MacSync: The Evasive macOS Stealer Exploiting ClickFix Lures

MacSync: The Evasive macOS Stealer Exploiting ClickFix Lures
MacSync Stealer is a macOS information-stealing MaaS operation that uses ClickFix lures, malvertising, and multi-stage native Mach-O loaders to evade Apple defenses. It exfiltrates credentials, Keychain data, cookies, SSH keys, and crypto wallets through HTTPS C2 infrastructure and cleans up traces with self-deleting temporary files. #MacSync #ClickFix #drivinguber.com #newsinweb.com #com.utils.Launcher

Keypoints

  • MacSync Stealer is a commercial macOS information stealer and remote-access stager sold as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS).
  • The malware is delivered mainly through ClickFix social engineering and search engine malvertising rather than software exploits.
  • Its native 64-bit Mach-O stagers detach from the terminal, hide output, and load AppleScript payloads directly into memory.
  • MacSync uses XOR string obfuscation, custom headers, and runtime endpoint construction to evade static analysis and detection.
  • Stolen data includes browser vaults, macOS Keychain data, session cookies, SSH keys, Telegram sessions, and cryptocurrency wallet databases.
  • Exfiltration is performed in 10 MB chunks over HTTP PUT with retry logic, then temporary files are deleted to reduce forensic traces.
  • Telemetry shows broad international targeting, with strong focus on software engineering, crypto/Web3, remote work, government, and fintech sectors.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1204.002 ] User Execution – Victims are tricked into running a Terminal command through ClickFix prompts (‘users are tricked into copying and running commands in Terminal under the guise of software installers, CAPTCHA checks, download errors, or troubleshooting prompts’).
  • [T1059.002 ] AppleScript – The stager pipes remote content directly into osascript to execute an in-memory AppleScript payload (‘pipes the response directly into /usr/bin/osascript via stdin’).
  • [T1059.004 ] Unix Shell – The infection chain uses shell commands such as curl and zsh to launch stages (‘curl -s … | zsh’).
  • [T1543.001 ] Launch Agent – Persistence is established by placing a malicious plist in LaunchAgents (‘persists using the ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ directory’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – Strings, URLs, headers, and paths are hidden with single-byte XOR obfuscation (‘hide functional strings … using … ObfuscatedString’).
  • [T1564.001 ] Hidden Files and Directories – Temporary artifacts are stored with dot-prefixed names (‘/tmp/.httpcode’).
  • [T1070.004 ] File Deletion – The malware removes staging and status files after successful upload (‘deletes /tmp/osalogging.zip and /tmp/.httpcode’).
  • [T1036.005 ] Masquerading – The signed binary uses a spoofed utility-style identifier to blend in (‘Signing Identifier com.utils.Launcher’).
  • [T1562.001 ] Impair Defenses – It suppresses terminal output by redirecting standard streams to /dev/null (‘redirects stdin, stdout, and stderr to /dev/null’).
  • [T1555.001 ] Credentials from Password Stores – The AppleScript steals Keychain data and stored credentials (‘steals all keychains data’).
  • [T1539 ] Steal Web Session Cookie – The payload dumps browser session cookies for reuse (‘session cookies’).
  • [T1552.004 ] Private Keys – The stealer targets SSH keys and other private credentials (‘SSH keys’).
  • [T1082 ] System Information Discovery – The malware collects host details such as macOS version and hardware UUID (‘collects macOS version, hardware UUID, and CPU architecture’).
  • [T1560.001 ] Archive Collected Data – Stolen data is bundled into a ZIP archive before exfiltration (‘archives stolen data into /tmp/osalogging.zip’).
  • [T1071.001 ] Web Protocols – C2 communication uses HTTPS with custom headers (‘connects to C2 servers over HTTPS’).
  • [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – The remote AppleScript payload is fetched from the server and executed (‘Downloads second-stage AppleScript modules’).
  • [T1030 ] Data Transfer Size Limits – Large archives are split into 10 MB chunks for upload (‘splits files into 10 MB chunks’).
  • [T1048.003 ] Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol – Data is uploaded with HTTP PUT requests (‘uploads them sequentially via HTTP PUT requests’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [SHA-256 Hash ] Native Mach-O stager sample – 9ff32f7c0108e9d27a3b491edf04827b6ca025f44db68aeadc44eeb97c9aab11, and other 2 items (MD5 9678f71ea4cccbc3d511dc8d7f24b113, SHA-1 59508d071661ea70fa5fcbe6f9e2fb72506e57df)
  • [Code Signing ID ] Spoofed ad-hoc signing identifier – com.utils.Launcher
  • [File Path ] Staging and cleanup artifacts – /tmp/osalogging.zip, /tmp/.httpcode
  • [Domain ] Primary and fallback C2 infrastructure – drivinguber.com, newsinweb.com
  • [Subdomain ] Region-specific fallback endpoints – asia.newsinweb.com, usa.newsinweb.com
  • [URI ] Dynamic payload and upload gates – /dynamic?txd=c4f70f37daae63fe47b0c92adf006f8cf50b6c522ad572a4014275cf979013a0, /gate?buildtxd=c4f70f37daae63fe47b0c92adf006f8cf50b6c522ad572a4014275cf979013a0
  • [HTTP Header ] Campaign authentication header – api-key: de62a2f47d1c7dec2997f931a050a615
  • [User-Agent ] Spoofed client string – Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) CFNetwork/Darwin 26.0.0 AppleWebKit/537.36
  • [Campaign Token ] Shared transaction token used in URLs – c4f70f37daae63fe47b0c92adf006f8cf50b6c522ad572a4014275cf979013a0


Read more: https://www.seqrite.com/blog/macsync-the-evasive-macos-stealer-exploiting-clickfix-lures/