Possible Pakistan-nexus Backdoor Targeting Afghanistan

A ZIP file uploaded from Afghanistan contained a renamed Windows executable and a malicious DLL that side-loaded a targeted backdoor likely aimed at an Afghanistan government agency. The backdoor used 185.235.137[.]35:9000 for command-and-control, dropped a decoy Pashto PDF, and supported extensive remote-control commands after establishing persistence. #ApplicationFrameHost.exe #dgxi.dll #HZHostingLtd

Keypoints

  • The ZIP file was uploaded to VirusTotal from Afghanistan on August 29, 2026 and contained an executable named Special Job Opportunities and Recruitment Information in Various Ministries of Afghanistan.exe plus dgxi.dll.
  • The filename and upload origin suggest the sample was likely intended for an Afghanistan government agency.
  • The executable was actually a legitimate Windows binary, ApplicationFrameHost.exe, while the DLL was malicious and was loaded through DLL side-loading.
  • The backdoor established persistence by copying itself to %AppData%MicrosoftApplicationHost and creating a Run key under HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun.
  • It performed anti-debugging and anti-analysis checks, including debugger detection, tool detection, and timing/integrity checks.
  • The malware dropped a decoy PDF in Pashto containing a list of officials, likely to distract victims and make the activity appear legitimate.
  • The backdoor used XOR-encrypted configuration data, connected to C2 at 185.235.137[.]35:9000, and supported 13 commands for system profiling, file operations, process control, and shell access.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1574.002] DLL Side-Loading – The malicious library was loaded by a renamed legitimate executable to execute the backdoor [‘a malicious library that is side-loaded by the renamed executable’]
  • [T1547.001] Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder – Persistence was created through the current user Run key [‘Persistent execution is established using the common registry run key HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun’]
  • [T1036.005] Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location – The malicious executable was disguised as a legitimate Windows component by using the name ApplicationFrameHost.exe [‘The executable is a legitimate executable (ApplicationFrameHost.exe, a Windows executable)’]
  • [T1497.001] System Checks – The backdoor performed anti-debugging and anti-analysis checks before executing its main logic [‘It detects debuggers’, ‘It performs timing and integrity checks’]
  • [T1057] Process Discovery – The malware enumerated running tools and system processes as part of analysis avoidance and command handling [‘It detects the presence of common analysis tools: ida.exe, ida64.exe, x64dbg.exe, x32dbg.exe, windbg.exe, ollydbg.exe’]
  • [T1005] Data from Local System – The backdoor collected local system information such as CPU, memory, disks, network information, and uptime [‘Send system profile (cpu, memory, disks, network information, uptime)’]
  • [T1082] System Information Discovery – The first beacon included OS version and machine identity data [‘machineName’, ‘osVersion’, ‘clientId’]
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – The C2 supported file upload and download operations between victim and operator [‘Read files in chunks (download victim -> C2)’, ‘File upload (C2-> victim) as a .tmp’]
  • [T1059.003] Windows Command Shell – The malware launched cmd.exe for command execution and hidden shell interaction [‘Uses “cmd.exe /c start” for non-executables’, ‘Spawns hidden cmd with anonymous pipes’]
  • [T1569.002] Service Execution – The backdoor created a shell-like execution environment to run commands on the victim system [‘Create a shell’]
  • [T1033] System Owner/User Discovery – The decoy document exposed names and personnel details that could support targeted operations [‘List of Officials’, ‘a list of individual names and their corresponding position name, salary, department, and phone number’]

Indicators of Compromise

  • [SHA-256] ZIP and DLL samples – d69d27a94c78889fc8694e13c122438125eb3d3e6023e0624b3137c7f982a852, a6ceacda670b88e8a8ec9ff5da6a77d9f1c896d6479b2dadb700474a8c408f80
  • [IP:Port] C2 infrastructure – 185.235.137[.]35:9000
  • [File names] Delivered and dropped artifacts – Special Job Opportunities and Recruitment Information in Various Ministries of Afghanistan.exe, dgxi.dll, Document_.pdf
  • [Registry key] Persistence location – HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun
  • [Directory path] Copy/persistence path – %AppData%MicrosoftApplicationHost
  • [XOR key] Backdoor configuration – thisscert23$SecretKey206


Read more: https://dmpdump.github.io/posts/Backdoor_Targeting_Afghanistan/