Unit 42 uncovered CL-CRI-1171, a long-running pay-per-install campaign that used OfferLoader to distribute multiple payloads through YouTube gaming videos and SEO-poisoned download pages. The operation delivered Insomnia RAT, ARKTunnel, and Docro Hijacker while hiding behind rotational domains, trojanized installers, and gating checks that filtered out scanners and analysts. #OfferLoader #CL-CRI-1171 #InsomniaRAT #ARKTunnel #DocroHijacker
Keypoints
- CL-CRI-1171 is a pay-per-install infection marketplace that has operated for at least two years and delivered countless payloads through a shared loader.
- The campaign used two main delivery funnels: YouTube gaming/optimization channels and SEO-poisoned download pages.
- At least 11 YouTube channels with large followings were used to lure users into downloading malicious âtoolsâ and âoptimization packs.â
- The shared loader, tracked as OfferLoader, used gating and rotational domains to selectively deliver payloads and evade scanners.
- Three notable payload families were identified: Insomnia RAT, ARKTunnel, and Docro Hijacker.
- Insomnia RAT deployed both Node.js and Python backdoors, ARKTunnel used bitmap steganography and WebSocket tunneling, and Docro Hijacker hijacked Chrome search behavior and injected monetization code.
- More than 10,000 distinct loader samples suggest the campaign distributed many more malware combinations than the three observed in the report.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1204.002 ] User Execution: Malicious File â Victims were induced to download and run trojanized installers and archives (âdownloaded a trojanized windirstat.exe installerâ, âclick a top search result that led to a malicious domainâ).
- [T1036 ] Masquerading â Malicious files and infrastructure impersonated legitimate software and services (âtrojanized software downloadsâ, âmasquerading as a windirstat.exe installerâ, âCrowdStrike-typosquatâ).
- [T1055 ] Process Injection â The article describes malicious stages spawning and loading components into execution chains to carry out payload delivery (âspawns three child processesâ, âdrops and loads Adblock.dllâ).
- [T1053.005 ] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task â Persistence was established with scheduled tasks mimicking legitimate Windows tasks (âregisters a scheduled task named Maps Performance Taskâ, âOOBETaskSchedulerâ).
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer â Payloads and scripts were downloaded from remote hosts during execution (âdownload t.ps1â, âdownloads and sets up the environment needed to execute both backdoorsâ).
- [T1218.011 ] System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 â A DLL was dropped and loaded to execute malicious functionality (âdrops and loads Adblock.dllâ).
- [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information â The campaign used Base64, XOR, and steganography to hide configuration and payloads (âBase64-encoded fingerprintâ, âLSB steganographyâ, âBase64-decoding followed by an XOR decryption routineâ).
- [T1090 ] Proxy â The WebSocket tunneling RAT supported TCP and UDP tunneling to relay traffic (âsupports TCP and UDP tunnelingâ).
- [T1195.002 ] Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain â The operation distributed trojanized legitimate utilities to infect users (âBluetooth driverâ, âWinDirStatâ, âlegitimate applicationâ).
- [T1566.002 ] Phishing: Spearphishing Link â Users were lured through links in video descriptions and redirect chains (âlinks in the descriptionâ, âintermediary sitesâ).
- [T1112 ] Modify Registry â The malware altered registry values to hide software and support persistence (âsetting SystemComponent=1 in the registryâ).
- [T1057 ] Process Discovery â Collected system identifiers and environment details from victims (âMachineGuid, hostname and operating system detailsâ).
- [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel â Results and telemetry were sent back through the command-and-control channel (âResults are reported back to the /e endpointâ, âInstall telemetry is reportedâ).
Indicators of Compromise
- [SHA256 hashes ] OfferLoader and staged payload samples â 7f792c45de1e28fd42ac44c9444f157a2161742d130bac336c0e991aabbb112c, fc485882626512e7ff82a1d7cd8e8fb3e9751b026d97e682d6908aefff1f2d73, and other 9 hashes.
- [SHA256 hashes ] Insomnia RAT components â 3052bd320a34e12ee694811ed0578797477dfd480c664491e509ed15ce1a6961, 62d49d0c78207ec2452cc8a30501db771c9edbae89889e41a7dd227551243e8e, and other 4 hashes.
- [SHA256 hashes ] ARKTunnel components â aaebc8c07de485be6d1bfa956668c5e18aa1ff5588dfe84672e20ae90b4560f1, b367762140ae7f5098230b8a5da738c9241f286281ec9439dd6ca581fc87989c, and other 2 hashes.
- [SHA256 hashes ] Docro Hijacker components â 2c6e11027b011042c9a118fc20728f8f4ebb6be8795cc84cc9a45622c297d354, fdcc95b7791c0d6590dcf1a412dc9fcc92ad2095818d1b78368b31efad012007, and other 1 hash.
- [Domains and URLs ] C2, update, and delivery infrastructure â stryper[.]info, aa.amazingshield[.]xyz, crowdstri[.]com, reg.pcsdkflyer[.]ca, vendralo[.]info, drelto[.]info, mqsearch[.]com, extentrack[.]com.
- [Domains ] Install trackers and gating hosts â voyagemist[.]space, statementtouch[.]xyz, chawton[.]info, noiseship[.]cfd, atthelake[.]info, and other rotational landing domains.
- [File names ] Malware and loader artifacts â windirstat.exe, windirstat.tmp, eld0.exe, eld1.exe, eld2.exe, Adblock.dll, t.ps1, aa.js, procorTrex.zip, wscl.exe.
- [YouTube channels ] Delivery accounts used in the campaign â @VelvoxYT, @Venrx, @RAVEX-wu1pg, @adex915, @ripex, and other 6 channels.
Read more: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ppi-network-malware-campaign-analysis/