SpyNote: Revealing a Complex Android Malware Threat

SpyNote is an advanced Android RAT disguised as a fake Avast antivirus app that leverages Accessibility Service abuse, gesture simulation, and device-admin privileges to gain broad control, persist on devices, and steal sensitive data including cryptocurrency wallet information. The campaign distributes the malware via phishing domains hosting Avastavv.apk and contacts a C2 server at 45.94.31.96; researchers attribute activity to the EVLF/CypherRat actor. #SpyNote #EVLF

Keypoints

  • SpyNote masquerades as a fake Avast Mobile Security APK (Avastavv.apk) to trick users into installing it.
  • It abuses Android Accessibility Service and simulated gestures to grant itself extensive permissions silently.
  • The malware uses obfuscation and emulator checks to evade analysis and hides artifacts to resist detection.
  • SpyNote targets cryptocurrency wallets (e.g., Trust Wallet, Binance) and actively harvests credentials and app data.
  • It maintains persistence through device-admin privileges, broadcast receivers, foreground services, overlays, and uninstall prevention techniques.
  • Distribution is via phishing domains (e.g., avastop[.]com) and it attempts to connect to a C2 at 45[.]94[.]31[.]96[:]7544.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1660] Phishing – Delivered via deceptive download pages and phishing domains (‘distributed as a fake Avast antivirus and, upon installation, it adopts the name and icon of “Avast Mobile Security for Android”’ / ‘https[:]//avastop[.]com/Avastavv.apk’).
  • [T1624.001] Broadcast Receivers – Uses broadcast receivers to auto-start services and maintain presence (‘Listens for broadcast intents and starts specific services if they are not already running’).
  • [T1541] Foreground Persistence – Ensures the app remains active and visible via foreground service notifications (‘Creates and shows a high-priority notification, then starts necessary jobs and services in the background’).
  • [T1626.001] Device Administrator Permissions – Requests device admin privileges to strengthen control (‘Request device administrator privileges using the DevicePolicyManager’).
  • [T1628] Hide Artifacts – Hides its presence and clears traces to avoid detection (‘Hides the app icon from the launcher’ / ‘Deletes log files to remove traces’).
  • [T1628.002] User Evasion – Prevents user actions that would stop or remove it (‘simulates a ‘back’ action to prevent uninstallation and escapes to the home screen’).
  • [T1629] Impair Defenses – Disables protections and phishing detection to avoid being flagged (‘App includes meta-data that disables Google’s phishing detection’).
  • [T1406] Obfuscated Files or Information – Employs code obfuscation to thwart static analysis (‘This specimen of SpyNote RAT is obfuscated to counter static analysis and thwart reverse engineering’).
  • [T1633] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion – Detects emulators and non-standard environments to avoid analysis (‘checks for an analysis environment, such as an emulator or virtual machine’).
  • [T1417] Input Capture – Captures user input and credentials via accessibility APIs and keylogging (‘captures and stores lock screen passwords’ / ‘readAllTextOnScreen to gather all text displayed on the screen’).
  • [T1430] Location Tracking – Tracks device location to monitor user movements (‘Monitors and retrieves the device’s location…sends it to a remote server’).
  • [T1422] Internet Connection Discovery – Monitors network state and repeatedly checks connectivity before contacting C2 (‘monitors network traffic to check for an active internet connection’ / repeated SYNs to 45[.]94[.]31[.]96).’
  • [T1517] Access Notifications – Reads and monitors notifications to capture sensitive info (‘Monitors notifications for sensitive information’).
  • [T1429] Audio Capture – Records audio from the device without consent (‘Records audio without user consent’).
  • [T1513] Screen Capture – Uses MediaProjection and accessibility APIs to take screenshots and continuous captures (‘startCapture method initiates a screen capture session’).
  • [T1646] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Sends harvested data to a command-and-control server (‘sends stolen data to command-and-control servers’).
  • [T1516] Input Injection – Simulates gestures and clicks to grant permissions and interact with the UI (‘leverages the accessibility service to simulate click gestures using the dispatchGesture method’).
  • [T1582] SMS Control – Sends SMS messages from the device for propagation or fraud (‘The malware has the capability to send SMS messages using the device’s messaging service’).
  • [T1616] Call Control – Uses telephony capabilities for calls or related actions (‘implements Call Control capabilities listed under Collection in the report’).
  • [T1414] Clipboard Data – Targets clipboard contents as part of data collection (‘Collection includes Clipboard Data as a targeted artifact’).
  • [T1636] Protected User Data – Accesses sensitive protected data across apps using accessibility and overlay techniques (‘Collects and stores credentials and sensitive data in external storage before deletion’).
  • [T1512] Video Capture – Can record video or capture camera frames for surveillance (‘CameraHandler captures images or video from the device’s camera’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File name] Malware APK – Avastavv.apk (fake Avast installer)
  • [File hash] Known sample hashes – MD5 214aad6338d607df7ec75a2c48af09d5, SHA-256 94a3b1fc830323234f5ac6e69cf0840507c23e15bee5c8c3aa86fddaf61ef8b1
  • [Domain] Phishing hosts – avastop[.]com, avastxo[.]com, and 12 more avast*.com domains involved in distribution
  • [URL] Malware download URL – https[:]//avastop[.]com/Avastavv.apk (phishing download link)
  • [IP address] Command-and-control – 45[.]94[.]31[.]96 (C2 server targeted by the sample)

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SpyNote is a feature-rich Android remote-access trojan that masquerades as a legitimate Avast mobile security installer to coax users into granting dangerous permissions. Once installed, it leverages Accessibility Service abuse and simulated gestures to automatically approve runtime permissions, request device-admin rights, disable battery optimizations, and hide its icon — all tactics that let it run persistently and resist uninstallation.

The malware is heavily obfuscated and includes emulator/sandbox checks to thwart analysis; it also uses broadcast receivers, foreground services, overlays, and VPN-like components to maintain connectivity and persist across reboots. Operational capabilities include screen and audio capture, keylogging and clipboard theft, camera capture, SMS sending, and focused attacks on cryptocurrency wallets (Trust Wallet, Binance) to intercept balances and credentials.

Distribution is driven by a phishing campaign using multiple avast*.com domains hosting Avastavv.apk, and the sample repeatedly attempts to contact a C2 at 45.94.31.96. Defenders should block the listed domains/IP, monitor for the provided hashes and filenames, and enforce least-privilege, app whitelisting, and behavior-based detection to mitigate this evolving threat.

Read more: https://www.cyfirma.com/research/spynote-unmasking-a-sophisticated-android-malware/