NSFOCUS Security Labs identified Actor240524, a new APT group, conducting a spear-phishing campaign against Azerbaijani and Israeli diplomats using ABCloader and ABCsync to steal data and evade detection. The operation features a malicious Word document with embedded macros, anti-analysis techniques, and AES-256 encrypted C2 communications. #Actor240524 #ABCloader #ABCsync #iden.doc #Azerbaijan #Israel
Keypoints
- Campaign Date: July 1, 2024
- Target Countries: Azerbaijan and Israel
- New APT Group: Actor240524
- Trojan Programs: ABCloader and ABCsync
- Attack Vector: Spear-phishing emails with malicious Word documents
- Decoy Document: “iden.doc” containing blurry images
- Persistence Mechanism: COM component hijacking using vcruntime190.dll and vcruntime220.dll
MITRE Techniques
- [T1566] Spearphishing – Brief description: Used spear-phishing emails to target diplomats. “Used spear-phishing emails to target diplomats.”
- [T1203] Execution – Malicious Macro – Brief description: Executed malicious macro code embedded in a Word document. “Executed malicious macro code embedded in a Word document.”
- [T1071] Command and Control – Brief description: Connected to a C2 server for remote command execution. “Connected to a C2 server for remote command execution.”
- [T1003] Credential Dumping – Brief description: Stole sensitive data from compromised systems. “Stole sensitive data from compromised systems.”
- [T1546.001] Persistence (COM Hijacking) – Brief description: Used vcruntime190.dll and vcruntime220.dll for persistence. “Used vcruntime190.dll and vcruntime220.dll for persistence.”
- [T1027] Obfuscated/Compressed Files and Information – Brief description: Important strings within the program and key API functions are encrypted to counteract sandbox detection. “Important strings within the program (file paths, file names, keys, error messages, C2 addresses) and key API functions are encrypted to counteract sandbox detection and static analysis.”
- [T1497] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion – Brief description: Anti-analysis checks to evade sandboxes; e.g., BeingDebugged/ NtGlobalFlag checks. “The BeingDebugged field and the NtGlobalFlag flag are checked to determine if the process is being debugged.”
Indicators of Compromise
- [File Name] Decoy Document – iden.doc
- [SHA-256 Hash] 1ee73b17111ab0ffb2f62690310f4ada
- [IP Address] C2 server – 185.23.253.143:36731