Stager Targeting Russian Organization

A malicious LNK sample appears to target a Russian-speaking victim, using a decoy CommuniGate Pro implementation questionnaire aimed at Delovye Linii. The infection chain downloads a tar archive, launches a second LNK, and sideloads calibre-launcher.dll to contact www.ncloudtechlab[.]online and retrieve additional payloads. #CommuniGatePro #DelovyeLinii #ncloudtechlabonline #calibrelauncherDLL

Keypoints

  • The sample was shared by MalwareHunterTeam on July 28, 2026 and appears to target a Russian-speaking victim.
  • The lure uses a filename impersonating a CommuniGate Pro implementation questionnaire for Delovye Linii, a Saint Petersburg-based logistics company.
  • The first LNK downloads a file named communigatepro.png from ncloudtechlab[.]online, which is actually a tar archive.
  • The tar archive contains a decoy PDF, a file named treesn, and a second LNK named 88.lnk that continues the infection chain.
  • The second LNK opens the decoy PDF, extracts treesn to %AppData%, and runs calibre.exe to sideload the malicious calibre-launcher.dll.
  • The DLL establishes persistence via a RunOnce entry, decrypts configuration with AES-CTR, and communicates with a C2 at www.ncloudtechlab[.]online using RSA, HMAC-SHA256, and WinHTTP.
  • The stager can download, write, and execute additional payloads based on tasks received from the C2.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1204.002 ] User Execution: Malicious File – The infection relies on a malicious LNK lure that the victim must open to start the chain (‘The LNK was created on June 15, 2026… This LNK downloads a file… and executes a second LNK’).
  • [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – The malware downloads the tar payload from the remote server and later retrieves additional payloads from the C2 (‘This LNK downloads a file named communigatepro.png… from ncloudtechlab[.]online’; ‘URLs to download additional payload’).
  • [T1055.012 ] Process Injection: Process Hollowing – Not mentioned.
  • [T1218.011 ] System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 – The first LNK invokes rundll32.exe through ShellExec_RunDLL (‘Relative path … rundll32.exe’).
  • [T1547.001 ] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder – Persistence is created with a RunOnce registry value (‘it creates a RunOnce registry persistence entry … HKCUSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce /v LightshotsService’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – Command strings and configuration are encoded/encrypted, including AES-CTR decrypted config and XOR-decrypted cookie contents (‘The stager configuration is decrypted using AES in CTR mode’; ‘The Cookie:SESSION= string is XOR decrypted’).
  • [T1573.001 ] Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography – The configuration is decrypted with AES-CTR and tasks are AES-decrypted (‘The stager configuration is decrypted using AES in CTR mode’; ‘receive tasks, AES decrypt them’).
  • [T1573.002 ] Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography – The beacon is RSA-encrypted before being sent to the C2 (‘RSA encrypts it, base64-encodes it, and sends it to the C2’).
  • [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – C2 traffic is sent over HTTP/S using WINHTTP (‘The connection to the C2 is implemented via the WINHTTP API’).
  • [T1090.002 ] Proxy – The implant performs proxy-aware communications and attempts WPAD and IE proxy configuration discovery (‘the implant attempts WPAD automatic discovery… attempts to use the proxy configured for Internet Explorer’).
  • [T1132.001 ] Data Encoding: Standard Encoding – The beacon is base64-encoded before transmission (‘RSA encrypts it, base64-encodes it’).
  • [T1056.001 ] Input Capture: Keylogging – Not mentioned.
  • [T1106 ] Native API – The malware uses multiple Windows APIs such as WinHttpGetIEProxyConfigForCurrentUser and CreateProcessW (‘implemented via the WINHTTP API’; ‘executed using the CreateProcessW API’).
  • [T1021.005 ] Remote Services: VNC – Not mentioned.
  • [T1102.001 ] Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver – Not mentioned.
  • [T1217 ] Browser Session Cookie – The RSA-encrypted beacon is placed in a Cookie:SESSION header (‘sent to the C2 as a “session cookie” in the request header’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [SHA-256 ] malicious LNK sample – 57e37123a8c30641640bada2e0712351a457ee6c8d279926819da178d99fabaf
  • [Domain ] C2 and download host – www.ncloudtechlab[.]online, ncloudtechlab[.]online
  • [Network Port ] C2 service – 443
  • [File Name ] initial lure and second-stage file – CGP_Заполненный_опросный_лист_по_внедрению_CommuniGate_Pro_Деловые_Линии_2026.pdf.lnk, 88.lnk
  • [File Name ] downloaded and extracted payloads – communigatepro.png, treesn
  • [SHA-256 ] downloaded payload examples – a8d04c3d4a97c48d33d9e14009bb3765f22242d51d9a6c9cabdaaa0bb7b22270, c73b421c0d32816e23f49a60cba708b8c113126b54af74e140af8cdb62acd3d7, and 1 more hash
  • [SHA-256 ] DLL payload example – ac8428684424dbae254570f757ac2b79eb5bf78e6dfbb0d4247fd814bb1e95cb
  • [Host/VM artifact ] victim environment evidence – desktop-oirv4ur, MAC 00:0c:29:ce:f3:1e
  • [Registry Path ] persistence location – HKCUSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce /v LightshotsService


Read more: https://dmpdump.github.io/posts/stager_targeting_russia/