Technical Analysis of Zloader Updates

Technical Analysis of Zloader Updates

Zloader, a Zeus-based modular trojan, reemerged in 2023 with enhanced obfuscation, anti-analysis checks, updated DNS tunneling protocol, and WebSocket support, shifting from wide banking-focused campaigns to targeted initial-access operations that enable ransomware deployment. New versions (2.11.6.0 and 2.13.7.0) add generic filenames (Updater.exe/Updater.dll), LDAP-based discovery commands for lateral movement, and a custom Base32+XOR DNS C2 encryption scheme. #Zloader #Zeus

Keypoints

  • Zloader reappeared in September 2023 with significant enhancements to obfuscation, DGA removal, DNS tunneling, and network communication including WebSockets.
  • New anti-analysis techniques include required filename checks (now supporting generic Updater.exe and Updater.dll) and additional XOR-based integer obfuscation layers to hinder sandbox analysis.
  • Zloader checks process integrity level and avoids running with high/system integrity, installing to %APPDATA% for medium integrity and %PROGRAMFILES% for system integrity to evade detection.
  • Static configuration changes include relocating SNI and DNS nameserver to the end of the C2 domain and representing DNS resolvers in a mini JSON format (proto, ip, port, qps).
  • Interactive shell expanded with LDAP functions (e.g., ldap_search_s, ldap_get_values) to improve network discovery and lateral movement capabilities.
  • DNS C2 protocol replaced TLS-within-DNS with Base32-encoded payloads and a custom XOR-based decoding using a per-session DWORD-derived final key; payloads then use VisualEncrypt + RC4 + RSA for transport parity with HTTPS messages.
  • Zscaler detects Zloader with signatures such as Win64.Downloader.Zloader and published IOCs including sample SHA256 hashes and C2 domains, noting Zloader’s targeted deployment model.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1059] Command and Scripting Interpreter – Zloader’s interactive shell allows execution of commands, deploying payloads and running shellcode (“interactive shell commands allow a threat actor to execute commands, deploy second-stage malware payloads, run shellcode”).
  • [T1005] Data from Local System – Exfiltration capabilities are supported via the shell (“…as well as identify and terminate specific processes” and “exfiltrate data”).
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – Zloader supports deploying second-stage payloads via its interactive shell (“deploy second-stage malware payloads”).
  • [T1078] Valid Accounts (credential use for LDAP) – LDAP functions used for network discovery and lateral movement indicate use of directory access and potential credential use (“ldap_bind_s authenticates and binds to the LDAP server”).
  • [T1218] Signed Binary Proxy Execution (Indicator: filename checks) – Use of specific expected filenames and addition of Updater.exe/Updater.dll to control execution environments (“previously expected to be run with a specific hardcoded filename… two generic filenames are Updater.exe and Updater.dll”).
  • [T1498] Network Denial of Service (evasion via protocol blending) – Use of WebSockets and blending with legitimate web traffic to evade detection (“introduced WebSockets… designed to further blend in with legitimate web-based traffic to bypass network-based detections”).
  • [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Custom DNS tunneling and encrypted channels used to send/receive payloads and exfiltrate data (“Zloader DNS tunnel header… payloads use VisualEncrypt + RC4 + RSA”).
  • [T1573] Encrypted Channel – Zloader uses custom Base32 + XOR encryption for DNS C2 and layered encryption (VisualEncrypt + RC4 + RSA) for payloads (“replaces TLS… with Base32 encoding layered on top of a custom encryption algorithm” and “payload is first encrypted using the Zeus VisualEncrypt algorithm, followed by RC4 and RSA”).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File Hash] Zloader sample SHA256 – 86ffd411b42d8d06bdb294f48e79393adeea586c56c5c75c1a68ce6315932881, 01fc5c5fd03b793437ed707233d067b330fb68a2de87e9d8607c6b75caca6356
  • [Domain] HTTPS C2 servers – adsemail.com, adsmarks.com
  • [Domain] DNS C2 server – dt1.automotosport.net
  • [File Name] Malware execution filenames – Updater.exe, Updater.dll (used as generic allowed filenames to bypass sandbox filename checks)

Read more: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-zloader-updates