SloppyRAT: A New Tool For Ransomware Attacks

SloppyRAT: A New Tool For Ransomware Attacks
Zscaler ThreatLabz identified SloppyRAT, a new malware family likely used in ransomware-related attacks and delivered through a multi-stage ClickFix infection chain. It combines anti-analysis features, EtherHiding-based C2 resolution, certificate pinning, and extensive remote command execution capabilities, while also showing signs of ongoing development and coding flaws. #SloppyRAT #ClickFix #CastleLoader #CastleRAT #EtherHiding

Keypoints

  • ThreatLabz discovered SloppyRAT in June 2026 and assessed it as likely supporting ransomware-related operations.
  • The infection chain begins with a ClickFix-style lure that uses finger.exe, a batch script, and renamed curl.exe to fetch additional payloads.
  • The loader chain leads to IronPython, then CastleLoader and CastleRAT, and finally to a SloppyRAT DLL loaded from cloud-hosted infrastructure.
  • SloppyRAT uses multiple anti-analysis methods, including encrypted runtime-decrypted code blocks, junk code, indirect syscalls, API hashing, and certificate pinning.
  • The malware supports HTTPS-based C2 communication, authenticated JSON requests, reverse SOCKS proxying, and optional EtherHiding over the Polygon blockchain.
  • SloppyRAT includes many built-in PowerShell-like commands, CLR-based PowerShell execution, PPID-spoofed PowerShell, and WMI execution for operator control.
  • Its persistence features are flawed, with broken Run key and COM hijacking implementations that appear incorrectly coded.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1204.002 ] User Execution: Malicious File – The infection relies on a ClickFix-style lure that prompts user interaction to launch the chain (‘press—ENTER’) and trigger execution.
  • [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – SloppyRAT downloads multiple stages and tools from remote locations including GitHub, cloud storage, and attacker-controlled domains (‘download and execute a batch script’, ‘downloaded … IronPython’).
  • [T1059.001 ] PowerShell – The malware executes both built-in PowerShell-like commands and PowerShell scripts, including PSInline and command handlers (‘PowerShell.Create().AddScript(cmd).Invoke()’).
  • [T1059.003 ] Windows Command Shell – It uses cmd.exe to launch commands and execute the initial chain (‘”C:windowssystem32cmd.exe” /c …’).
  • [T1059.007 ] JavaScript – Not mentioned.
  • [T1059.004 ] Unix Shell – Not mentioned.
  • [T1055.012 ] Process Hollowing – Not mentioned.
  • [T1055.013 ] Process Doppelgänging – Not mentioned.
  • [T1055.001 ] Dynamic-link Library Injection – SloppyRAT reflectively loads a DLL in memory and invokes an export (‘download a DLL in memory’, ‘invoked the DLL export name’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – It hides strings, encrypts code blocks, and uses junk code to hinder analysis (‘string obfuscation’, ‘encrypted code blocks’, ‘junk code’).
  • [T1027.015 ] Indicator Removal from Tools – Not mentioned.
  • [T1140 ] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – Runtime decryption is used to decode strings and code blocks before execution (‘decrypted and executed at runtime’).
  • [T1562.001 ] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools – SloppyRAT targets Defender settings through built-in commands such as Get-MpComputerStatus and Set-MpPreference (‘Modifies Microsoft Defender configuration’).
  • [T1057 ] Process Discovery – Built-in commands enumerate running processes (‘Enumerates running processes’).
  • [T1018 ] Remote System Discovery – Commands retrieve host, domain, user, OS, and system information to support reconnaissance (‘Retrieves system information’).
  • [T1082 ] System Information Discovery – The malware gathers OS version, machine name, uptime, CPU count, and related host details (‘Retrieves system information’).
  • [T1046 ] Network Service Discovery – Test-NetConnection and Test-Connection provide connectivity checks (‘Performs a TCP connectivity probe’).
  • [T1016 ] System Network Configuration Discovery – Not mentioned.
  • [T1005 ] Data from Local System – Built-in commands read files, registry values, and local environment data (‘Reads a file’s contents’, ‘Reads a registry key’s values’).
  • [T1112 ] Modify Registry – Persistence and COM hijacking attempts use registry keys such as Run and CLSID InprocServer32 (‘Adding an entry under the HKCU…Run registry key’).
  • [T1546.015 ] COM Hijacking – A fallback persistence method attempts to abuse CLSID InprocServer32 registry entries (‘perform COM hijacking’).
  • [T1547.001 ] Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder – The malware attempts persistence through the HKCU Run key (‘Adding an entry under the HKCU…Run registry key’).
  • [T1090.001 ] Internal Proxy – SloppyRAT supports reverse SOCKS so the infected host can proxy access to internal systems (‘use the infected host as a proxy’).
  • [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – C2 traffic uses HTTPS with JSON-formatted messages (‘communicates over HTTPS with JSON-formatted messages’).
  • [T1095 ] Non-Application Layer Protocol – The infection vector and tooling include the Finger protocol over TCP port 79 (‘The finger.exe utility uses the Finger protocol’).
  • [T1021.002 ] SMB/Windows Admin Shares – Not mentioned.
  • [T1055.001 ] Process Injection – Not mentioned.
  • [T1569.002 ] Service Execution – Not mentioned.
  • [T1134.004 ] Parent PID Spoofing – PSSpoof launches powershell.exe with explorer.exe as the parent process (‘Parent process ID spoofing’).
  • [T1055.003 ] Process Hollowing – Not mentioned.
  • [T1106 ] Native API – SloppyRAT resolves NT functions and invokes them through direct syscalls instead of standard APIs (‘direct syscall instead of using the Windows API’).
  • [T1021.006 ] Windows Remote Management – Not mentioned.
  • [T1218.011 ] Rundll32 – The Run key persistence attempt references rundll32.exe as the launch mechanism (‘the name rundll32’).
  • [T1059.001 ] PowerShell – The built-in command set includes PowerShell-style execution paths and aliases (‘ps1’, ‘Invoke-Expression’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [SHA256 hashes ] SloppyRAT DLL samples – 9f84cfcf988530941555d1cb7780a091743cf567396201eff7731f5475768f9a, 8774533134d9d1514106c4090a0c5bccab4550facdcfe03f4e02b9764343a990, and 2 more hashes
  • [SHA256 hash ] SloppyRAT DLL samples – f534a957edec74d69081665309311b791b6d11a3221fffa67744812d73ad98eb, 466f9b8dce77b3a026fe4f833aa4949784fb854bea4137e52609e857d439dec8, and other remaining hashes
  • [File name ] Loader and script artifacts – config.py, hostfxr.dll, IronPython.3.4.2.pdf
  • [Domain ] Delivery and infrastructure domains – finger.linked4x[.]com, skipraid[.]com
  • [URL ] Payload and loader locations – hxxps://stro7121.blob.core.windows[.]net/dpp1/config.py, hxxps://stro7121.blob.core.windows[.]net/dpp1/hostfxr.dll
  • [IP address ] C2 endpoint – C262.106.66[.]148:443
  • [User-Agent strings ] Loader and download identification – Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; DLLMemLoader/1.0), K8VGmQTrzX
  • [Domain ] C2 infrastructure – api.truesmart[.]org, api.telephoneip[.]net
  • [HTTP paths ] C2 endpoints – /api/auth, /api/systeminfo, /api/av_edr, /api/poll, /api/command/get, /api/command/result, /api/proxy/ack
  • [Registry keys ] Persistence targets – HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun, HKLMSoftwareClassesCLSID{[clsid]}InprocServer32
  • [Blockchain selector ] EtherHiding resolution – 0xd6bd8727


Read more: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/sloppyrat-new-tool-ransomware-attacks