Cuckoo is a newly observed macOS Mach-O malware that blends spyware with infostealer capabilities, distributed via a malicious version of DumpMedia Spotify Music Converter and related tools. It uses heavy stealth techniques, including XOR-encoded strings, app masquerading, and persistence, to harvest system and browser data and exfiltrate it to a remote C2. #Cuckoo #DumpMediaSpotifyMusicConverter #macOS #SpotifyMusicConverter
Keypoints
- A Mach-O binary named upd in the DumpMedia Spotify Music Converter bundle acts as the malicious loader for Cuckoo, a cross between spyware and an infostealer.
- Cuckoo uses ad hoc signing, attributes quarantine removal, and app translocation techniques to evade initial execution and persist on macOS.
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MITRE Techniques
- [T1547.001] Launch Agent – Persistence via LaunchAgents plist and launchctl load -w to run every 60 seconds. Quote: “launchctl load -w “/Users/test/Library/LaunchAgents/com.dumpmedia.spotifymusicconverter.plist””
- [T1059.004] Unix Shell – Execution through a bash shell and system_profiler usage to gather hardware UUID. Quote: “spawned a bash shell and started to gather host information using the system_profiler command to gather the hardware UUID.”
- [T1059.005] AppleScript – AppleScript/osascript prompts for credentials and interacts with system prompts. Quote: “osascript to ask the user for their password using the prompt “macOS needs to access System Settings.””
- [T1113] Screen Capture – Uses screencapture to capture the screen and save images. Quote: “The malware then proceeds to look for various file-type extensions… It will then unmute the computer by running the screencapture command.”
- [T1036] Masquerading – Masquerades as legitimate DumpMedia Spotify Music Converter by duplicating the legitimate app into /Applications and opening it. Quote: “the malware copies the legitimate version of the application that was found in the resource folder to the /Application directory. It then launches the application.”
- [T1083] File and Directory Discovery – Discovers and enumerates directories and files (e.g., /Applications, Safari data, Keychains, Notes). Quote: “openDir_readDir(DirectoryOpen: &DirectoryOpen, “*”, avoid_DS_Store, &var_2b0, 0x3e7)”
- [T1056] Input Capture – Password collection via pw.dat after prompting the user; credential verification via Core Services Identity. Quote: “PasswordCapture() is executed… passwordChecker() function uses Core Services Identity functions to determine if the captured password is correct”
- [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 – Uses curl to post data to a remote C2; includes the target URL. Quote: “http://146.70.80.123/static.php” and “curl_easy_setopt(curlHandle, …)”
- [T1027] Obfuscated/Compressed Files and Information – XOR encoding decodes strings and commands at runtime. Quote: “The strings are XOR-encoded; the output of the command above is set up and decoded in this subroutine.”
Indicators of Compromise
- [DMG] context – Spotify-music-converter.dmg: 254663d6f4968b220795e0742284f9a846f995ba66590d97562e8f19049ffd4b
- [Mach-O] context – DumpMediaSpotifyMusicConverter: 1827db474aa94870aafdd63bdc25d61799c2f405ef94e88432e8e212dfa51ac7
- [Mach-O] context – TuneSoloAppleMusicConverter: d8c3c7eedd41b35a9a30a99727b9e0b47e652b8f601b58e2c20e2a7d30ce14a8
- [Mach-O] context – TuneFunAppleMusicConverter: 39f1224d7d71100f86651012c87c181a545b0a1606edc49131730f8c5b56bdb7
- [Mach-O] context – FoneDogToolkitForAndroid: a709dacc4d741926a7f04cad40a22adfc12dd7406f016dd668dd98725686a2dc
- [Domains/IPs] context – 146.70.80.123/static.php, 146.70.80.123/index.php, tunesolo.com, fonedog.com, tunesfun.com, dumpmedia.com, tunefab.com
Read more: https://blog.kandji.io/malware-cuckoo-infostealer-spyware