[.]com, extentrack[.]com.
  • [Domains ] Install trackers and gating hosts – voyagemist[.]space, statementtouch[.]xyz, chawton[.]info, noiseship[.]cfd, atthelake[.]info, and other rotational landing domains.
  • [File names ] Malware and loader artifacts – windirstat.exe, windirstat.tmp, eld0.exe, eld1.exe, eld2.exe, Adblock.dll, t.ps1, aa.js, procorTrex.zip, wscl.exe.
  • [YouTube channels ] Delivery accounts used in the campaign – @VelvoxYT, @Venrx, @RAVEX-wu1pg, @adex915, @ripex, and other 6 channels.


Read more: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ppi-network-malware-campaign-analysis/