Symantec reports that attackers have revived abuse of Node.js since February 2026, using the trusted node.exe runtime for persistence and execution against victims including government departments, technology companies, and hotels. In the observed campaigns, actors tied to Woodgnat/KongTuke and other threats used ClickFix, AdaptixC2, Cobalt Strike, ModeloRAT, Backdoor.Mistic, C2Looper, and EtherHiding-style Ethereum blockchain lookups to maintain access and evade defenses. #Node.js #AdaptixC2 #CobaltStrike #ModeloRAT #BackdoorMistic #C2Looper #EtherHiding #Woodgnat #KongTuke
Keypoints
- Attackers have increasingly abused Node.js since February 2026 as a trusted, signed runtime to execute malicious JavaScript and maintain persistence.
- Victims mentioned in the campaigns include a U.S. fintech company, an Asian technology company, government departments, and hotels.
- In one Asian technology-company intrusion, blocked payloads led attackers to download the official Node.js installer and run a malicious implant that contacted Ethereum blockchain gateways.
- The blockchain-based behavior was likely EtherHiding, suggesting commands or payloads were hidden in smart contracts.
- The same activity pattern included attempts to deploy AdaptixC2 and Cobalt Strike, plus the use of a Rust-based backdoor identified as C2Looper.
- Other observed tools and malware included ModeloRAT and Backdoor.Mistic, which are linked to Woodgnat/KongTuke and multiple ransomware-related operations.
- Persistence was achieved through a Windows service-launched PowerShell downloader and a Run-key entry that relaunched node.exe at login.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1059.001] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell â Used to download scripts, launch payloads, and maintain beaconing; [âa PowerShell script named earthquakeist.ps1 was then recordedâ, âa persistent PowerShell downloaded another AdaptixC2 binaryâ]
- [T1059.007] Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript â Node.exe was abused to execute malicious JavaScript payloads in an interpreted runtime; [âuse the trusted, signed runtime to execute a malicious implantâ, âthe malicious logic lives in interpreted scripts rather than in a binaryâ]
- [T1547.001] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder â Persistence was established by adding a Run key to relaunch node.exe at every login; [âadding a randomly named value under the current userâs Run keyâ, ârelaunch node.exe headlessly through conhost.exe at every loginâ]
- [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer â Attackers downloaded official and malicious tooling, including Node.js and payloads; [âdownload the official Node.js installer from nodejs.orgâ, âthe persistent PowerShell downloaded another AdaptixC2 binaryâ]
- [T1068] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation â ClickFix-style lure was used for initial access via pasting and running attacker-supplied commands; [âa command indicative of a ClickFix-style infection was executedâ, âa victim pastes and runs an attacker-supplied string through the Windows Run dialogâ]
- [T1071.001] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols â Beaconing and C2 activity used HTTP/HTTPS connections to attacker infrastructure; [ârepeated outbound HTTPS connectionsâ, âgenerated by powershell.exe itselfâ]
- [T1071.004] Application Layer Protocol: DNS â Domain-based spoofing and use of lookalike domains supported command-and-control infrastructure; [âdomain spoofing of a company called Devmineâ, âused the same C&C (datalayerservice)â]
- [T1562.001] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools â Payloads were repeatedly blocked, prompting attackers to change tactics and use Node.js to evade detection; [âalmost every payload they attempted to deploy ⌠was blockedâ, âuse the trusted, signed runtime to execute a malicious implantâ]
- [T1018] Remote System Discovery â Domain computer enumeration was performed to identify systems in Active Directory; [âgroup âdomain computersâ /domâ, âgiving the attackers a list of every machine joined to the Windows domainâ]
- [T1135] Network Share Discovery â PowerShell/Windows tools were used in broader reconnaissance activity across the domain; [âbrief Active Directory reconnaissance commandâ, âgiving the attackers a list of every machine joined to the Windows domainâ]
- [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel â The implant likely retrieved commands or payloads from blockchain gateways over its C2 path; [âmost likely to retrieve commands or additional payloads hidden in a blockchain smart contractâ, âmade repeated connections to Ethereum blockchain gatewaysâ]
- [T1566] Phishing â ClickFix-style lures were used to trick users into running attacker-supplied commands; [âClickFix-style lure was used for initial accessâ, âvictim pastes and runs an attacker-supplied stringâ]
Indicators of Compromise
- [IP addresses] C2 and staging infrastructure â 45.158.196[.]23:8888, 199.231.70.175:443
- [Domains] attacker C2, spoofed, and staging domains â datalayerservice[.]com, devminelimited[.]com
- [Domains] malware delivery and persistence-related domains â nodejs.org, rebronzeal[.]com
- [URLs] payload retrieval and update endpoints â hxxps://summonhood[.]com, hxxps://toogwido.sa[.]com/Ca.ps1
- [File names] scripts, loaders, and backdoors â accumulatally.ps1, evasion.node
- [File names] remote access and beaconing binaries â thread.exe, main.x64a.exe, and 2 more hashes/files
- [File hashes] identified samples and modules â e901df53873d5379ad9399c63d3e014c7be188a7599b32e5b36b1de1cf7d5fba, d965de63dbd27abb00efeb9bea029cd38952dc5c268b61a522b2358d8452e43a, and other numerous hashes
Read more: https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/node-js-returns-ransomware