Prometei botnet improves modules and exhibits new capabilities in recent updates

Prometei v3 continues to evolve with updated execution-chain modules, self-updating capabilities, and a bundled Apache webserver with a PHP web shell, expanding both Windows and Linux variants. The threat remains financially driven, targeting a wide global victim pool with a DGA for C2 and Tor-based communication, while adapting to geopolitical constraints related to Russia and Ukraine. #Prometei #Monero #DGA #Tor #CVE-2019-0708 #ApacheWebserver

Keypoints

  • Prometei v3 is estimated to be a medium-sized botnet (~10,000 infected systems) based on sinkholing DGA domains over a one-week window in Feb 2023.
  • Open-source intel indicates continued spread and improvement of Linux versions of Prometei alongside Windows activity.
  • New functionality includes a domain-generation algorithm (DGA), a self-updating mechanism, and a bundled Apache webserver with a PHP-based web shell on victims.
  • The botnet shows Ukraine-war–influenced targeting, with Russia excluded in Tor configurations, suggesting geopolitical shaping of infections.
  • Execution chain upgrades automate updates, encrypt/de-obfuscate payloads, and use PowerShell to fetch the primary module (sqhost.exe) and subsequent components.
  • Prometei employs SMB/RDP spread, Mimikatz-based credential theft, BlueKeep exploitation, SSH-based lateral movement, and Tor-based C2 communications.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1584.005] Compromise Infrastructure: Botnet – The actors maintain and expand a botnet infrastructure to host and distribute payloads. “Resource Development” – “Prometei operators… continuously updating and expanding Prometei’s modules.”
  • [T1059.001] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell – The execution chain begins with a malicious PowerShell command that downloads the primary module. “malicious PowerShell command that downloaded the primary listening and execution module, referred to throughout as “sqhost.exe.””
  • [T1569.002] System Services: Service Execution – Persistence via a Windows service named “UPlugPlay” that runs sqhost.exe. “persistence is obtained by creating an automated system service named ‘UPlugPlay’.”
  • [T1505.003] Server Software Component: Webshell – Dropping a bundled Apache Webserver with a PHP-based web shell on victims. “bundled version of the Apache Webserver with a web shell deployed onto victim hosts.”
  • [T1027] Obfuscated Files or Information – The primary module is downloaded in encrypted form using XOR obfuscation. “encrypted form through a simple XOR byte alteration pattern.”
  • [T1036] Masquerading – Files are renamed (e.g., zsvc.exe to sqhost.exe) to blend with legitimate processes. “The original downloaded file is then renamed from ‘zsvc.exe’ to ‘sqhost.exe’.”
  • [T1070.004] Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion – Install/update flow deletes older module instances before replacing them. “deletes all current versions of the target files on disk and then renames the extracted versions.”
  • [T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – Payloads are deobfuscated/decrypted as part of execution. “Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information” – content describes decoding steps (e.g., XOR decoding).
  • [T1562] Impair Defenses – Defense evasion via firewall rule manipulation to allow malicious components. “firewall rule named ‘Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (HTTP)’ … to add ‘C:Windows…sqhost.exe’ to the allowed programs list.”
  • [T1210] Exploitation of Remote Services – Lateral movement using SMB/SMB-based spreaders and Mimikatz-based credential theft. “spreader program through Server Message Block (SMB) and is used alongside its partner component ‘miwalk.exe’ … A remote desktop protocol (RDP)-based spreading module, ‘bklocal2.exe’ and ‘bklocal4.exe’.”
  • [T0884] Connection Proxy – C2 communications via Tor network and onion addresses. “the C2’s Tor address represented by the hardcoded URL in sqhost.exe and ‘onion’ TLD: … .onion/cgi-bin/prometei.cgi”.
  • [T1090.003] Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy – Tor-based multi-hop proxy used for C2 communications. “Tor configuration” mentioning exit-node exclusion/inclusion.
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – Modules and payloads are downloaded from the C2 server (e.g., sqhost.exe, 7z archives, etc.). “downloaded from a C2 server.”

Indicators of Compromise

  • [Domain] xinchao-related domains – xinchaodbcdbh.org, xinchaodbcdbh.com, and 2 more domains
  • [Domain] Tor onion domain – gb7ni5rgeexdcncj.onion
  • [IP] 103.65.236.53:80, 221.120.144.101:3333, and 2 more IPs
  • [File name] sqhost.exe, zsvc.exe, and 2 more items (7z.exe, 7z.dll)
  • [Archive] AppServ180.zip, SearchIndexer.exe, and 2 more items
  • [Wallet] Monero wallet – 4A1txQ9L8h8NqF4EtGsZDP5vRN3yTVKynbkyP1jvCiDajNLPepPbBdrbaqBu8fCTcFEFdCtgbekSsTf17B1MhyE2AKCEyfR
  • [File] desktop.txt / desktop.dat (miner config files), and related payloads

Read more: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/prometei-botnet-improves/