Trend Research analyzes Vidar Stealer v2.0, a full rewrite in C that adds multithreaded data theft, advanced anti-analysis and AppBound bypass techniques, and an automatic polymorphic builder, enabling faster and more evasive credential and wallet exfiltration. The release aligns with declining Lumma Stealer activity and a spike in Vidar adoption, suggesting threat actors may migrate to Vidar and StealC; #Vidar #LummaStealer
Keypoints
- Vidar 2.0 is a complete rewrite from C++ to C, claimed to improve stability and speed.
- Multithreaded architecture enables parallelized data collection that scales with CPU cores and memory.
- Advanced browser credential extraction includes memory injection to bypass Chrome AppBound protections and uses named pipes for inter-process communication.
- An automatic polymorphic builder generates unique binaries and control-flow flattening obfuscation to hinder static detection and reverse engineering.
- Targets a wide range of data: browser credentials, crypto wallets, cloud credentials, FTP/SSH files, gaming/social platform data, and screenshots.
- Exfiltration uses HTTP multipart form submissions to a round-robin C2 infrastructure including Telegram bots and Steam profiles, followed by cleanup and self-deletion.
- Release timing correlates with Lumma Stealer decline and a measurable spike in Vidar activity, indicating likely increased adoption by underground actors.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1622 ] Debugger Evasion â Vidar performs debugger detection as part of extensive anti-analysis checks: âdebugger detectionâ.
- [T1497.001 ] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion â The malware uses timing verification, system uptime validation, and hardware profiling to avoid execution in analysis environments: âtiming verification, system uptime validation, and hardware profilingâ.
- [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information â Uses control flow flattening and numeric state machines to obscure program logic and hinder analysis: âheavy use of control flow flattening, implementing complex switch-case structures with numeric state machinesâ.
- [T1055.001 ] Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection â Vidar injects malicious code into running browser processes using reflective DLL or shellcode injection to extract encryption keys from memory: âinjects malicious code directly into running browser processes using either shellcode or reflective DLL injectionâ.
- [T1055.002 ] Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection â The malware performs injections into active processes to steal keys from memory rather than from storage: âinjects malicious code directly into running browser processes ⌠The injected payload extracts encryption keys directly from browser memoryâ.
- [T1082 ] System Information Discovery â Conducts system profiling and hardware enumeration to adapt thread count and behavior: âsystem profiling to collect victim informationâ and âThread count is dynamically calculated based on CPU Core count and available physical memoryâ.
- [T1083 ] File and Directory Discovery â The file grabber searches user directories and removable drives for valuable files and wallets: âsystematically searches for valuable files across user directories and removable drivesâ.
- [T1087.001 ] Account Discovery: Local Account â Performs account and environment discovery as part of initialization and profiling (enumeration of local accounts implied in discovery steps): âsystem profiling to collect victim informationâ.
- [T1518.001 ] Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery â Conducts security software checks during initialization to decide whether to proceed: âanti-analysis checks including ⌠security checksâ (implied in evasion checks and software profiling).
- [T1555.003 ] Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers â Extracts browser credentials from storage and memory across Chrome, Firefox, Edge and other browsers: âcomprehensive browser credential extraction capabilities targeting both traditional browser storage methods and Chromeâs latest security protectionsâ.
- [T1555 ] Credentials from Password Stores â Uses DPAPI decryption of Local State files and memory theft to obtain stored credentials: âattempts to extract encryption keys from Local State files using standard DPAPI decryptionâ.
- [T1552.001 ] Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files â Searches for credential files and configuration files such as FileZilla recentservers.xml and WinSCP sessions: âAppDataRoamingFileZillarecentservers.xmlâ and âSoftwareMartin PrikrylWinSCP 2Sessionsâ.
- [T1528 ] Steal Application Access Token â Targets cloud and application tokens such as msal.cache and IdentityService tokens to harvest access tokens: â.IdentityService â Azure identity tokensâ and âmsal.cache â Microsoft Authentication Library cacheâ.
- [T1005 ] Data from Local System â Collects files and databases (browser storage, wallet files, documents) from the local system and removable media: âfile grabber component systematically searches for valuable files across user directories and removable drivesâ.
- [T1113 ] Screen Capture â Captures screenshots for additional intelligence prior to exfiltration: âscreenshot capture for additional intelligence valueâ.
- [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols â Exfiltrates data via HTTP multipart form submissions to C2 infrastructure: âdata packaging and exfiltration through HTTP multipart form submissionsâ.
- [T1102.001 ] Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver â Uses web services like Telegram bots and Steam profiles as communication channels for C2 and data transfer: âround-robin command-and-control (C&C) infrastructure that includes Telegram bots and Steam profiles as communication channelsâ.
- [T1573 ] Encrypted Channel â Employs encrypted channels and authenticated tokens for communication and victim tracking (C2 authentication tokens and build identifiers): âuses specific authentication tokens and build identifiers for tracking and victim managementâ.
- [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel â Sends stolen data to command-and-control infrastructure over application-layer channels: âExfiltration through HTTP multipart form submissions to a round-robin command-and-control infrastructureâ.
- [T1020 ] Automated Exfiltration â Uses automated routines to package and exfiltrate data, categorizing stolen data and using different operation modes: âThe malware employs different operation modes to categorize stolen dataâ and âstreamlined exfiltration routinesâ.
Indicators of Compromise
- [File names ] targeted data and artifacts â examples: Local State (browser key store), login Data (Chrome/Edge passwords), logins.json (Firefox passwords).
- [File paths ] credentials and config locations â examples: %AppData%RoamingFileZillarecentservers.xml, %UserProfile%.aws (AWS CLI credentials).
- [Artifacts ] browser and wallet stores â examples: key4.db (Firefox master key), 0.indexeddb.leveldb (wallet storage), and other wallet extension IndexedDB files.
- [Communication channels ] C2 mechanisms â examples: Telegram bots, Steam profiles used as command-and-control channels.
- [Obfuscation/behavioral ] binary characteristics â examples: unique polymorphic builds (automatic morpher) and heavy control-flow flattening observed in samples.
- [Operational indicators ] runtime behaviors â examples: multithreaded worker creation based on CPU/core count and named pipes usage for IPC when exfiltrating keys from browser memory.