An analysis of how researchers uncover and trace ransomware campaigns through shared code, IOCs, and evolution across variants, using ADHUBLLKA and its descendants as a case study. It highlights rebranding tactics, TOR-based communication, and the use of a Freshdesk portal for victim negotiations and decryptor delivery. #ADHUBLLKA #DeathRansom #Lolkek #OBZ #U2K #TZW #Freshdesk #TOR
Keypoints
- ADHUBLLKA is a ransomware family with a long lineage: DeathRansom → BIT → LOLKEK → OBZ → U2K → TZW, showing how campaigns evolve while staying linked.
- August 2023 saw a new strain (r.exe) identified as a spin-off of ADHUBLLKA, active since August 1, 2023, with known MD5: 0f77484639b1193ad66e313040c92571b.
- The group uses TOR-based victim portals and an alternate channel (e.g., yip.su/2QstD5) to negotiate and obtain decryption keys after payment.
- Negotiation flows include a Freshdesk ticketing system, sample file submissions, and explicit decryption key delivery post-payment, with notes that the operator may delete messages to cover tracks.
- Ransomware notes and communications indicate a shift from v2 to v3 TOR URLs and the use of a short URL to reach a ticketing site, suggesting ongoing operational adaptation.
- IOCs include multiple IPs, domains, email addresses, and MD5/SHA hashes, plus file artifacts like r.exe, AddInProcess32.exe, and extensions such as .MMM and .readme.
- There is potential cross-over with GlobeImposter branding, but the article argues these samples belong to the ADHUBLLKA family based on observed tactics and communications.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1573] Encrypted Channel – The threat actor communicates via TOR-based portals to obtain decryption keys after payment. Quote: “The threat actor asks victims to communicate via a TOR-based victim portal to obtain decryption keys following ransom payment.”
- [T1090] Proxy – TOR-based communications and alternate channels are used to hide activity. Quote: “Alternate communication channel: https://yip.su/2QstD5”
- [T1486] Data Encrypted for Impact – All files are encrypted with “.MMM” extensions and contain “CRYPTO LOCKER” text. Quote: “All files will be encrypted with “.MMM” extensions appended to the affected files.”
- [T1055] Process Injection – The sample drops malicious components (AddInProcess32.exe) and initiates infection via process injection. Quote: “process injection or dropping a malicious executable (AddInProcess32.exe) in a victim environment and initializing the infection chain.”
- [T1036] Masquerading – The campaign rebrands and rotates between variants, effectively masquerading as new ransomware. Quote: “they may change the encryption scheme, ransom notes, or command-and-control (C2) communication channels and then, re-brand themselves as a “new” ransomware.”
- [T1573] Encrypted Channel (duplicate line for emphasis) – TOR-based operations and observed transitions from v2 to v3 TOR URLs. Quote: “The above ransom notes indicate that the group has changed their communication channel from v2 TOR Onion URLs to v3 TOR URL.”
- [T1091] Replication through Removable Media – The article maps this technique in the matrix; observed code reuse across variants implies propagation practices. Quote: “T1091: Replication through Removable Media”
- [T1560] Archive Collected Data – Included as part of the ATT&CK matrix listing in the article; context suggests collection/archival behavior around exfiltration. Quote: “T1560: Archive Collected Data”
- [T1158] Hidden Files and Directories – Encryption and file naming patterns imply attempts to conceal artifacts. Quote: “Hidden Files and Directories”
- [T1027] Obfuscated Files or Information – The presence of encrypted and gibberish content in encrypted files implies obfuscation. Quote: “Obfuscated Files or Information”
- [T1406.002] Software Packing – Packaging/packing of malicious components is implied by the multi-component infection chain. Quote: “Software Packing”
- [T1056] Input Capture – User or victim interactions during negotiation or ticket submission may represent input capture activity. Quote: “Input Capture”
- [T1124] System Time Discovery – Timelines and variant release dates hint at time-based analysis of infections. Quote: “System Time Discovery”
- [T1518.001] Security Software Discovery – The notes discuss deception and evasion tactics that can reveal security tools. Quote: “Security Software Discovery”
- [T1057] Process Discovery – Understanding running processes as part of infection and persistence. Quote: “Process Discovery”
Indicators of Compromise
- [MD5 Hashes] Case-related hashes – 0f77484639b1193ad66e313040c92571b, 77d0a95415ef989128805252cba93dc2, and 25+ more hashes
- [File Names] Infected/executed files – r.exe, AddInProcess32.exe, and other variants (e.g., MD5.vir, SHA256.bin)
- [Extensions] Encrypted file extensions – .MMM, and note-associated extensions like .readme
- [IP Addresses] Communications and C2 nodes – 104.18.14.101, 20.99.184.37, 192.229.211.108, 23.216.147.61
- [Domains/Onion Services] TOR domains – mmcbkgua72og66w4jz3qcxkkhefax754pg6iknmtfujvkt2j65ffraad.onion; 162.159.130.233, 162.159.133.233, etc. (listed domains/IPs)
- [Tor/Web Channels] Tor and Freshdesk references – yip.su/2QstD5; bit7.freshdesk.com
- [Emails] Contact addresses – [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Read more: https://netenrich.com/blog/discovering-the-adhubllka-ransomware-family