Shared secret: EDR killer in the kill chain

Shared secret: EDR killer in the kill chain

Since 2022, ransomware groups and underground marketplaces have increasingly utilized sophisticated EDR killer tools, such as those packed with HeartCrypt, to disable endpoint security during multi-stage attacks. Evidence suggests significant tool sharing and technical knowledge transfer among competing ransomware groups, complicating defense efforts. #EDRKillShifter #HeartCrypt #RansomHub #MedusaLocker #INC

Keypoints

  • Malicious EDR killer tools, including AVKiller, have been developed and used by ransomware groups like RansomHub, with multiple versions targeting various security vendors.
  • These tools often use heavily protected executables that load compromised driver files signed with revoked or abused certificates to disable endpoint security products.
  • HeartCrypt packer-as-a-service is widely used to obfuscate these tools, making detection and mitigation more challenging.
  • Several ransomware families, such as Blacksuit, RansomHug, Medusa, Qilin, Dragonforce, Crytox, Lynx, and INC, have been observed utilizing the EDR killer in their attack chains.
  • Specific cases, like MedusaLocker, show exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities (e.g., in SimpleHelp) to deliver the EDR killer followed by ransomware deployment.
  • There is strong evidence of tool sharing and technical knowledge transfer between competing ransomware groups, each using different builds of EDR killers but consistently employing HeartCrypt packing.
  • This ecosystem complexity increases the difficulty for defenders to detect and prevent ransomware attacks effectively.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1059] Command and Scripting Interpreter – The malware executes commands through cmd.exe, as evidenced by “cmd.exe /c start c:temp6Vwq.exe” in the MedusaLocker case.
  • [T1218] Signed Binary Proxy Execution – The EDR killer loads drivers signed with compromised certificates to bypass security controls (“driver is signed with a compromised certificate”).
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – Use of HeartCrypt packer-as-a-service suggests transferring and obfuscating malicious payloads (“heavily protected executable… packed with HeartCrypt”).
  • [T1057] Process Discovery – The tool enumerates and terminates specific security-related processes like MsMpEng.exe and SophosHealth.exe to evade detection.
  • [T1574] Hijack Execution Flow – Injecting loader code near the entry point of legitimate utilities to execute malicious payloads (“loader code was injected near the entry point”).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File Hash] HeartCrypt-packed EDR killer example – vp4n.exe (SHA-256: c793304fabb09bb631610f17097b2420ee0209bab87bb2e6811d24b252a1b05d), 6Vwq.exe (SHA-256: 43cd3f8675e25816619f77b047ea5205b6491137c5b77cce058533a07bdc9f98)
  • [Driver File] Malicious driver files – mraml.sys (SHA-1: 21a9ca6028992828c9c360d752cb033603a2fd93), noedt.sys (SHA-256: 6fc26e8ac9c44a8e461a18b20929f345f8cfc86e9a454eae3509084cf6ece3be)
  • [Ransomware File] Ransomware payloads – MilanoSoftware.exe (SHA-256: 3a6d5694eec724726efa3327a50fad3efdc623c08d647b51e51cd578bddda3da)
  • [File Name] Targeted EDR killer executable – uA8s.exe
  • [Ransom Note] Examples include README_0416f0.txt and README.txt used in ransomware incidents.


Read more: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2025/08/06/shared-secret-edr-killer-in-the-kill-chain/