North Korea Kimsuky – CJ Olive Networks Certificate Exploitation

North Korea Kimsuky – CJ Olive Networks Certificate Exploitation

The article analyzes a malicious code attack by the North Korean hacking group Kimsuky, which exploited a stolen digital certificate from CJ OliveNetworks to target a Korean research institute. The malware demonstrates advanced techniques such as self-modifying code, hardware I/O manipulation, and debugger evasion, impacting CJ OliveNetworks and the Korean research organization. #CJOliveNetworks #Kimsuky

Keypoints

  • The malware uses a stolen digital signature issued by Sectigo for CJ OliveNetworks, which was promptly revoked after detection.
  • Key malicious file involved: โ€œ20250428 ํ”Œx์•„์ด ์ž‘์—…๊ณ„ํš์„œ ๋ฐ ์ž‘์—…์™„๋ฃŒ์„œ_๊ธฐ๊ณ„์—ฐ ์ดxํ™”.scrโ€ sized 6MB with multiple file hashes documented.
  • The malware employs self-modifying code that manipulates memory addresses based on carefully calculated input parameters and triggers abnormal termination if debugging conditions are detected.
  • Direct hardware communication occurs through dynamically calculated I/O port outputs, likely for debugging detection or hardware-level attacks such as keylogging.
  • The code demonstrates advanced obfuscation using bitwise operations, XOR memory encoding, and dynamic function pointer invocation to evade static analysis.
  • Multiple subroutines do not return normally, indicating forced process termination or infinite loops to disrupt analysis.
  • The analysis identifies potential stack overflow vulnerabilities and exploitation vectors such as shellcode injection and function pointer overwriting.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1071] Application Layer Protocol โ€“ The malware communicates via HTTP to a suspicious domain hxxp://gsegse(.)dasfesfgsegsefsede(.)o-r(.)kr/login(.)php, indicating command and control.
  • [T1106] Execution through API โ€“ Dynamic function pointer calls are made, leveraging virtual function tables for execution flow hijacking (โ€˜param_2[0x1e]์— ์ €์žฅ๋œ ํ•จ์ˆ˜ ํฌ์ธํ„ฐ๋ฅผ ๋™์ ์œผ๋กœ ํ˜ธ์ถœโ€™).
  • [T1055] Process Injection โ€“ The malware manipulates memory and overwrites function pointers on the stack to subvert normal execution flows (โ€˜์Šคํƒ ๋‚ด๋ถ€ ํ•จ์ˆ˜ ํฌ์ธํ„ฐ ๋ฎ์–ด์“ฐ๊ธฐ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑโ€™).
  • [T1204] User Execution โ€“ The initial infection vector is a malicious executable file signed with stolen digital certificates that trick users into running the malware.
  • [T1562] Impair Defenses โ€“ The malware uses debugger evasion techniques, such as conditional abnormal termination on debugger detection (โ€˜์กฐ๊ฑด ์ถฉ์กฑ ์‹œ ๊ฐ•์ œ ์ค‘๋‹จโ€™).
  • [T1027] Obfuscated Files or Information โ€“ Use of XOR-based runtime decoding and self-modifying code to hide payload content and obstruct static analysis (โ€˜XOR๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•œ ๋ฉ”๋ชจ๋ฆฌ ๋‚œ๋…ํ™”, self-modifying codeโ€™).
  • [T1499] Endpoint Denial of Service โ€“ Subroutines that do not return normally hint at forced termination or infinite loops to disrupt endpoint operations (โ€˜์„œ๋ธŒ๋ฃจํ‹ด์ด ๋ฐ˜ํ™˜ํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์Œโ€™).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File Hashes] Malicious signed executable with hashes MD5: 7ec88818697623a0130b1de42fa31335, SHA-1: 49fd125c5f516be6883404c256d79afa54dd42d7, SHA-256: 123aefe0734da130b475bfdad6c3ebe49688569ab8310e71ec5252ec46cb67eb
  • [File Hashes] Supporting config.dat file with hashes MD5: 580d7a5fdf78dd3e720b2ce772dc77e9, SHA-1: df3e07199e8457341dd06dfa5b04d6a9d45b01c1, SHA-256: 7047efbd15b20086933a3e41f23252d3f8b049b913b2c05af520a3233368f700
  • [Domain] Suspicious C2 domain: hxxp://gsegse(.)dasfesfgsegsefsede(.)o-r(.)kr/login(.)php used for control and commands
  • [IP Address] Associated IP: 162.220.11.186 linked to suspicious network activity
  • [File Name] Malicious executable: โ€œ20250428 ํ”Œx์•„์ด ์ž‘์—…๊ณ„ํš์„œ ๋ฐ ์ž‘์—…์™„๋ฃŒ์„œ_๊ธฐ๊ณ„์—ฐ ์ดxํ™”.scrโ€ digitally signed with stolen certificate

Read more: https://wezard4u.tistory.com/429487