ESET researchers link Lazarus to the 3CX supply-chain attack, detailing Operation DreamJob’s Linux payload OdicLoader delivering the SimplexTea backdoor via OpenDrive. The findings reinforce Lazarus’s cross-OS toolkit (Windows, macOS, Linux) and its engagement in high-profile supply-chain compromises. #Lazarus #3CX
Keypoints
- The Lazarus group’s Operation DreamJob targeted Linux users with a decoy HSBC job offer, culminating in the SimplexTea Linux backdoor delivered through OpenDrive.
- Attribution strengthened to Lazarus for the 3CX supply-chain attack, with links to previously observed Lazarus Mac and Windows components (AppleJeus, Gopuram, etc.).
- The attack chain starts with a ZIP containing a lure and ends with a second-stage backdoor fetched from cloud storage, modified Bash profile, and muted output.
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- The 3CX incident is tied to Lazarus with cross-OS malware families (Windows/macOS/Linux) sharing code and infrastructure patterns.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1593.001] Social Media: Social Media – Lazarus attackers probably approached a target with a fake HSBC-themed job offer that would fit the target’s interest. “The Lazarus group’s Operation DreamJob involves approaching targets through LinkedIn and tempting them with job offers from industry leaders.”
- [T1584.001] Acquire Infrastructure: Domains – Unlike many previous cases of compromised C&C used in Operation DreamJob, Lazarus operators registered their own domain for the Linux target. “Acquire Infrastructure: Domains.”
- [T1587.001] Develop Capabilities: Malware – Custom tools from the attack are very likely developed by the attackers. “Develop Capabilities: Malware.”
- [T1585.003] Establish Accounts: Cloud Accounts – The attackers hosted the final stage on the cloud service OpenDrive. “Establish Accounts: Cloud Accounts.”
- [T1608.001] Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware – The attackers hosted the final stage on the cloud service OpenDrive. “Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware.”
- [T1204.002] User Execution: Malicious File – OdicLoader masquerades as a PDF file in order to fool the target. “User Execution: Malicious File.”
- [T1566.002] Phishing: Spearphishing Link – The target likely received a link to third-party remote storage with a malicious ZIP archive. “Phishing: Spearphishing Link.”
- [T1546.004] Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification – OdicLoader modifies the victim’s Bash profile, so SimplexTea is launched each time Bash is started and its output is muted. “Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification.”
- [T1134.002] Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token – SimplexTea can create a new process, if instructed by its C&C server. “Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token.”
- [T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – SimplexTea stores its configuration in an encrypted apdl.cf. “Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information.”
- [T1027.009] Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads – The droppers of all malicious chains contain an embedded data array with an additional stage. “Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads.”
- [T1562.003] Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging – OdicLoader modifies the victim’s Bash profile, so the output and error messages from SimplexTea are muted. “Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging.”
- [T1070.004] Indicator Removal: File Deletion – SimplexTea has the ability to delete files securely. “Indicator Removal: File Deletion.”
- [T1497.003] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time-Based Evasion – SimplexTea implements multiple custom sleep delays in its execution. “Time Based Evasion.”
- [T1083] Discovery: File and Directory Discovery – SimplexTea can list the directory content together with their names, sizes, and timestamps. “File and Directory Discovery.”
- [T1071.001] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – SimplexTea can use HTTP and HTTPS for communication with its C&C server. “Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols.”
- [T1573.001] Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography – SimplexTea encrypts C&C traffic using AES-GCM. “Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography.”
- [T1132.001] Data Encoding: Base64 – SimplexTea encodes C&C traffic using base64. “Data Encoding: Standard Encoding.”
- [T1090] Proxy – SimplexTea can utilize a proxy for communications. “Proxy.”
- [T1041] Exfiltration: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – SimplexTea can exfiltrate data as ZIP archives to its C&C server. “Exfiltration Over C2 Channel.”
Indicators of Compromise
- [File hash] Linux/NukeSped.E – 0CA1723AFE261CD85B05C9EF424FC50290DCE7DF
- [File hash] Linux/NukeSped.E – 3A63477A078CE10E53DFB5639E35D74F93CEFA81
- [Network] C2 server – 23.254.211.230 (Hostwinds LLC.)
- [Network] C2 server – 172.93.201.88 (journalide[.]org hosting)
- [Domain] C2 domain – journalide[.]org
- [Domain] Cloud storage domain – od[.]lk
- [Filename] guiconfigd – Linux/NukeSped.E
- [Filename] HSBC_job_offer.pdf – Linux/NukeSped.E