Operation ForumTroll conducted targeted phishing against Russian academics in October 2025 using a spoofed e-library domain to deliver a PowerShell-based downloader and an OLLVM-obfuscated DLL loader. The final payload deployed the commercial Tuoni framework and used COM Hijacking for persistence, with C2 infrastructure on fastly.net. #ForumTroll #Tuoni
Keypoints
- ForumTroll ran a targeted phishing campaign in Oct 2025 focused on political science, international relations, and global economics scholars in Russia, using spoofed eLibrary emails and personalized archive filenames.
- Phishing emails originated from support@e-library[.]wiki and linked to https://e-library[.]wiki/elib/wiki.php?id= which delivered a personalized archive named __.zip.
- The archive contained a victim-named .lnk shortcut that executed a PowerShell script to download a DLL payload and a decoy PDF saved and opened automatically to mask the infection.
- The final DLL was an OLLVM-obfuscated loader that saved to %localappdata%MicrosoftWindowsExplorericoncache_.dll and established persistence via COM Hijacking (writing to HKCRCLSID{1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d}InProcServer32).
- The deployed implant in the fall campaign was the Tuoni red-teaming framework (public portions on GitHub) with C2 traffic routed through fastly.net hostnames.
- The attackers used long-registered malicious infrastructure and UI elements copied from the legitimate site to build credibility, plus one-time download restrictions and OS checks to hinder analysis.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1059.001 ] PowerShell β Used to execute a downloader script launched by the shortcut to fetch and run the payload. (βWhen the user clicked the shortcut, it ran a PowerShell script.β)
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer β The PowerShell script retrieved the final DLL payload from a remote URL on the malicious site. (βContacted a URL in the format: https://e-library[.]wiki/elib/query.php?id=&key= to retrieve the final payload, a DLL file.β)
- [T1546.011 ] COM Hijacking β Persistence was achieved by writing the DLL path into a CLSID InProcServer32 registry key to hijack COM component loading. (βwriting the path to the DLL file into the registry key HKCRCLSID{1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d}InProcServer32.β)
- [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information β The final loader was OLLVM-obfuscated to impede analysis and detection. (βThe DLL file deployed to infected devices proved to be an OLLVM-obfuscated loader.β)
- [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols β C2 communications and payload hosting used HTTP/S and fastly.net hostnames for command-and-control. (βAs in the previous campaign, the attackers used fastly.net as C2 servers.β)
- [T1204 ] User Execution β The attack relied on social engineering (clicking the link, downloading the archive, and opening the shortcut and decoy PDF) to execute the malicious payload. (βThe downloaded archive was named with the victimβs last name, first name, and patronymic.β and βThis PDF was saved to the userβs Downloads folder β¦ and then opened automatically.β)
Indicators of Compromise
- [Domain ] phishing and payload hosting β e-library[.]wiki, perf-service-clients2.global.ssl.fastly[.]net, and 2 more fastly hostnames
- [Email ] phishing sender β support@e-library[.]wiki
- [IP address ] historical access to legitimate site β 193.65.18[.]14
- [URLs ] download and payload retrieval endpoints β https://e-library[.]wiki/elib/wiki.php?id=, https://e-library[.]wiki/elib/query.php?id=&key=
- [File names ] archive, shortcut, and decoy PDF naming patterns β __.zip, __.lnk, __.pdf
- [File path ] installed payload location β %localappdata%MicrosoftWindowsExplorericoncache_.dll
Read more: https://securelist.com/operation-forumtroll-new-targeted-campaign/118492/