FortiGuard Labs observed tax-themed phishing campaigns in Taiwan delivering Winos 4.0 (ValleyRat) via weaponized attachments, DLL sideloading, and BYOVD driver abuse to achieve persistence, privilege escalation, and remote control. Analysis links the activity and infrastructure to a specialized Silver Fox subgroup responsible for evolving, memory-resident plugin delivery and targeted defensive evasion. #Winos4.0 #SilverFox
Keypoints
- Attackers used localized tax and e-invoice lures to distribute Winos 4.0 (ValleyRat) via weaponized RAR/LNK archives and malicious download links.
- Delivery methods include malicious LNK downloaders, DLL sideloading through legitimate executables, and BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) using wsftprm.sys to obtain kernel privileges.
- Malicious scripts perform system binary masquerading (copying curl.exe to url.exe) and obfuscated cmd.exe commands to download and execute Setup64.exe from rotating domains and cloud-hosted URLs.
- Winos 4.0 implements UAC bypass via Debug Object Hijacking, checks privileges, loads drivers, enumerates and terminates numerous security processes, and persists with memory-resident plugins stored in the registry.
- The malware hides C2 using Base64 encoding and loads modular plugins (online/login/file management/screen/control) directly into memory to minimize disk footprints.
- Attribution ties the campaigns to Silver Fox through consistent registrant metadata, a recurring C2 (47.76.86.151), an observed MachineID, and reused project strings (e.g., 大馬專案), indicating organized development and ongoing operations.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1566 ] Phishing – Initial access via tax-themed spearphishing with weaponized attachments and links (‘tax audit notifications, tax filing software installers, and cloud-based e-invoice downloads.’)
- [T1204.002 ] User Execution: Malicious File – Victims are tricked to open a RAR containing a malicious LNK that initiates the infection (‘RAR archive named “taxIs_RX3001.rar,” which contains a benign decoy document and a malicious LNK file.’)
- [T1059.003 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell – LNK invokes cmd.exe with obfuscated arguments to create directories, masquerade binaries, and download payloads (‘By calling cmd.exe, the attacker executes a series of obfuscated commands designed to download the next-stage payload… Arguments:/C md %public%501 & … -o %public%501Se^tup^64.exe …’)
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – Downloading of next-stage binaries and archives from attacker-controlled domains and cloud services (‘download an executable named Setup64.exe from the remote domain bqdrzbyq[.]cn’ and E-Invoice.rar from cloud hosts)
- [T1036 ] Masquerading – System binary masquerading and renaming legitimate utilities to evade filename-based detection (‘copying the legitimate system utility curl.exe to this new directory and renaming it to url.exe to bypass simple filename-based monitoring.’)
- [T1574.002 ] DLL Side-loading – Delivery of a malicious DLL that is loaded by a legitimate executable to execute code (‘delivers an archive containing a DLL that is sideloaded through a legitimate application.’)
- [T1215 ] Kernel Modules and Extensions – Use of a signed kernel-mode driver (wsftprm.sys) via BYOVD to gain kernel privileges (‘core driver involved is wsftprm.sys … perform a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attack by dynamically obtaining Native APIs … to bypass standard service monitoring.’)
- [T1548 ] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism – UAC bypass via Debug Object Hijacking to escalate without prompting the user (‘calls BypassUACViaDebugObject, a technique that combines RPC AppInfo service calls with Debug Object Hijacking … computerdefaults.exe can elevate its thread to administrator level without triggering a UAC prompt.’)
- [T1562.001 ] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools – Malware enumerates and terminates a hardcoded list of security processes to create a clean environment (‘monitoring loop to cross-reference active processes against a hardcoded list of security products… Terminating these processes achieves a clean environment for Winos 4.0 to persist’).
- [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – C2 communications and module retrieval over web protocols, with C2 hidden via Base64 (‘Winos 4.0 hides its C2 address, 47[.]76[.]86[.]151, using Base64 encoding … After verifying the system version, it connects to its C2 to load the core component’).
- [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – Use of obfuscated command strings and multiple Base64-encoded data fields to conceal driver and plugin loading (‘Its data fields contain numerous Base64-encoded strings used to load drivers and target security software’ and use of obfuscated command fragments like c^u^rl.e^x^e).
- [T1057 ] Process Discovery – Active process monitoring to identify and react to security products (‘enters a monitoring loop to cross-reference active processes against a hardcoded list of security products.’)
Indicators of Compromise
- [Domains ] Hosting and distribution infrastructure – bqdrzbyq[.]cn, twtaxgo[.]cn, and 9 more domains
- [IP Address ] C2 server – 47[.]76[.]86[.]151
- [URLs ] Cloud-hosted download links used in phishing – hxxps://twmoi2002.tos-cn-shanghai.volces[.]com/E-Invoice.rar, hxxps://twtaxgo[.]cn/uploads/20260129/taxIs_RX3001.7z, and 1 more URL
- [File Names ] Delivered artifacts and driver – taxIs_RX3001.rar, Setup64.exe, wsftprm.sys
- [SHA256 ] Known malicious file hashes – 64ee7a2e6259286311c8ba1c7b6d30e1e52fe78befcfd1b71b291c788f3e3e6a (Setup.exe), 156f31b37ee0d6e7f87cdc94dcd2d3b084b2e15da08bd8588e17d6bdc43159fe (AISafeSDK64.dll)