Technical Analysis of Lucid Stealer : Execution, Capabilities, and C2 Infrastructure

Technical Analysis of Lucid Stealer : Execution, Capabilities, and C2 Infrastructure
Lucid Stealer is a Node.js SEA-based information-stealing malware that hides its payload with encryption, obfuscation, false certificate-like data, and UAC bypass behavior while collecting browser credentials, wallet data, Discord tokens, screenshots, and keystrokes. It uses PowerShell, a malicious Node.js native module, and WebSocket/HTTP POST communication to contact lucidstealer[.]one, with the analysis also noting shared infrastructure containing AsyncRAT and promotion through a Telegram channel. #LucidStealer #Nodejs #AsyncRAT #Telegram

Keypoints

  • Lucid Stealer is an information-stealing malware that targets browser data, cryptocurrency wallets, Discord artifacts, screenshots, and keystrokes.
  • The malware disguises itself as the Node.js JavaScript Runtime and uses the Node.js SEA framework to conceal its malicious payload.
  • It employs anti-analysis measures including encrypted payloads, obfuscated resources, false ASN.1/DER certificate-like structures, and hidden artifacts.
  • Execution involves PowerShell, Add-Type, csc.exe, and a malicious native module renamed to bridge_cfg.node to support data theft and other functions.
  • The sample attempts privilege escalation via UAC bypass behavior and hides its working directory using Hidden and System attributes.
  • It communicates with lucidstealer[.]one over WebSocket and HTTP POST endpoints to upload harvested data and send metadata, though the observed requests received HTTP 403 responses.
  • Directory listings on the C2 server showed AsyncRAT, suggesting shared infrastructure or multiple malware families used by the same operator.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1204.002 ] User Execution: Malicious File – The malware is delivered as a disguised executable and relies on the victim running it (‘distributed under the guise of legitimate software’).
  • [T1059.001 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell – Used to hide the window, compile C# code, keylog, and decrypt DPAPI-protected data (‘executed a PowerShell command’, ‘Add-Type cmdlet’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – Payloads are encrypted/obfuscated and reconstructed at runtime to hinder analysis (‘encrypted and obfuscated payload components’).
  • [T1036 ] Masquerading – The sample pretends to be the legitimate Node.js JavaScript Runtime (‘masquerading as the Node.js JavaScript Runtime’).
  • [T1564.001 ] Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories – The malware marks its working directory hidden/system to avoid visibility (‘attrib +h +s’).
  • [T1555.003 ] Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers – Steals saved browser passwords, cookies, autofill, and other browser-stored data (‘collect browser credentials’).
  • [T1056.001 ] Input Capture: Keylogging – A PowerShell routine polls keyboard state to record keystrokes (‘continuously monitored keyboard input’).
  • [T1057 ] Process Discovery – Enumerates running processes to identify browsers and Discord (‘enumerates running processes’).
  • [T1005 ] Data from Local System – Collects local browser, wallet, Discord, and screenshot data prior to exfiltration (‘data collection phase’).
  • [T1113 ] Screen Capture – Captures a desktop screenshot using a native routine (‘captured a screenshot of the victim’s desktop’).
  • [T1548.002 ] Bypass User Account Control – Launches itself with -Verb RunAs to trigger a UAC prompt and gain elevation (‘Start-Process … -Verb RunAs’).
  • [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Attempts to send harvested ZIP data and metadata to the C2 using HTTP POST/WebSocket (‘upload the collected ZIP archive’).
  • [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – Uses HTTP POST and WebSocket communications for C2 activity (‘WebSocket handshake’, ‘HTTP POST request’).
  • [T1657 ] Financial Theft – Targets cryptocurrency wallets and payment card information (‘cryptocurrency wallet information’, ‘payment card information’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [SHA-256 ] Lucid Stealer executable and related artifacts – 054ed7761c96210e31e3cae2a476cad18ba645ebc70b6c2e3cffdfe18cf6011a, cdba69887866a484276b35a818f5604047fb7369eec687af803752a6dcd0e885, and 2 more hashes
  • [Domain ] C2 and upload infrastructure – lucidstealer[.]one
  • [IP address ] C2 resolution and OSINT-related infrastructure – 172[.]67[.]157[.]161, 104[.]21[.]8[.]179, and 2 more IPs
  • [Directory ] Persistent and temporary working directories – C:Users[user-name]AppDataLocalTempMicrosoft82c88d32, C:Users[user-name]AppDataLocalTempMicrosoft82c88d32data-
  • [File ] Dropped and logged artifacts – C:Users[user-name]AppDataLocalTempMicrosoft82c88d32deps.zip, C:Users[user-name]AppDataLocalTempLUCID_native_loader.log
  • [URL ] C2 endpoints used for upload, logging, and WebSocket communication – http[:]//lucidstealer[.]one/api/upload, http[:]//lucidstealer[.]one/api/internal/log, and http[:]//lucidstealer[.]one/ws
  • [File name ] Executables and native module names observed during analysis – node.exe, bridge_cfg.node, and Nioxbaba.exe


Read more: https://www.cyfirma.com/research/technical-analysis-of-lucid-stealer-execution-capabilities-and-c2-infrastructure/