Howling at the Inbox: Sticky Werewolf’s Latest Malicious Aviation Attacks

Morphisec Labs tracks Sticky Werewolf activity, noting a shift toward espionage-style operations targeting aviation stakeholders with phishing, multi-stage payloads, and data exfiltration. The campaign leverages archive attachments, LNK files, WebDAV-hosted payloads, and a sophisticated loader chain involving Batch and AutoIt, along with anti-analysis and persistence techniques.
#StickyWerewolf #OKBKristall

Keypoints

  • Sticky Werewolf expanded beyond early targets to the aviation sector, signaling broader espionage objectives.
  • The latest campaign uses archive attachments with LNK files that point to a payload hosted on WebDAV servers, impersonating aviation executives.
  • The infection chain begins with a phishing email containing a decoy PDF and masquerading LNKs, leading to a Batch script and then an AutoIt script that injects the final payload.
  • The loader uses a CypherIT crypter/NSIS self-extracting archive, RC4 decryption, and LZNT1 decompression to deliver the payload, with anti-analysis measures baked in.
  • Persistence is achieved via registry Run Keys and a scheduled task/startup directory; the malware also masquerades components to evade detection.
  • Final payloads include Rhadamanthys Stealer and Ozone RAT, with earlier campaigns distributing MetaStealer, DarkTrack, NetWire, and otherLoader families.
  • Defensive measures like Morphisec Automated Moving Target Defense (AMTD) claim to stop these attacks early in the chain, without relying on traditional signatures.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566.001] Phishing – The phishing email targets aviation/defense sector and uses deceptive lures. Quote: “The phishing email, purportedly sent by the First Deputy General Director and Executive Director of AO OKB Kristall, targets individuals in the aerospace and defense sector.”
  • [T1204.002] User Execution – The initial archive contains LNK and decoy files intended to coax the recipient into executing content. Quote: “The initial archive delivered in the phishing email contains three files designed to deceive the recipient into executing at least one of the malicious email’s contents.”
  • [T1059] Command and Scripting Interpreter – The infection chain includes Batch scripts and an AutoIt script used to deliver the final payload. Quote: “The initial email includes an archive attachment; when the recipient extracts the archive, they find LNK and decoy files. These LNK files point to an executable hosted on a WebDAV server. Once executed, this initiates a Batch script, which then launches an AutoIt script that ultimately injects the final payload.”
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – The payload is hosted on WebDAV servers for download/execution. Quote: “LNK files point to an executable hosted on a WebDAV server.”
  • [T1036] Masquerading – LNK files masquerade as DOCX documents to appear legitimate. Quote: “Two LNK Files Masquerading as DOCX Documents.”
  • [T1547.001] Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder – Persistence via a registry entry to run a network-shared WINWORD.exe on login. Quote: “Registry Entry for Persistence: Adds a registry entry to run WINWORD.exe from a network share (94.156.8[.]166Microsoft Office Word$WINWORD.exe) on login.”
  • [T1053.005] Scheduled Task – Persistence via scheduled task or startup folder. Quote: “Persistence is established via a scheduled task or the startup directory.”)
  • [T1140] Deobfuscation/Decode – Payload decrypted with RC4 via shellcodes. Quote: “decrypts it using two shellcodes that perform RC4 decryption.”
  • [T1027] Obfuscated/Compressed Files and Information – Decrypted bytes decompressed with RtlDecompressFragment (COMPRESSION_FORMAT_LZNT1). Quote: “The decrypted bytes are decompressed using RtlDecompressFragment with COMPRESSION_FORMAT_LZNT1.”
  • [T1055.012] Process Hollowing – Final payload injected via process hollowing into a legitimate AutoIt process. Quote: “The final payload is then injected using a process hollowing into a legitimate AutoIT process.”
  • [T1562.001] Impair Defenses – Anti-analysis/anti-emulation checks by the AutoIt script. Quote: “Anti-Analysis and Anti-Emulation: The script checks for artifacts or signs belonging to security vendors’ emulators and environments.”

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File Hash] MD5 hashes – 05880ff0442bbedc8f46076ef56d4d1ffeda68d9ef26b659c4868873fa84c1a9, 03ee2011ad671b1781015024ea53edfbff92c28c2b123bba02d6a6f462e74105, c3efbac8ebffcf3d8178ce23e59f3b4978f5a91bf93773889870d45cc1b554b0, ce2b6d3aad07d3dec2b24f676cc9d2022bab5a086c7e773f9cfa3e7b7dc6d66a, 217196571088cfd63105ae836482d742befcb7db37308ce757162c005a5af6ab, 9eddffbef4d9d7329d062db0a93c933104d00f12106bf91fa3b58e8f8b19aa41
  • [IP Address] 79.132.128[.]47, 94.156.8[.]166, 94.156.8[.]211 – IPs referenced in LNK/decoy/exfiltration/external resource communications
  • [Domain] document-cdn[.]org – Domain referenced in LNK/Scripts/loader chain
  • [File name] Повестка совещания.docx.lnk, Список рассылки.docx.lnk, image.jpg, C:aaa_TouchMeNot_.txt – Decoy/Loader-related files

Read more: https://blog.morphisec.com/sticky-werewolfs-aviation-attacks