RansomHouse operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service group that uses a tool called MrAgent to automate ransomware deployment across many hypervisors. The report outlines their double-extortion model, Tor-based negotiation platform, and the technical details of MrAgent that enable rapid, large-scale infections. #RansomHouse #MrAgent #MarioESXi #Babuk #Tor #Citrix #VMwareESXi
Keypoints
- RansomHouse is identified as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group targeting Windows and Linux hypervisors with a tool named MrAgent to automate ransomware deployments at scale.
- MrAgent is a binary designed to run on hypervisors, autonomously connecting to C2, gathering host info, disabling defenses, and orchestrating ransomware deployment across many VMs.
- The initial access chain included an exploit in Citrix remote access software and compromises of weak domain credentials.
- Ransom negotiation takes place on a Tor-based chat platform with unique victim links, English/Chinese chat, and a countdown to pressure payment.
- Exfiltrated data was moved to cloud storage (MEGA, put.io) and the operation involved a two-stage ransom payment around $1.25 million, followed by data decryption tooling.
- In 2023 US victims and the Industrials/Technology sectors were heavily impacted, with a shift toward mid-size companies and North American targets.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1190] Exploit Public-Facing Application – Initial compromise through an exploit in Citrix. ‘Initial compromise through an exploit in Citrix’
- [T1078] Valid Accounts – Gaining control of weak domain user accounts. ‘Valid Accounts’ and ‘Gaining control of weak domain user accounts’
- [T1021.001] SMB/Windows Admin Shares – Lateral Movement. ‘Exploiting weak monitoring and analysis systems, the group was able to gain unauthorized access via SMB/RDP’
- [T1021.002] Remote Services – Lateral Movement. ‘Exploiting weak monitoring and analysis systems, the group was able to gain unauthorized access via SMB/RDP’
- [T1567.002] Exfiltration to Cloud Storage – Data exfiltration via CDN/cloud storage. ‘Utilized CDN servers for data exfiltration during attacks’
- [T1560.001] Archive Collected Data – Data compression/archival before exfiltration. ‘Collected data was compressed’
- [T1059.004] Unix Shell – Use of Unix/esxcli commands to gather system information and manipulate firewall settings. ‘Unix commands such as and esxcli commands to gather system information and manipulate firewall settings’
- [T1016] System Network Configuration Discovery – Retrieve MAC/IP addresses. ‘Retrieves MAC and IP address of the compromised system using esxcli commands and ioctl calls’
- [T1562.004] Impair Defenses: Disable Firewall – Disable ESXi firewall. ‘Disable the ESXi firewall by executing the command “esxcli network firewall set –enabled false”’
- [T1090] Proxy – Tor-based communications for C2. ‘Tor-based chat room’
- [T1583] Acquire Infrastructure: Server – Acquire infrastructure: server. ‘Acquire Infrastructure: Server’
- [T1071.001] Application Layer Protocol – C2 using JSON messages. ‘Messages to and from the command & control server are transmitted as JSON encoded strings with a zero-byte terminator’
Indicators of Compromise
- [Hash] MrAgent – 8189c708706eb7302d7598aeee8cd6bdb048bf1a6dbe29c59e50f0a39fd53973, bfc9b956818efe008c2dbf621244b6dc3de8319e89b9fa83c9e412ce70f82f2c
- [Hash] Mario – 3934b3da6bad0b4a28483e25e7bab919d7ed31f2f51cca22c56535b9f8183a0e, afe398e95a75beb4b0508c1bbf7268e8607d03776af0b68386d1e2058b374501
- [IP] 64.52.80.118 – Mega Pro account login used during exfiltration
- [IP] 192.168.56.10 – Example IP address reported in C2/status exchange
- [BTC Address] 1MmkNa1gRUmVSocZic8wJhehef8NW4GzDZ
- [BTC Address] 1GqGTYE2a9c14jegP1aK9Qj58gYyyt7Dxu
- [BTC Address] bc1q93xvcqux2xl4n03985lyrh8w55et8tt60fcrmy
- [BTC Address] 17voYysEw5NJbbT5TCQqsaTwbv4ZhmTPLa
- [File] test-flat.vmdk
- [File] test.vmdk
- [File] test.vmsd
- [Credential] [email protected]
Read more: https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/ransomhouse-am-see/