OriginBotnet Spreads via Malicious Word Document | FortiGuard Labs

FortiGuard Labs analyzed a phishing Word document that delivers a multi-stage loader inflating to 400 MB, which then deploys OriginBotnet, RedLine Clipper, and Agent Tesla. The campaign combines credential theft, cryptocurrency wallet theft, and keylogging across a complex malware chain. #OriginBotnet #RedLineClipper #AgentTesla #Bankslip #SoftwarezOnline #NitroSoftwareShop

Keypoints

  • The malicious Word document uses binary padding to inflate the file size and evade detection, reaching about 400 MB.
  • The loader delivers three main payloads: OriginBotnet (keylogging/password recovery), RedLine Clipper (crypto clipboard hijacking), and Agent Tesla (credential harvesting).
  • Phishing email delivers the document with a blurred image and counterfeit reCAPTCHA to entice clicks; the embedded malicious link is in word_relsdocument.xml.rels.
  • The loader chain decrypts resources via XOR and AES, loads multiple components, and achieves persistence (Startup folder) and staged execution.
  • OriginBotnet collects system information, establishes C2 contact at nitrosoftwares.shop/gate, and supports commands like downloadexecute, uninstall, update, and load, including Keylogger and PasswordRecovery plugins.
  • RedLine Clipper continuously monitors the clipboard to replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses for multiple coins (ClipBanker variant) using OnClipboardChangeEventHandler and regex checks.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566.001] Phishing – A phishing email delivers the Word document as an attachment and uses a blurred image/ counterfeit recaptcha to lure the recipient into clicking on it. ‘A phishing email delivers the Word document as an attachment, presenting a deliberately blurred image and a counterfeit reCAPTCHA (Figure 2) to lure the recipient into clicking on it.’
  • [T1027] Obfuscated/Compressed Files and Information – The loader uses a binary padding evasion strategy and XOR/AES to decrypt resources. ‘The initial loader was acquired from … It uses an XOR operation with the string … and then ‘Activator.CreateInstance()’ to execute the decoded information. The decoding procedure is shown in Figure 4.’
  • [T1547.001] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution – Persistence is achieved by duplicating the EXE into the Startup directory so it runs on startup. ‘it duplicates the EXE file into the directory “%AppData%MicrosoftWindowsStart MenuProgramsStartup” … to ensure that the file runs automatically even if the victim restarts their device.’
  • [T1059.001] Windows PowerShell – A PowerShell command is used for persistence within the loader chain. ‘PowerShell command for persistence in “Main Project.dll”.’
  • [T1082] System Information Discovery – OriginBotnet gathers device details ( Antivirus, CPU, GPU, country, OS name, username) before contacting C2. ‘gathers essential information about the victim’s device, such as the installed AntiVirus Product, CPU, GPU, country, OS name, and username.’
  • [T1115] Clipboard Data – RedLine Clipper monitors the clipboard to intercept and potentially replace cryptocurrency addresses. ‘OnClipboardChangeEventHandler to regularly monitor clipboard changes …’
  • [T1555.003] Credentials from Web Browsers – Agent Tesla’s PasswordRecovery targets browser/software credentials and reports them via HTTP POST. ‘retrieves and organizes the credentials of various browser and software accounts. It records these results and reports them via HTTP POST requests.’
  • [T1059.003] Windows Command Shell – The loader uses Process.Start to run downloaded files and may invoke commands like msiexec.exe /I or java.exe -jar. ‘It may involve using “Process.Start” or invoking commands such as “msiexec.exe /I” or “java.exe -jar.”’
  • [T1071.001] Web Protocols – C2 communications occur via HTTP POST with encryption. ‘The communication is conducted via a POST request … TripleDES encryption … encoded in Base64.’
  • [T1056.001] Input Capture: Keylogging – OriginBotnet’s Keylogger plugin records keystrokes and monitors active windows. ‘The Keylogger plugin … uses techniques such as “SetWindowsHookEx” for capturing keyboard input events …’
  • [T1056.001] Clipboard Data (secondary) – RedLine Clipper also monitors clipboard for data extraction, supporting multiple currencies. ‘Clipboard text content through “SetClipboardViewer.”’
  • [T1555.001] Credentials from Password Stores (PasswordRecovery scope) – Agent Tesla enumerates and retrieves credentials from a wide range of browsers and apps. ‘The plugin is designed to target the following browsers and software applications:’

Indicators of Compromise

  • [URL] Bankslip domain – bankslip.info; bankslip[.]info
  • [URL] SoftwareZ domain – softwarez.online; softwarez[.]online
  • [URL] NitroSoftwareShop domain – nitrosoftwares.shop; nitrosoftwares[.]shop
  • [File hash] Example 1 – c9e72e2865517e8838dbad0ce41561b2bd75c399b7599c1711350f9408189b9b
  • [File hash] Example 2 – 56ced4e1abca685a871b77fab998766cbddfb3edf719311316082b6e05986d67
  • [File hash] Example 3 – c204f07873fafdfd48f37e7e659e3be1e4202c8f62db8c00866c8af40a9a82c5
  • [File hash] Example 4 – 21ad235118c371e2850c539040b6dcdd88196c021245440155fe80aacf6ccc7e
  • [File hash] Example 5 – 4617631b4497eddcbd97538f6712e06fabdb53af3181d6c1801247338bffaad3
  • [File hash] Example 6 – be915d601276635bf4e77ce6b84feeec254a900c0d0c229b0d00f2c0bca1bec7
  • [File hash] Example 7 – c241e3b5d389b227484a8baec303e6c3e262d7f7bf7909e36e312dea9fb82798
  • [File hash] Example 8 – dfd2b218387910b4aab6e5ee431acab864b255832eddd0fc7780db9d5844520a
  • [File hash] Example 9 – f36464557efef14b7ee4cebadcc0e45af46f5c06b67c5351da15391b03a19c4c
  • [File hash] Example 10 – b15055e75ae0eeb4585f9323ef041fa25ed9b6bf2896b6ea45d871d49a1c72b8
  • [File hash] Example 11 – 49c969a5461b2919fd9a7dc7f76dd84101b2acc429b341f8eeee248998e9da32
  • [File hash] Example 12 – 65e47578274d16be1be0f50767bad0af16930df43556dd23d7ad5e4adc2bcbe3
  • [URL/Filename] OriginBotnet entry point – david.exe (SHA256: be915d601276635bf4e77ce6b84feeec254a900c0d0c229b0d00f2c0bca1bec7)
  • [File] Agent Tesla variant – COPPER.exe (SHA256: c241e3b5d389b227484a8baec303e6c3e262d7f7bf7909e36e312dea9fb82798)

Read more: https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/originbotnet-spreads-via-malicious-word-document