INC ransomware evolved into one of the most active RaaS operations by 2026, surpassing 800 victims since 2023 and expanding after LockBit’s disruption and BlackCat’s shutdown. The group uses Rust-compiled Windows and Linux/ESXi encryptors, updated Veeam credential-dumping tooling, and an affiliate ecosystem that helped spawn related families like Lynx and Sinobi. #INC #LockBit #BlackCat #Veeam #Lynx #Sinobi
Keypoints
- INC has grown from a mid-2023 RaaS operation into one of the most active ransomware groups in 2026, with more than 800 victims since 2023.
- The group benefited from the disruption of LockBit and BlackCat, as affiliates reportedly migrated to INC.
- Both Windows and Linux/ESXi payloads were rewritten in Rust, increasing portability and making analysis harder.
- INC updated its tooling with a modified Veeam credential dumper that supports newer salted DPAPI credential encryption.
- The 2024 sale of INC source code helped inspire related ransomware families, including Lynx and Sinobi, which share code overlap.
- Victims are heavily concentrated in the United States, with legal services, manufacturing, construction, technology, and health care among the top targets.
- INC uses double extortion, exfiltration to cloud storage via rclone, remote access tools, and printer-based ransom note delivery to pressure victims.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1566 ] Phishing – Initial access via spear phishing used by affiliates to enter victim environments (‘spear phishing’).
- [T1078 ] Valid Accounts – Actors used stolen or compromised credentials from Initial Access Brokers and reused valid logins (‘valid account credentials from Initial Access Brokers (IAB)’).
- [T1190 ] Exploit Public-Facing Application – Initial access through exploitation of exposed systems such as Citrix, Fortinet EMS, and SimpleHelp (‘exploitation of vulnerabilities in public-facing applications’).
- [T1016 ] System Network Configuration Discovery – Discovery of networked systems and volumes by iterating drives and checking connectivity (‘GetDriveTypeW’, ‘ping and net commands’).
- [T1047 ] Windows Management Instrumentation / Command and Scripting Interpreter – Command execution and discovery were performed through cmd.exe and PowerShell (‘deploy a base64 encoded script through cmd.exe’).
- [T1003 ] OS Credential Dumping – A modified Veeam credential dumper was used to extract stored credentials (‘The decoded script is found to be a Veeam credential dumper’).
- [T1021.001 ] Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol – Lateral movement used RDP to access other systems (‘including remote desktop protocol (RDP)’).
- [T1021.002 ] Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares – Lateral movement included PsExec-based remote execution (‘PsExec’).
- [T1489 ] Service Stop – Used tools such as PsKill and custom terminators to kill EDRs and processes (‘used different tools to kill EDRs’).
- [T1562.001 ] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools – Dropped vulnerable drivers and terminated security tooling to weaken defenses (‘drops vulnerable drivers … and installs them as a service’).
- [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – Payloads were packed with VMProtect and encoded notes/scripts were embedded in Base64 (‘heavily packed and protected by VMProtect’, ‘Base64-encoded string’).
- [T1219 ] Remote Access Software – Commercial tools were used for C2 and remote control (‘Cobalt Strike, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, and TeamViewer’).
- [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Staged data was compressed and uploaded to attacker-controlled cloud storage using rclone (‘upload the archives to attacker-controlled cloud storage using rclone’).
- [T1486 ] Data Encrypted for Impact – Files were encrypted across the environment with configurable partial encryption (‘run the encryptor across the environment’).
- [T1490 ] Inhibit System Recovery – Shadow copies were deleted to hinder recovery (‘Successfully deleted shadow copies’).
- [T1046 ] Network Service Scanning – The malware scanned for active printers and other network assets (‘scans the compromised network for active printers’).
- [T1565.001 ] Stored Data Manipulation: Data Encrypted – The malware appended .INC to files and used file footers to mark encrypted data (‘appends ‘.INC’ extension to all encrypted files’).
- [T1070.004 ] File Deletion – The payload removed or overwrote artifacts such as shadow copies and notes during execution (‘while deleting shadow copies’).
- [T1091 ] Replication Through Removable Media – Not directly confirmed; no direct use beyond removable media discovery, so omit if strict matching is required.
Indicators of Compromise
- [File hashes ] Windows sample and Linux sample hashes – 31800380c359143ae82c4f9011eee653dd22443d03d6a499148203bbfc275502, 589d9480fbfec2d8e61638eb0b537183d0f9977411fd1d2c0f8eb611feebe8807
- [Domains ] Public leak and payment infrastructure – incblog[.]su, incblog6qu4y4mm4zvw5nrmue6qbwtgjsxpw6b7ixzssu36tsajldoad[.]onion
- [Domains ] Payment site – incpaykabjqc2mtdxq6c23nqh4x6m5dkps5fr6vgdkgzp5njssx6qkid[.]onion
- [File names ] Ransom note and family marker – INC-README.txt, .INC
- [Executable names / paths ] Discovery and defense-impairment tools used in incidents – ipscan.exe, pskill.exe, netscan.exe
- [IP addresses ] Internal discovery targets mentioned in incident context – 10.2.2.202
- [Driver names ] Vulnerable drivers dropped by the custom terminator – filwfp.sys, filnk.sys, fildds.sys