Team46 and TaxOff: two sides of the same coin

Team46 and TaxOff: two sides of the same coin

In March 2025, the TaxOff group exploited a Google Chrome zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-2783) to deploy the Trinper backdoor via phishing emails. Evidence strongly suggests that TaxOff and Team46 are the same threat actor, sharing similar tactics, techniques, and malware. #TaxOff #Team46 #Trinper #CVE20252783

Keypoints

  • In March 2025, TaxOff exploited Google Chrome zero-day CVE-2025-2783 with phishing emails delivering the Trinper backdoor.
  • The attack chain involved malicious links disguised as forum invitations and fake websites hosting the exploit.
  • Similar attacks dating back to September and October 2024 used phishing emails, DLL hijacking, and malicious PowerShell scripts.
  • Analysis shows TaxOff and Team46 share nearly identical infrastructure, malware loaders, PowerShell commands, and encryption techniques.
  • The malware uses multiple layers of encryption and system-specific keys like firmware UUIDs to ensure execution only on targeted systems.
  • TaxOff/Team46 leverage advanced evasion techniques including debugger detection, sandbox evasion, and process injection with Cobalt Strike and donut loaders.
  • The group uses custom .NET tools for system reconnaissance and collects sensitive data including keystrokes and clipboard content.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1588.005] Obtain Capabilities: Exploits – Team46 used the CVE-2025-2783 exploit for system compromise. (“Team46 used a CVE-2025-2783 exploit for system compromise”)
  • [T1566.002] Phishing: Spearphishing Link – Phishing emails contained links to sites hosting exploits or loaders. (“Team46 used phishing emails containing a link to a website with CVE-2025-2783 and an archive with a malicious shortcut loader”)
  • [T1059.001] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell – PowerShell was used to download payloads and execute scripts. (“Team46 uses PowerShell to download intermediate payloads and the main payload”)
  • [T1106] Native API – Donut shellcode used for code injection. (“Team46 uses donut shellcode to download and inject code”)
  • [T1204.001] User Execution: Malicious Link – Users were tricked into clicking malicious links in phishing emails. (“Team46 sends out phishing emails with a link to trick users into clicking it”)
  • [T1204.002] User Execution: Malicious File – Decoy files delivered and executed backdoors. (“Team46 used decoy files to run the Trinper and Dante backdoors”)
  • [T1055] Process Injection – Cobalt Strike used to inject payloads into processes. (“Team46 used Cobalt Strike to inject various malicious payloads into processes”)
  • [T1027] Obfuscated Files or Information – Loaders used control flow flattening. (“Team46’s loader used control flow flattening”)
  • [T1055.012] Process Injection: Process Hollowing – Trinper backdoor injects code into processes. (“Team46 used the Trinper backdoor to inject code into processes”)
  • [T1070.004] Indicator Removal: File Deletion – Dante backdoor self-deletes based on registry key. (“Dante backdoor has a self-deletion feature triggered by a ‘deadline’ registry key”)
  • [T1070.009] Indicator Removal: Clear Persistence – Self-deletion removes persistence registry keys. (“Self-deletion removes registry keys responsible for persistence”)
  • [T1480.001] Execution Guardrails: Environmental Keying – Payload decryption is tied to system UUID. (“Loader used system UUID as a decryption key for the payload”)
  • [T1497.001] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks – Dante backdoor loader detects virtual environments by scanning OS logs. (“Dante backdoor loader scans OS logs for virtualization indicators”)
  • [T1562.001] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools – Donut shellcode patches AMSI and other defense APIs. (“Donut shellcode patches AMSI, WLDP, and Native API exit functions”)
  • [T1622] Debugger Evasion – Dante loader detects debuggers via debug registers and driver scans. (“Dante backdoor loader detects debuggers by checking debug registers”)
  • [T1056.001] Input Capture: Keylogging – Trinper backdoor intercepts keystrokes. (“Trinper backdoor used to intercept keystrokes”)
  • [T1057] Process Discovery – ProcessList.exe obtains running processes. (“Team46 used ProcessList.exe to obtain process lists”)
  • [T1083] File and Directory Discovery – Trinper collects file system info. (“Trinper backdoor collects file system information”)
  • [T1115] Clipboard Data – Trinper accesses clipboard content. (“Trinper backdoor accesses clipboard”)
  • [T1071] Application Layer Protocol – Backdoors use HTTP/HTTPS for C2. (“Trinper and Dante backdoors use HTTP and HTTPS for Command and Control”)
  • [T1090.004] Proxy: Domain Fronting – Domain fronting evades network detection. (“Team46 used domain fronting for Trinper C2 communication”)
  • [T1132.001] Data Encoding: Standard Encoding – Base64 encoding used for data transmission. (“Trinper backdoor encodes data using Base64”)
  • [T1572] Protocol Tunneling – Cobalt Strike uses HTTPS encapsulation. (“Cobalt Strike encapsulated own C2 protocol in HTTPS”)
  • [T1573.001] Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography – Trinper uses AES-256 encryption. (“Trinper backdoor uses AES-256 to encrypt transmitted data”)
  • [T1573.002] Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography – Trinper and Dante use RSA encryption. (“Trinper and Dante backdoors use RSA asymmetric encryption”)
  • [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Data exfiltrated to command and control servers. (“Trinper backdoor used to exfiltrate data over C2 channel”)

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File Hashes] Malware samples and tools – TaxOff loader twinapi.dll (MD5: 7d3a30dbf4fd3edaf4dde35ccb5cf926), winsta.dll (MD5: 07d2b50cf8ffe13a4722955ea94317aa), TaxOff Trinper backdoor (SHA-256: 16f6227f760487a70a3168cf9a497ac320943541522cd3937b275c42016ad3e1e), Team46 loader AdobeARM.exe (MD5: a767542f4af58fc3072e74574725ee3c1)
  • [Domains] Command and control and infrastructure – ms-appdata-fonts.global.ssl.fastly.net, ms-appdata-main.global.ssl.fastly.net, fast-telemetry-api.global.ssl.fastly.net, common-rdp-front.global.ssl.fastly.net
  • [IPs] Noted network artifacts – 185.81.114.15
  • [File Names] Decoy and loader files – Ростелеком.pdf.lnk (malicious shortcut), AdobeARM.exe (loader), dirlist.exe, ProcessList.exe, ScreenShot.exe (custom reconnaissance tools)
  • [URLs] Malicious PowerShell download links – https://ms-appdata-query.global.ssl.fastly.net/query.php?id=[REDACTED], https://srv510786.hstgr.cloud/ordinary.php?id=9826fbb409f65dc6b068b085551bf4f3


Read more: https://global.ptsecurity.com/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/team46-and-taxoff-two-sides-of-the-same-coin