Cybereason’s Threat Analysis chronicles an IcedID (BokBot) campaign, detailing its use as a dropper and initial access tool, TTPs, and post-compromise activity across a Windows environment. The report notes a shift to ISO/LNK infection vectors, cross-group technique sharing, and extensive credential theft, discovery, and exfiltration stages. #IcedID #BokBot #TA551 #CobaltStrike #Kerberoasting #AteraAgent
Keypoints
- Standardized attack flow: recon, credential theft, lateral movement, then executing Cobalt Strike on the compromised host.
- Techniques borrowed from Conti, LockBit, FiveHands, and others, showing cross-group idea sharing and aiding detection strategies.
- Initial infection vector shifted from macros to ISO/LNK files due to changes in Microsoft defenses.
- IcedID acts as a dropper and persistence mechanism, with later use of Cobalt Strike beacons across the network.
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MITRE Techniques
- [T1204] User Execution – The victim opens an archive and clicks an ISO file, which leads to an LNK file. ‘Victim opens an archive.’
- [T1059.003] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Batch – The batch file drops a DLL and uses rundll32.exe for execution. ‘The batch file calls xcopy.exe to copy and drop the DLL into the %TEMP% directory where it gets executed with rundll32.exe and a command line argument “#1”…’
- [T1218.011] Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 – DLL loaded by Rundll32 to execute IcedID components. ‘Rundll32.exe loads the DLL, which creates network connections to IcedID-related domains, downloading the IcedID payload.’
- [T1047] Windows Management Instrumentation – Lateral movement via WMI with ‘process call create’ to run db.dll on remote hosts. ‘Wmic.exe with the “process call create” arguments to execute a remote file “db.dll” on the remote workstation.’
- [T1059.001] PowerShell – Use of a Base64 encoded PowerShell to download additional files. ‘PowerDEF.bat executes a Base64 encoded powershell that downloads additional files.’
- [T1082] System Information Discovery – OS/AD discovery commands, e.g., ‘systeminfo’ and net.exe usage to gather system data.
- [T1069.002] Domain Groups Discovery – Discovery of Domain Admins via ‘net group “Domain Admins” /domain’.
- [T1046] Network Service Scanning – Network discovery with Netscan.exe to locate hosts. ‘Netscan.exe used to locate additional hosts for lateral movement.’
- [T1558.003] Kerberoasting – Kerberoasting to pull service account hashes using Rubeus. ‘Kerberoasting (MITRE ATT&CK ID: T1558.003) to pull the hashes of service accounts on the domain.’
- [T1003.006] DCSync – Domain Controller Secrets via DCSync to obtain password hashes. ‘DCSync attacks (MITRE ATT&CK ID: T1003.006) allow an attacker to impersonate a domain controller and request password hashes.’
- [T1555.003] Credentials in Web Browsers – Browser hooking to steal credentials/cookies. ‘IcedID is known to attempt to hook into browsers such as Firefox or Chrome to attempt to steal credentials, cookies, and saved information.’
- [T1567.002] Exfiltration to Cloud Storage – Exfiltration via rclone to Mega. ‘renamed copies of the popular rclone file syncing software to encrypt and sync several directories to the Mega file sharing service.’
- [T1053.005] Scheduled Task – Persistence via scheduled tasks created by MSRPC to run xaeywn1.dll. ‘MSRPC call indicating the creation of a scheduled task … to execute xaeywn1.dll every hour and at each logon.’
Indicators of Compromise
- [Domain] crhonofire.info – Cobalt Strike-related beacon activity and payload delivery
- [Domain] dimabup.com – Cobalt Strike command and control server
- [Domain] blackleaded.tattoo – IcedID-related HTTP/S traffic
- [Domain] curioasshop.pics – IcedID traffic and payload delivery
- [Domain] cerupedi.com – IcedID-related infrastructure
- [File] xaeywn1.dll – IcedID main payload loaded by Rundll32
- [File] homesteading.dll – DLL loaded by Rundll32 (IcedID component)
- [File] license.dat – Decrypts the IcedID payload
- [File] dealing.bat – Initial batch file observed in the infection chain
- [File] init_dll_64.dll – Decrypted IcedID main bot loaded into memory
- [File] power.bat / powerDEF.bat – Downloaders for additional payloads
- [File] 2.txt / 2.exe – Retrieved after Base64 PowerShell execution
- [Domain] dimabup[.]com – C2 domain
Read more: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-from-icedid-to-domain-compromise