Fake Microsoft Teams Campaign Delivers ValleyRAT via NSIS Installer and DLL Sideloading

Fake Microsoft Teams Campaign Delivers ValleyRAT via NSIS Installer and DLL Sideloading

Fake Microsoft Teams download sites were used to distribute a trojanized ZIP archive that installs a multistage loader chain ending in ValleyRAT. The campaign abuses GameBox.exe for DLL sideloading, evades Windows Defender, steals clipboard and log data, and communicates with a C2 server at 103.215.77.17. #ValleyRAT #GameBox.exe #SilverFoxAPT #MicrosoftTeams

Keypoints

  • Fake Microsoft Teams distribution sites were shared on X in mid-April and closely mimicked the legitimate Teams download page.
  • Users were tricked into downloading a ZIP archive that launched a malicious NSIS installer instead of a normal Teams installer.
  • The attack used DLL sideloading through the legitimate Tencent executable GameBox.exe to load a malicious DLL named utility.dll.
  • The malware weakened Windows Defender by adding exclusion paths and exclusion processes through PowerShell commands.
  • The infection chain used in-memory decryption, shellcode injection, API hashing, and reflective loading to reduce disk-based detection.
  • The final payload was identified as a ValleyRAT variant, with behavior and registry patterns suggesting a link to SilverFox APT activity.
  • The malware captured clipboard contents, wrote local logs, and maintained outbound communication with a command-and-control server.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1189 ] Drive-by Compromise – Users were directed to malicious Teams-lookalike sites that prompted a harmful download (‘users are prompted to download a compressed archive’).
  • [T1566.002 ] Phishing: Spearphishing Link – The campaign used convincing fake Microsoft Teams themed websites to lure victims into clicking and downloading (‘closely mimic the official Microsoft Teams download page’).
  • [T1036 ] Masquerading – The sites and downloaded files were designed to appear legitimate, including a fake Teams installer and shortcut (‘helping avoid suspicion by presenting an expected behavior’).
  • [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer – The malicious archive and staged payloads were downloaded from attacker-controlled infrastructure (‘prompted to download a compressed archive’).
  • [T1218 ] System Binary Proxy Execution – A legitimate Tencent executable GameBox.exe was abused to execute malicious code via sideloading (‘legitimate executable (GameBox.exe) being abused’).
  • [T1574.002 ] Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading – The attack loaded utility.dll through a legitimate executable to execute the payload (‘side-load a malicious dll named utility.dll’).
  • [T1562.001 ] Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools – Windows Defender was weakened using PowerShell exclusions (‘Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath’ and ‘Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess’).
  • [T1036.002 ] Masquerading: Prepend/Append Legitimate Name or Location – Malware was copied into ProgramData and hidden to blend in (‘copied to the ProgramData folder’).
  • [T1112 ] Modify Registry – The malware used registry keys for configuration and persistence-related data (‘configuration data… were likely written to HKCUSOFTWAREIpDates_info’).
  • [T1543.003 ] Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service – Persistence was established by creating an auto-start service named _CCGDAT (‘creating a service named _CCGDAT’).
  • [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information – Payloads were stored encrypted and later decrypted in memory using AES and XOR (‘stored in an encrypted format in memory’).
  • [T1055 ] Process Injection – Shellcode was allocated in memory and executed in the current process (‘allocates memory within the current process and writes the decrypted shellcode into it’).
  • [T1106 ] Native API – The malware used Windows APIs such as CreateThread, GetClipboardData, SetFileAttributes, and BcryptDecrypt to perform actions (‘Execution is then transferred using CreateThread’).
  • [T1027.007 ] Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution – API hashing was used to resolve Windows APIs at runtime (‘computes hashes and dynamically matches them’).
  • [T1620 ] Reflective Code Loading – The final payload used reflective loading to map the PE into memory (‘uses Reflective Loading techniques to map the PE into memory’).
  • [T1056.001 ] Input Capture: Keylogging – Local logs stored captured keystrokes, indicating keylogging activity (‘stores operational data such as captured keystrokes’).
  • [T1115 ] Clipboard Data – The malware accessed clipboard contents to steal sensitive information (‘accessing clipboard contents through the GetClipboardData API’).
  • [T1071.001 ] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols – The malware communicated with a remote C2 server and exchanged data (‘maintaining communication with the remote server’).
  • [T1041 ] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Collected logs and data were sent back to the command-and-control server (‘sends collected data back to the server’).

Indicators of Compromise

  • [Domains ] fake Microsoft Teams lure sites – teams-securecall[.]com, teamszs[.]com
  • [URL/Archive Name ] trojanized download archive names – 98653.2.87.teamsx.zip, teamsxb.zip
  • [File Names ] dropped malicious and staged files – utility.dll, user.dat
  • [File Names ] installer-related component – GameBox.exe, legitimate Microsoft Teams installer
  • [File Hashes ] detected IOC hashes associated with the files – 709604CE58E3F8255587AC9253DB6994, 18F3E85D7237E3CAC0AD13BDCF513F0F and 1 more hash
  • [IP Address ] command-and-control server – 103.215.77.17


Read more: https://labs.k7computing.com/index.php/fake-microsoft-teams-campaign-delivers-valleyrat-via-nsis-installer-and-dll-sideloading/