SmokeLoader’s Plugins | Bitsight

Introduction to SmokeLoader’s Plugins

SmokeLoader is a well-known malware family that has been around for more than 10 years. Its main purpose is to download and drop other malware families. However, SmokeLoader’s operators also sell plugins that add capabilities to the main module. Those plugins allow an affiliate to collect browser data from infected computers, as well as emails, cookies, passwords, and much more.

In this blog post, we’ll dissect SmokeLoader’s plugins that were received by an infected computer from the botnet “0020”. We’ll be exploring their inner workings, capabilities, and threat vectors.

SmokeLoader’s Plugins analysis

Plugins decryption

SmokeLoader sends encrypted plugins to the boots with a message that starts with a header that specifies the number of plugins, the combined size of them, a plugin marker, and a plugin ID. The header is followed by one or more plugin structures that specify the plugin size, its 15-byte RC4 key, and the encrypted plugin content. This was previously documented by Pim Trouerbach in his talk at BSides Portland 2022. Figure 2 is an overview of what’s sent to the bot by the Command and Control (C&C).

UPX, however, attempts to unpack it using the same tool were unsuccessful, likely due to the removal of certain metadata from the original file.

The unpacking procedure can be done by setting a breakpoint at the end of the UPX code, then dumping the in-memory image, and adjusting the Import Address Table using Scylla, and finally modifying the entry point.

Diving into code

We obtained a total of 8 plugins, with 4 being 32-bit and the other 4 being 64-bit. We saw unique functionalities on 5 of the plugins, meaning there were 3 pairs of plugins that had the same functionality, but were implemented in both 32 and 64-bit.

Upon reception of a plugin, the main module creates a new process, maps the plugin in memory, and sets three parameters for its entry point. The first two parameters can be likened to “hinstDLL” and “fdwReason”, similar to those used in DllEntryPoint. The first parameter represents the base address of the module, while the second corresponds to DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH. The third parameter, on the other hand, serves as a pointer to a malware-related data structure previously copied into memory by the main module.

The structure can be described as the following:

struct plugin_struct
BYTE is_injected;
uint rc4_encrypt_key;
char bot_id[41];
uint main_module_process_id;
char c2s[260];
char user_agent[552];
uint size_plugin;
BYTE encrypted_plugin[size_plugin];

We can distinguish two different types of plugins:

  • The ones that steal data from disk. They usually run once, then terminate. Their purpose is looking for specific files on disk, and sending those to the C&C server.
  • The ones that get injected into processes and steal data directly from memory. Usually the plugin hooks a key Windows API (send, WSASend, …) within process memory, and sends the collected data to the C&C server. We’ll call those plugins “Hook plugins”.

Process injection

When a Hook plugin starts, one of the first checks that it does is to look for the value of the first byte of the malware structure.

SmokeLoaders Plugins chart 4

Figure 4 – injection byte check

When the main module runs a plugin, this value is set to 0, so the plugin will run the function fn_map_itself_in_processes().

The injection process is the same for all Hook plugins. The plugin embeds a hardcoded list of processes names that should be injected if they’re found running on the infected client.The names of processes are hardcoded within the plugin.

For each process to inject into, the plugin will decrypt the raw bytes that were passed by the main module within the plugin_struct (field encrypted_plugin). Those raw bytes are the plugin’s bytes in its original format, without the Portable executable header.

The plugin then creates a section using NtCreateSection, used to map the plugin in the target process. The plugin will then map the section in its own process and in the target process, using NtMapViewOfSection, and will perform all the loading work on the map view that it created in its own process. It’ll be mirrored in the target process. Once the plugin has loaded sections and resolved the import address table, it calls LdrProcessRelocationBlock() to apply relocations and finalize the injection in the target process.

Also, the plugin will map a small trampoline (Figure 5) and the plugin_struct (with the is_injected byte set to 1) in the target process using the same procedure. Since the plugin code needs 3 arguments when starting, it’ll replace the values in RCX with the base address of the plugin, R8 with a pointer to the plugin_struct, then RAX with the entry point of the plugin.

Finally, the plugin will make a call to the API CreateRemoteThread within the target process, with the start address being the first byte of the trampoline.

SmokeLoaders Plugins chart 5

Figure 5 – Figure 5 – Trampoline

Hooking functions

In order to gather valuable information, plugins use hooking to hijack the control flow that enters specific windows API. This is done by replacing the first few instructions of a function with a trampoline that jumps to the hooking function. That way, valuable information, like arguments that were passed to that function, can be sent to the C&C.

We won’t go into much detail about the hooking procedure, since SmokeLoader’s plugins implement it in a pretty standard way.

Plugin’s SHA256 Architecture Description
e45f05c69821061719fbbfecd107db8200429ea23753d2b6106a9c6f74ffa47f 32
  • Steal credentials from internet explorer using vaultcli.dll
  • Steal “profiles.ini” file from Firefox and Thunderbird
  • Steal “Login Data”, “Cookies” and “Web Data” files from Chrome, Opera, Chromium, Edge, Amigo, Go, QQBrowser
  • Steal data from outlook registry keys
  • Steal connection data from Filezilla and WinSCP
36d59dcdf6860e27d7238b583e67560d2ed7795c4eaa884c10f0c5d20af53d79 64
  • Steal “profiles.ini” file from firefox and Thunderbird
47bff089e05cafe0f0384e07ed4ce02ae457403af921054aff837df3bfeb67fc 32
  • Hook PR_Write in firefox.exe
  • Hook HTTPSendRequestA/W, InternetWriteFile from iexplore.exe
  • Hook multiple functions from chrome.exe, opera.exe and msedge.exe
ad073b2d3e1702b573263718bcacddbe134bc9ce8f2cc1e03e14525e588117e7 64 64 bits version of 431c9e7fbceac89eeac9a61eb3bca78dd44a1241
1bd225e2a4bd9cfdab22811b4d072d99ac3325a6c7b7b64182f3ca04ccd43ccb 32
  • Hook send and WSASend from firefox.exe, iexplore.exe, chrome.exe, opera.exe, microsoftedgecp.exe, outlook.exe, thebat.exe, thebat32.exe, thebat64.exe, thunderbird.exe, filezilla.exe, smartftp.exe, winscp.exe, flashfxp.exe, cuteftppro.exe, mailmaster.exe, 263em.exe, foxmail.exe, alimail.exe, mailchat.exe
fdc148593ee71e5cb47170757fc4c930c1cfbc7d97722ae503a5cb0632364877 64 64 bits version of 1107011f4e5dd3b05b8dc29df8e089564acfbe3a
5339bda196e6090309995c18f83fab58d570fa3564f5c6afae9b72ca9f66140f 32
  • Hook GetClipboardData and TranslateMessage in explorer.exe
a0a1d60b2fc491e1c6c2a8e5db1d5566297926e5f97c06c71a0c10cc364ef083 64 64 bits version of 4479b9b4edf1d5cb7affc0622d91b23e6274030f

36d5…3d79 is not exactly the 64 bits version of e45f…a47f. The 64 bits version of it might have encountered some problems at execution so they probably removed functionalities.


In this blog post, we’ve taken a closer look at SmokeLoader’s plugins and explored what they can do. Originally, SmokeLoader was designed to do one thing: download and run other malicious software on infected computers. But now, it has an extra feature where it can download and use these plugins sent from its C&C. These plugins allow attackers to steal important information, either from the computer’s memory or from files saved on the computer. The ones we’ve examined mostly focus on gathering data from web browsers and email. It’s essential to keep in mind that there might be more of these plugins available because SmokeLoader operators sell them, and not every botnet may have all of them.