Technical Analysis of AZORult Malware on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog

AZORult is a sophisticated credential and payment card stealer that also acts as a downloader for other malware, with evolution from Delphi to C++ and added .bit domain support. The analysis highlights its evasion, persistence, and multi-domain/IP activity observed in ANY.RUN sandbox sessions, including its interactions with Ramnit and Chthonic. Hashtags: #AZORult #Ramnit #Chthonic #ANYRUN #Delphi #CPlusPlus #BitDomains

Keypoints

  • AZORult steals credentials and payment card data and can function as a downloader for other malware families.
  • Its evolution includes a Delphi origin, a C++ rewrite, and now support for .bit domains (version 2).
  • It employs evasion techniques such as anti-debugging, registry manipulation, and environment-based checks to complicate detection.
  • The malware communicates with multiple IP addresses and a domain, indicating broad network Reach and potential for wide damage.
  • It relies on Windows API calls (e.g., SHGetFolderPathW, GetTempPathW, GetProcAddress, LoadLibraryA) to obtain resources, persist, and load functionality.
  • AZORult has been observed operating alongside Chthonic and deployed by Ramnit; analysis was conducted via ANY.RUN sandbox.
  • The Any.RUN analysis reveals detailed behaviors, including payload deployment, registry activity, and dynamic code loading.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – The malware uses a hidden PowerShell command to run a script: β€œpowershell.exe” -windowstyle hidden β€œ$Nummmeret=Get-Content β€˜C:UsersadminAppDataLocalTempforgrovelsekonstituerendesPrintermanualens.Ear’;$Trojanerens=$Nummmeret.SubString(42833,3);.$Trojanerens($Nummmeret) β€œ.
  • [T1059] Command and Scripting Interpreter – The sample relies on scripting/command execution flow (PowerShell usage shown above).
  • [T1106] Native API – It uses LoadLibraryA and GetProcAddress to resolve APIs: β€œLoadLibraryA and GetProcAddress to resolve these APIs.”
  • [T1112] Modify Registry – The malware queries, deletes, and modifies some registry keys and uses registry-based persistence.
  • [T1547] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution – Persistence via registry-related autostart mechanisms.
  • [T1574] Hijack Execution Flow – The code shows attempts to alter execution flow, including DLL side-loading strategies.
  • [T1574.002] DLL Side-Loading – The malware leverages DLL loading techniques to gain execution or capabilities.
  • [T1055] Process Injection – The sample’s behavior includes process-level manipulation to inject or influence other processes.
  • [T1070] Indicator Removal – The malware includes steps to cover its tracks and reduce artifact visibility.
  • [T1070.006] Timestomp – Time-stamping techniques to obscure timeline evidence.
  • [T1027] Obfuscated Files or Information – Obfuscation/packing techniques are used to hinder analysis.
  • [T1027.002] Software Packing – The sample employs packing methods as part of defense evasion.
  • [T1027.009] Embedded Payloads – Payloads are embedded within the sample to complicate analysis.
  • [T1036] Masquerading – The malware uses masquerading techniques to blend with legitimate artifacts.
  • [T1552] Credentials in Registry – Sensitive credentials may be located/read from registry locations.
  • [T1003] OS Credential Dumping – Credentials token operations and elevation-related actions are observed.
  • [T1010] Application Window Discovery – Discovery of application windows as part of environment reconnaissance.
  • [T1012] Query Registry – Registry queries are used to glean system/config information.
  • [T1018] Remote System Discovery – The malware enumerates or interacts with remote systems as part of its spread.
  • [T1057] Process Discovery – The malware checks running processes to understand the system state.
  • [T1082] System Information Discovery – System information gathering is performed to tailor actions.
  • [T1083] File and Directory Discovery – The malware locates relevant files/directories for operation.
  • [T1518] Software Discovery – Identification of software on the host to adapt behavior.
  • [T1518.001] Security Software Discovery – Detection of security software to avoid analysis/detection.
  • [T1071] Application Layer Protocol – Network communication uses application-layer protocols for C2 or data exfiltration.
  • [T1095] Non-Application Layer Protocol – Uses non-application-layer protocols for covert traffic.
  • [T1573] Encrypted Channel – Some communications may be encrypted to evade network monitoring.
  • [T1529] System Shutdown/Reboot – The malware can trigger or exploit shutdown/restart scenarios for persistence or impact.

Indicators of Compromise

  • [MD5 Hash] 0824428fdccf3c63fc1ca19a1dd7ef74 – MD5 hash of the payload/sample referenced in the analysis.
  • [Domain] ehzwq.shop – DNS request observed by AZORult during activity.
  • [Domain] r10.o.lencr.org – DNS request observed by AZORult during activity.
  • [Domain] t-ring-fdv2.msedge.net – DNS request observed by AZORult during activity.
  • [IP Address] 108.167.181.251 – One of the observed outbound connections.
  • [IP Address] 20.166.126.56 – Another observed outbound connection.
  • [IP Address] 52.168.117.175 – Another observed outbound connection.
  • [IP Address] 20.223.35.26 – Another observed outbound connection.
  • [Hash] 90a82defe606e51d2826265a43737130682b738241700782d7e41188475b7fb7 – Sample hash noted in the analysis.
  • [File Name] Declinometer235.exe – Main AZORult payload dropped by the sample.
  • [File Path/Registry] HKEY_CURRENT_USERControl PanelDesktopResourceLocale – Registry key the sample queries.
  • [Certificate] Certificate issued by Pretermit Brunbejdsedes – Digital certificate associated with the sample.

Read more: https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/cybersecurity-blog/azorult-malware-analysis/