Nitrogen Campaign Concludes with BlackCat Ransomware After Targeting Sliver

In November 2023, Nitrogen campaign began with a malvertising drive-by drop of Advanced IP Scanner, followed by loading Sliver and Cobalt Strike beacons and later deploying BlackCat ransomware across the domain after data exfiltration with Restic. The operation spanned eight days (Time to Ransomware ~156 hours) with six private rules added to a ruleset; Nitrogen, Sliver, Cobalt Strike, Restic, and BlackCat were central to the intrusion. #Nitrogen #Sliver #CobaltStrike #Restic #BlackCat #AdvancedIPScanner

Keypoints

  • Intrusion started when a user downloaded a malicious version of Advanced IP Scanner disguised on a fraudulent site.
  • Nitrogen malware deployed Sliver and Cobalt Strike beacons on the beachhead host.
  • Post-exploitation involved network enumeration with PowerSploit, SharpHound, and native Windows utilities.
  • Lateral movement occurred after harvesting domain credentials, using Impacket for movement.
  • Data exfiltration used the Restic backup tool to a remote Bulgarian server.
  • BlackCat ransomware was deployed across the domain after modifying a privileged user password and using PsExec for distribution.
  • The incident lasted eight days, with a Time to Ransomware of about 156 hours, and six rules were added to a Private Ruleset.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1189] Drive-by Compromise – Malicious version of Advanced IP Scanner downloaded via a fraudulent website. – “Malicious version of Advanced IP Scanner downloaded via a fraudulent website.”
  • [T1562.001] Impair Defenses – Bypassing AMSI, WLDP, and ETW. – “Bypassing AMSI, WLDP, and ETW.”
  • [T1574.002] DLL Side-Loading – Nitrogen loads a hidden Python DLL to execute code. – “The hidden python311.dll was loaded (DLL sideloading) and the Nitrogen code was launched.”
  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – PowerShell-based discovery using PowerView during initial access. – “PowerView was loaded in memory to perform further discovery activities. This action was identified through PowerShell Script Block Logging.”
  • [T1069.001] Local Groups – Discover local admins via PowerView. – “PowerView was used to: Gather the local admins.”
  • [T1018] Remote System Discovery – Discovery of network resources and user accounts using various tools. – “Discovery of network resources and user accounts using various tools.”
  • [T1047] Windows Management Instrumentation – Lateral movement using Impacket’s wmiexec. – “Lateral movement using Impacket’s wmiexec.”
  • [T1021.001] Remote Desktop Protocol – Interacting with other systems via a Cobalt Strike beacon injected into winlogon.exe. – “Remote Desktop Protocol … interacting with other systems such as a file server through a Cobalt Strike beacon which was injected into winlogon.exe.”
  • [T1021.002] SMB/Windows Admin Shares – Lateral movement and file/tool transfer via SMB/Windows Admin Shares. – “SMB and Windows copy utility” and “distributing the BlackCat ransomware binary across the network using SMB and the Windows copy utility.”
  • [T1053.005] Scheduled Task – Creation of scheduled tasks for persistence on compromised hosts. – “Creation of scheduled tasks for persistence on compromised hosts.”
  • [T1547.001] Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder – Registry-based persistence via UserInit/Run keys. – “registry run key to launch the ransomware binary upon reboot.”
  • [T1562.009] Safe Mode Boot – Safe Mode with Networking to facilitate ransomware execution. – “set all hosts to restart in safe mode with networking.”
  • [T1003.001] LSASS Memory – Dumping credentials from LSASS for lateral movement. – “dump domain credentials from LSASS.”
  • [T1055] Process Injection – Sliver and Cobalt Strike beacons injected into memory. – “Injection of Sliver and Cobalt Strike beacons into memory.”
  • [T1070.001] Clear Windows Event Logs – Ransomware execution included log clearing. – “clearing of various event logs while the hosts were in safe mode.”
  • [T1569.002] Service Execution/Remote Services – PsExec used to execute on remote hosts. – “distributed the BlackCat ransomware binary across the network using SMB and the Windows copy utility” (PSExec-based execution observed elsewhere).
  • [T1059.003] Windows Command Shell – Use of cmd.exe to run batch scripts and commands. – Various references to batch scripts and cmd execution throughout the activity.
  • [T1059.001] PowerShell (repeat) – PowerShell-based discovery and loading PowerView for domain enumeration. – (covered above under T1059.001).
  • [T1087.001] Local Groups – BloodHound/PowerView discovery of domain admin paths. – (BloodHound collection to identify paths to escalate privileges to domain admin).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [IP] 91.92.250.65, 91.92.250.60 – Cobalt Strike command-and-control servers in Bulgaria; used during lateral movement.
  • [IP] 194.49.94.18:8443, 194.169.175.134:8443 – Sliver/Cobalt Strike C2 servers with invalid certificates; observed in Netherlands/The Netherlands.
  • [IP] 195.123.226.84:8000 – Restic backup repository/exfiltration server (Bulgarian-based).
  • [File name] setup.exe – Malicious Python DLL sideloaded loader named as a legitimate setup executable.
  • [File name] Version.zip – ZIP containing the malicious loader components.
  • [File name] UpdateEdge.bat – Batch script used for persistence; registry Run key and Safe Boot manipulation.
  • [File name] UpdateEG.bat – Additional batch script used in persistence chain.
  • [Hash] DBF5F56998705C37076B6CAE5D0BFB4D – Included in Version.zip; used for artifact identification.
  • [Hash] E6AB3C595AC703AFD94618D1CA1B8EBCE623B21F – Included in Version.zip; used for artifact identification.
  • [Hash] EB64862F1C8464CA3D03CF0A4AC608F4 – Included in wo14.py/Cobalt Strike loader artifacts.
  • [Hash] 6F43E6388B64998B7AA7411104B955A8949C4C63 – Included in loader artifacts.
  • [Certificate] Serial 1657766544761773100 – Untrusted certificate associated with C2 servers; used in FOFA/metadata observations.
  • [Domain/Server] 195.123.226.84:8000 – Restic backup repository, exfiltration target.

Read more: https://thedfirreport.com/2024/09/30/nitrogen-campaign-drops-sliver-and-ends-with-blackcat-ransomware/