Unleashing the Kraken ransomware group

Unleashing the Kraken ransomware group

Cisco Talos observed the Russian-speaking Kraken ransomware group (linked to HelloKitty) conducting big-game hunting and double-extortion attacks using SMB exploitation for initial access, Cloudflared for persistence, and SSHFS for data exfiltration before deploying cross-platform encryptors that append .zpsc and drop a “readme_you_ws_hacked.txt” ransom note. Kraken benchmarks victim machines to choose full or partial encryption, targets Windows, Linux, and ESXi (including SQL and VM files), and announced an underground forum “The Last Haven Board” tied to HelloKitty and WeaCorp. #Kraken #HelloKitty

Keypoints

  • Kraken, a Russian-speaking ransomware group emerging from HelloKitty remnants, uses double extortion and operates a public data leak site; victims span multiple countries including the US, UK, Canada, Denmark, Panama, and Kuwait.
  • Initial access observed by Talos involved exploiting internet-exposed SMB vulnerabilities, followed by credential theft and re-entry via RDP using privileged accounts.
  • Attackers established persistence using Cloudflared reverse tunnels and used SSHFS to navigate and exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption.
  • Kraken is cross-platform with distinct encryptors for Windows (32-bit), Linux/ESXi (64-bit), and VMware ESXi, appending the .zpsc extension and dropping “readme_you_ws_hacked.txt”.
  • The ransomware implements encryption benchmarking (performance tests) to decide full vs. partial encryption and supports targeted modules for SQL databases, network shares, local drives, Hyper-V/VMs.
  • Extensive anti-analysis and anti-recovery measures are used: control-flow obfuscation, sandbox evasion (sleep delays), disabling WoW64 redirection, privilege elevation, stopping backup services, deleting restore points, and multi-stage self-deletion.
  • Kraken provides many command-line options for attackers (e.g., -timeout, -solid, -limit, -noteonly, -tempfile, -tempsize) and includes operational flexibility for remote execution and selective encryption.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1210] Exploitation of Remote Services – Kraken exploited SMB vulnerabilities on internet-exposed servers for initial access (“the Kraken actor gained initial access to the victim’s machine by exploiting an existing vulnerability in the SMB service on servers exposed to the internet”).
  • [T1078] Valid Accounts – The actor extracted valid administrator and privileged account credentials and re-entered via Remote Desktop using those credentials (“they extracted valid administrators’ and other privileged accounts’ credentials… re-entered the victim environment through a Remote Desktop connection using the exfiltrated privileged account credentials”).
  • [T1098] Account Manipulation (persistence via external service) – Established persistent access by installing Cloudflared and configuring a reverse tunnel on the victim machine (“installed the Cloudflared tool and configuring a reverse tunnel on the victim’s machine”).
  • [T1048] Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol – Used SSHFS to navigate the environment and exfiltrate sensitive data (“installed the SSHFS tool on the victim machine, utilizing it to navigate the victim’s environment and exfiltrate sensitive data”).
  • [T1486] Data Encrypted for Impact – Deployed Kraken encryptors across Windows, Linux, and ESXi to encrypt files and append .zpsc, with ransom notes (“Kraken encrypts the victim’s environment, uses the .zpsc file extension for the encrypted files, and drops a ransom note titled ‘readme_you_ws_hacked.txt’”).
  • [T1112] Modify Registry (to find SQL data paths) – The SQL encryption module queries SQL Server registry keys to locate database file paths (“the module accesses the Microsoft SQL Server registry keys… retrieving the ‘SQLDataRoot’ registry value to determine the path to the database files”).
  • [T1490] Inhibit System Recovery – The ransomware stops backup services and deletes restore points (“stops the backup services, and executes the embedded command to remove all restore points… vssadmin delete shadows /all /quite”).
  • [T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (anti-analysis/obfuscation) – Kraken employs control-flow obfuscation and other anti-analysis techniques to hinder detection and analysis (“employs extensive control flow obfuscation with multiple conditional loops throughout the code”).
  • [T1070] Indicator Removal on Host – Performs multi-stage self-deletion and cleanup to remove logs, history, and binaries (“creates a bash script ‘_bye_bye_.sh’ … delete the log files, shell history, ransomware binary, and the script itself”).
  • [T1499] Endpoint Denial of Service (stopping VMs) – For ESXi and Hyper-V, the ransomware force-stops VMs to unlock files for encryption (“forcefully stops all running virtual machines” / “esxcli vm process kill –type=force –world-id=”).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File extension] Encrypted file marker – .zpsc (used by Kraken to mark encrypted files)
  • [Ransom note filename] Ransom note – readme_you_ws_hacked.txt (dropped by Kraken to instruct victims)
  • [Tool names] Tools used in intrusion – Cloudflared (persistence), SSHFS (exfiltration)
  • [Commands / Artifacts] Anti-recovery and cleanup commands – ‘vssadmin delete shadows /all /quite’, creation of ‘_bye_bye_.sh’ script
  • [Snort SIDs / detections] Detection signatures – Snort SIDs 65480, 65479; ClamAV detections Win.Ransomware.Kraken-10056931-0, Unix.Ransomware.Kraken-10057031-0


Read more: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/kraken-ransomware-group/