Phishing Campaign Targeting Companies via UpCrypter

Phishing Campaign Targeting Companies via UpCrypter

FortiGuard Labs observed a global phishing campaign that delivers personalized phishing pages which prompt victims to download obfuscated JavaScript droppers (UpCrypter) that execute PowerShell and an in-memory MSIL loader to deploy multiple RATs. The campaign delivered PureHVNC, DCRat, and Babylon RAT via staged downloads, steganography, and persistence mechanisms targeting Windows environments. #UpCrypter #PureHVNC #DCRat #BabylonRAT

Keypoints

  • Phishing emails with personalized HTML attachments redirect victims to spoofed pages that embed the victim’s email/domain to increase credibility and track targets.
  • Downloaded ZIP archives contain heavily obfuscated JavaScript (UpCrypter) that launches a Base64 PowerShell payload with anti-analysis checks and in-memory execution of an MSIL loader.
  • The pipeline retrieves loader data from remote servers (plain text or steganographically embedded in images) and executes .NET assemblies in memory to avoid disk artifacts.
  • The MSIL loader performs extensive anti-VM and anti-analysis checks, conditionally forces system restarts, and writes persistence to HKCU Run while using a subfolder under AppData for storage.
  • Final payloads observed include remote access tools PureHVNC, DCRat, and Babylon RAT, enabling long-term remote control of compromised Windows systems.
  • Attackers use fragment-based parameter passing, Base64/XOR obfuscation, and delays/anti-automation tricks to evade detection and logging.
  • Campaign shows rapid global expansion across multiple industries; Fortinet protections detect and block the malicious components.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566 ] Phishing – used to deliver HTML attachments that redirect victims to spoofed pages tailored with the victim’s email/domain (“the script sets the target user’s email… and assigns the result to ‘window.location.href’ after 413 milliseconds”).
  • [T1204.002 ] User Execution: Malicious File – victims are urged to download and open a ZIP containing an obfuscated JavaScript dropper (“the downloadFile() handler … submits the form, causing the delivery of a ZIP archive … ‘Please open it for review…’”).
  • [T1059.001 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell – JavaScript constructs a Base64 PowerShell command and executes it with ShellExecute to run hidden PowerShell (-ExecutionPolicy bypass) (“it then calls ShellExecute to run PowerShell with ‘-ExecutionPolicy bypass’ and the decoded command using a window style of 0”).
  • [T1218.011 ] Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32/Regsvr32/PowerShell – use of PowerShell to execute embedded loader code and scripts in-memory (“PowerShell is responsible for network verification, anti-analysis checking, and preparing for loader execution … executed directly in memory through .NET reflection”).
  • [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – downloads additional files (01.txt, 02.txt, bu.txt) and loader/payload data from remote URLs to stage and execute the final payloads (“retrieves files ’01.txt,’ ’02.txt’ … and a payload from ‘ktc2005[.]com/bu[.]txt’”).
  • [T1005 ] Data from Local System – reads system/registry/BIOS fields for anti-analysis checks (“reads the registry ‘HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINEHARDWAREDESCRIPTIONSystemBIOS’ to obtain BaseBoardManufacturer and BaseBoardProduct”).
  • [T1490 ] Inhibit System Recovery – forces system restarts when anti-analysis checks or connectivity checks fail to disrupt analysis (“If this fails, it then restarts the computer… If any are found, it forces a system restart”).
  • [T1106 ] Native API – uses WinExec and Shell.Application objects for execution and persistence (“creates a Shell.Application object… It then leverages WinExec to launch the attack”).
  • [T1543.003 ] Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service – persistence via registry Run key (“adds the complete PowerShell execution into the registry ‘HKCU:SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun’”).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – heavy obfuscation of JavaScript, Base64/XOR fragmenting, and padding with junk code (“heavily obfuscated JavaScript file padded with large amounts of junk code… reconstructs a link by XORing a set of small string chunks with 0x15 and then applying ‘atob’”).
  • [T1074.001 ] File Deletion – deletes staged artifacts and cleans working folders on detection (“writes the marker file ‘detect_analisse_process.txt’, deletes staged artifacts, cleans working folders, forces a restart, and exits”).
  • [T1001.001 ] Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs or other traces – cleaning working folders and deleting artifacts to minimize traces (“deletes staged artifacts, cleans working folders … minimizing traces”).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [Domain ] phishing and payload hosting – maltashopping24[.]com, www[.]tridevresins[.]com
  • [Domain ] loader/payload distribution – andrefelipedonascime1753562407700.0461178[.]meusitehostgator[.]com.br, ktc2005[.]com
  • [URL ] phishing/redirect endpoints – brokaflex[.]com/tw/w.php (used to POST victim email and deliver ZIP), power-builders[.]net/vn/v.php
  • [HTML hash ] malicious attachment – 4b03950d0ace9559841a80367f66c1cd84ce452d774d65c8ab628495d403ad0fc7b6205c411a5c0fde873085f924f6270d49d103f57e7e7ceb3deb255f3e6598
  • [JavaScript hash ] UpCrypter JS dropper – a5fe77344a239af14c87336c65e75e59b69a59f3420bd049da8e8fd0447af235c0bfa10d2739acd6ee11b8a2e2cc19263e18db0bbcab929a133eaaf1a31dc9a5
  • [DLL hash ] MSIL loader artifact – f2633ef3030c28238727892d1f2fcb669d23a803e035a5c37fd8b07dce442f177e832ab8f15d826324a429ba01e49b452ffc163ca4af8712a6b173f40c919b43


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