Flash Alert: EtherRat and TukTuk C2 End in The Gentleman Ransomware – The DFIR Report

The intrusion linked EtherRAT, TukTuk, GoTo Resolve, and The Gentlemen ransomware in a multi-stage campaign that used malicious MSI installers, blockchain-based C2, SaaS platforms, and cloud services. The attackers performed reconnaissance, credential theft, lateral movement, data exfiltration, and domain-wide ransomware deployment while abusing legitimate tools and infrastructure to evade detection. #EtherRAT #TukTuk #GoToResolve #TheGentlemen #TryCloudflare #Wasabi #Supabase #ClickHouse #Arweave #Ethereum

Keypoints

  • EtherRAT was first observed targeting Linux servers via CVE-2025-55182, and later appeared in a Windows campaign linked to the same activity cluster.
  • A malicious MSI disguised as Sysinternals RAMMap installed EtherRAT, which used Ethereum blockchain-based EtherHiding to fetch its C2 configuration.
  • The attacker later updated configuration to activate C2 through TryCloudflare tunnels and used decoy domains to obscure infrastructure analysis.
  • TukTuk was deployed through trojanized binaries and DLL sideloading, with primary C2 over ClickHouse and Supabase and backup channels via other SaaS services.
  • The intruders conducted Kerberoasting, credential discovery, LSASS/NTDS dumping, RDP/SMB/WinRM activity, and lateral deployment of GoTo Resolve.
  • Rclone was used to exfiltrate data to Wasabi storage before The Gentlemen ransomware was deployed across the domain via malicious GPO and scheduled tasks.
  • The campaign relied on blockchain, SaaS, RMM, and cloud infrastructure to maintain access and resist traditional network defenses.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1204 ] User Execution – The victim executed a malicious MSI installer disguised as a Sysinternals utility (‘user execute a malicious MSI installer masquerading as the Sysinternals RAMMap utility’).
  • [T1218.007 ] Msiexec – The malware was installed through MSI execution using msiexec (‘Monitor msiexec.exe executing from user Desktop/Downloads’).
  • [T1055 ] Process Injection – The report indicates memory-captured activity and LSASS-targeting behavior consistent with injected or in-memory tradecraft (‘captured in memory’).
  • [T1082 ] System Information Discovery – The actor profiled the host, OS, video controller, domain state, and antivirus (‘system profiling, antivirus enumeration, domain checks’).
  • [T1018 ] Remote System Discovery – The threat actor enumerated domain controllers and trusted domains (‘nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts’, ‘nltest /dclist’).
  • [T1033 ] System Owner/User Discovery – The actor used whoami /all and LDAP-style user discovery to learn about accounts (‘user activity discovery’, ‘whoami /all’).
  • [T1482 ] Domain Trust Discovery – Domain trust enumeration was performed during discovery (‘nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts’).
  • [T1069.002 ] Domain Group Discovery – The actor queried privileged groups such as Domain Admins and Enterprise Admins (‘net group “Domain Admins” /domain’).
  • [T1068 ] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation – Initial access began with exploitation of a public vulnerability on Linux servers (‘exploitation of CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell)’).
  • [T1003.001 ] OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory – The attacker dumped LSASS via comsvcs.dll (‘rundll32.exe … comsvcs.dll … lsass.exe’).
  • [T1003.003 ] OS Credential Dumping: NTDS – NetExec was used with the –ntds option and NTDS dumping was referenced (‘nxc smb … –ntds’, ‘LSASS/NTDS dumping activity’).
  • [T1110.003 ] Kerberoasting – The attacker performed Kerberoasting to target service account credentials (‘Kerberoasting operations’).
  • [T1021.001 ] Remote Services: RDP – The intrusion expanded access through Remote Desktop Protocol (‘expanded access through RDP’).
  • [T1021.002 ] Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares – Lateral movement used SMB across systems (‘expanded access through … SMB’).
  • [T1021.006 ] Remote Services: WinRM – The actor used WinRM for lateral access (‘expanded access through … WinRM’).
  • [T1219 ] Remote Access Software – GoTo Resolve was installed and used as remote management tooling (‘deploy GoTo Resolve remote management tooling’).
  • [T1071.001 ] Web Protocols – C2 and tasking used HTTPS-based services and tunnels such as TryCloudflare, ClickHouse, and Supabase (‘communicated with … SaaS platforms’).
  • [T1090.002 ] External Proxy – TryCloudflare tunnels were used as a proxy to the environment (‘allowing remote access … over a Cloudflare tunnel’).
  • [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – Additional payloads were downloaded from S3 buckets and other internet sources (‘downloaded additional payloads from S3 buckets’).
  • [T1053.005 ] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task – Ransomware binaries were executed via scheduled tasks in SYSVOL/NETLOGON (‘executed staged ransomware binaries … via scheduled tasks’).
  • [T1486 ] Data Encrypted for Impact – The Gentlemen ransomware was deployed to encrypt systems (‘ransomware operations began’).
  • [T1562.001 ] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools – Defender protections and AV were disabled or excluded (‘disabled Microsoft Defender protections, added AV exclusions’).
  • [T1070.004 ] Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion – Shadow copies and forensic artifacts were removed (‘deleted shadow copies, cleared event logs, and removed forensic artifacts’).
  • [T1610 ] Deploy Container – Virtual machines were stopped before encryption, impacting system recovery (‘stopped virtual machines’).
  • [T1136.001 ] Create Account: Local Account – Privileged account passwords were reset during the intrusion (‘resetting privileged account passwords’).
  • [T1071.004 ] DNS – The operation used DNS lookups for configuration and infrastructure resolution (‘DNS Lookup (1rpc.io)’, ‘DNS Query to Commonly Abused Cloudflare Domain’).
  • [T1555 ] Credentials from Password Stores – Credential discovery targeted administrative credentials and service account secrets (‘credential discovery targeting administrative accounts’).
  • [T1574.002 ] Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading – TukTuk was executed via DLL sideloading (‘executed via DLL sideloading’).
  • [T1102.001 ] Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver – TukTuk could query Arweave as a dead-drop resolver (‘queries the Arweave blockchain … retrieves an encrypted configuration blob’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [Domain ] blockchain/C2 configuration and resolution – 1rpc.io, trycloudflare.com
  • [Domain ] SaaS C2 and staging infrastructure – vefbdzzuaadnascpeqcn.supabase.co, k135neflez.westus3.azure.clickhouse.cloud
  • [Domain ] related campaign infrastructure – vngz3ntdrb.us-east1.gcp.clickhouse.cloud, muurfzqprzmdkzoibxaz.supabase.co
  • [Domain ] fallback/exfil and related services – borjumaniya.store, ep-lively-cherry-a80bmwii.eastus2.azure.neon.tech
  • [Domain ] Arweave gateways used for dead-drop resolution – goldsky.arweave.net, arweave.net, and g8way.io
  • [Ethereum Contract ] EtherHiding/C2 resolution – 0xdf0b529043ef7a2bb9111bad26de624a326bacf90, 0x5953f27F044779a3AFCd2BF56a4B712583Dd2E4e
  • [Arweave Drive-Id ] TukTuk dead-drop lookup key – a6278417-39f4-407e-90bf-599f74726e66
  • [File ] malicious initial access and loader artifacts – RAMMap.msi, smokymo.msi
  • [File ] EtherRAT payload/config files – MVnVmUYj.cmd, A7Pnj975bl.cfg, v72HYLU3OpRBznc.ini
  • [File ] TukTuk-related binary – log4net.dll
  • [Hash ] malicious installer and payload hashes – RAMMap.msi hash 73ce2438d4ed475e03727b7b000d27943d5ee8429ef00824c0351cba507dfeb92b54f83bd9487fdc097f770e5661f9e5dee130068cb179d33716abff1a21c8cb901f25a6, MVnVmUYj.cmd hash b2d51212744f404714fd909e87254d98c98ee41f09ae079a5643626f57eb84f92205bb2b8c2665adf8bfab65463f2a9bd1b7bb0231de3f5c1e6a2e51479e44aaac2e7bf0
  • [Hash ] additional payload hashes – A7Pnj975bl.cfg hash c92cf9a1af5b1fe25cdcb8771ce52be4b44c8084b88d31113ee51758740eb84c251bdae84142d5efd4ea2abab77f2f0a917610e2ff976bf9e19d7ad1e9156eccdc5412db, v72HYLU3OpRBznc.ini hash 77fbe265fd65c7f7b6d323fb6de6a4fd114ec028a3fc4ed50056ee8166b0c39acff6ff032d4b4bb18b8445e49eeda571982874403befcecf78266e3d405f6529d98bee46
  • [Hash ] more payload hashes – log4net.dll hash f985b8d6d635c266fc4779dad77aa75cba80d7b038758a129861e1e498e462cc3d68ae2019021e53b9929fdf4b7d0e0707434d56bb73c1a9b7403c8837b44d1c417198dc, smokymo.msi hash b188fbc6ff5557767e73e4c883a553a3aa9218994798ae31a19d3e7e39cfac2e2ee558401795eacd2c58894ccdd6be8854fe6456c3b069a3a873432343b57b475b256aee


Read more: https://thedfirreport.com/2026/05/11/flash-alert-etherrat-and-tuktuk-c2-end-in-the-gentleman-ransomware/