RomCom resurfaces by targeting Ukraine politicians and a U.S.-based healthcare provider aiding Ukrainian refugees, using Trojanized installers hosted on cloned websites. The campaign leverages typosquatted domains and a dedicated C2 network (startleague.net) with multiple IoCs and dropped binaries; this is Part 1 of a two-part study. #RomCom #RemoteDesktopManager #GoToMeeting #StartleagueNet
Keypoints
- RomCom targeted Ukrainian politicians who work with Western countries, and a U.S.-based healthcare organization assisting refugees from Ukraine.
- The campaign uses Trojanized installers for Devolutions Remote Desktop Manager and other software, hosted on cloned/fake websites.
- The initial infection vector is linked to a cloned website with typosquatting designed to resemble legitimate domains.
- Once installed, RomCom drops multiple components (dlls and config files) and executes via RunDLL32, enabling remote access capabilities.
- C2 communications rely on startleague.net (with HTTP via WinHTTP) and fallback methods, including ICMP, if HTTP fails.
- Numerous IoCs are documented, including domains (rdp-devolutions.com, startleague.net), IPs, and DLL/file hashes associated with RomCom payloads.
- Several additional RomCom variants were observed (GoTo Meeting trojanized installer and WinSCP downloader) indicating broader targeting and delivery methods.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1566.002] Spearphishing Link – The fake domain and cloned website approach aligns with targeted phishing that directs victims to a Trojanized installer. Quote: “previous RomCom attacks used targeted phishing emails to point a victim to a cloned website hosting Trojanized versions of popular software.”
- [T1189] Drive-by Compromise – Initial access via a faked/cloned website and typosquatting used to imitate legitimate sites. Quote: “The fake domain utilized a form of typosquatting to attempt to appear as close to the real one as possible.”
- [T1598.002] Acquire Infrastructure – C2 and hosting infrastructure used to support RomCom operations (e.g., rdp-devolutions.com hosting, startleague.net as C2). Quote: “The domain rdp-devolutions[.]com is to host RomCom’s cloned website, both hosting and delivering a Trojanized/fake version of the Devolutions’ Remote Desktop Manager software.”
- [T1218] Signed Binary Proxy Execution – The Trojanized installer is executed via RunDLL32, enabling stealthy execution of the payload. Quote: “The core RomCom binary is executed via the Windows host process RunDLL32 in the background.”
- [T1036] Masquerading – The Trojanized installer masquerades as legitimate software with a valid digital signature. Quote: “The Trojanized main setup file… is signed by an in-date digital signature.”
- [T1027] Obfuscated/Compressed Files and Information – RomCom uses obfuscation to thwart static analysis. Quote: “improvements were made to its obfuscation to thwart static analysis.”
- [T1071.001] Web Protocols – C2 communication over HTTP via WinHTTP, as evidenced by statements like “Request sent via the WinHTTP API.”
- [T1082] System Information Discovery – After installation, RomCom enumerates host/user data to send to C2. Quote: “enumerate the infected host and gather some basic host and user metadata.”
Indicators of Compromise
- [Domain] startleague.net – C2 domain used for check-ins; 46.246.98.15 IP association.
- [Domain] rdp-devolutions.com – Malware hosting domain for cloned Devolutions RDM site; 74.119.239.234 IP association.
- [Domain] devolutions.net (real) vs. fake clone domains mentioned; context: clone sites hosting Trojanized installers.
- [IP] 74.119.239.234 – associated with rdp-devolutions.com; [IP] 91.235.116.232 – initial hosting info for the domain; [IP] 46.246.98.15 – later resolution for startleague.net; [IP] 104.234.10.207:7931 – WinHTTP/HTTP-based C2 reference.
- [SHA-256] 6d3ab9e729bb03ae8ae3fcd824474c5052a165de6cb4c27334969a542c7b261d – Main binary hash (Installer.RemoteDesktopManager.2022.3.35.0.exe).
- [SHA-256] c94e889a6c9f4c37f34f75bf54e6d1b2cd7ee654cd397df348d46abe0b0f6ca3 – Drop file hash for installer.RemoteDesktopManager.2022.3.35.0.exe.
- [SHA-256] 3b26e27031a00a32f3616de5179a003951a9c92381cd8ec552d39f7285ff42ee – GoTo Meeting Opener MSI drop file hash.
- [SHA-256] 916153d8265a2f9344648e302c6b7b8d7e1f40f704b0df83edde43986ab68e56 – prxyms[0-9].dll drop file hash (RomCom Loader).
Read more: https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/06/romcom-resurfaces-targeting-ukraine