Emulating the Notorious Chinese State-Sponsored Winnti Group

AttackIQ emulates the Winnti group’s latest activities to help security teams validate defenses against a long-standing, state-sponsored adversary. Winnti has conducted espionage and financially motivated operations across technology, healthcare, and pharmaceuticals, with notable campaigns during COVID-19 and high-profile supply chain intrusions. #Winnti #Harvest

Keypoints

  • Winnti is a notorious, likely state-supported threat actor operating since at least 2010 with global targets across tech, healthcare, and pharma.
  • During COVID-19, Winnti intensified efforts against healthcare/pharma to steal medical research and vaccine data; the group is linked to multiple supply chain compromises.
  • The group uses multiple backdoors and tools (its own backdoor, ShadowPad, PlugX) and operates in several clusters, complicating attribution and defense.
  • AttackIQ released three new attack graphs—CuckooBees, Harvest, and Sri Lanka campaigns—to help validate security controls against Winnti TTPs.
  • CuckooBees (2022-05) details execution/discovery phases, including VBScript, credential dumping (Mimikatz), and DLL side-loading techniques.
  • Harvest (2021-09) centers on long-term intrusion using PlugX, PSexec, Procdump, Mimikatz, BadPotato/RottenPotato, and lateral movement via RDP, with data exfiltration via HTTP.
  • Sri Lanka government campaign (2022-08) involved a DBoxAgent ISO delivered via Google Drive, followed by SerialVlogger, Keyplug, and DLL side-loading with data staged and exfiltrated over HTTPS/HTTP channels.
  • AttackIQ highlights detection and mitigation opportunities, prioritizing techniques such as Scheduled Task, DLL side-loading, Windows Service, and native execution via RunDLL32/Regsvr32, with corresponding mitigations.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1059.005] Command and Scripting Interpreter – Visual Basic Script: ‘This scenario attempts to execute a Visual Basic Script (VBS) via cs.’
  • [T1016] System Network Configuration Discovery: ‘This scenario executes route, ipconfig, nltest, net or arp commands to obtain the different information available about the network configuration.’
  • [T1082] System Information Discovery: ‘This scenario executes the systeminfo command to collect information about the compromised system.’
  • [T1087.001] Account Discovery: Local Account: ‘This scenario executes the native net user Windows command to get a list of local accounts.’
  • [T1007] System Service Discovery: ‘This scenario executes sc, Get-Service, net start or tasklist /svc to query all running Windows services.’
  • [T1083] File and Directory Discovery: ‘This scenario executes the dir command to discover files and directories.’
  • [T1003.002] OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager: ‘Mimikatz is employed to dump credentials from the system.’
  • [T1003] OS Credential Dumping: ‘This scenario utilizes an obfuscated version of Mimikatz to dump passwords and hashes for Windows accounts.’
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer: ‘These scenarios download to memory and save to disk in two separate scenarios…’
  • [T1012] Query Registry: ‘This scenario executes reg query to obtain information from the registry.’
  • [T1055.001] Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection: ‘This scenario performs the injection of a Dynamic-link Library (DLL) into a process using CreateRemoteThread and LoadLibrary.’
  • [T1574.002] Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading: ‘This scenario leverages a legitimate and trusted executable to load a malicious DLL.’
  • [T1620] Reflective Code Loading: ‘This scenario takes a default AttackIQ DLL and loads it into the memory space of its own process…’
  • [T1218.011] System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32: ‘This scenario executes an exported function from a specific DLL using the rundll32.exe Windows utility.’
  • [T1218.010] Regsvr32: ‘…RegSvr32’ (implied alongside Rundll32 as native execution methods)
  • [T1543.003] Windows Service: ‘This scenario creates a new service to achieve persistence within the system.’
  • [T1049] System Network Connections Discovery: ‘net session’ to list the active network sessions.
  • [T1071.004] Application Layer Protocol: DNS: ‘nslookup’ Windows command to resolve a domain via DNS.
  • [T1016.001] Internet Connection Discovery: ‘tracert’ to gather information about network topology.
  • [T1120] Peripheral Device Discovery: ‘fsutil fsinfo drives’ to gather information about attached devices.
  • [T1201] Password Policy Discovery: ‘net accounts’ to obtain password policy details.
  • [T1087.002] Account Discovery: Domain Account: ‘net group’ to list domain administrator accounts.
  • [T1135] Network Share Discovery: ‘net share’ to list network shares.
  • [T1057] Process Discovery: ‘tasklist’ to enumerate running processes.
  • [T1033] System Owner/User Discovery: ‘query user’ and ‘whoami’ to retrieve logged-on user information.
  • [T1124] System Time Discovery: ‘net time’ to identify system time/time zone.
  • [T1021.001] Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol: ‘RDP’ for lateral movement.
  • [T1078] Valid Accounts (referenced contextually with credential dumping and lateral movement)
  • [T1074.001] Data Staged: Local Data Staging: ‘automated collection of files and stores them in a specific directory prior to exfiltration.’
  • [T1048.003] Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol: ‘exfiltrates a pre-generated text file containing the output from a series of discovery commands… HTTP POST’
  • [T1048] Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol (general note): ‘exfiltration over HTTP to an AttackIQ controlled test server.’

Indicators of Compromise

  • [Domain] drive.google.com – ISO file hosted on Google Drive for Sri Lanka campaign (context: stage delivery via Google Drive)
  • [URL] https://web.archive.org/web/20230111181611/https:/www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intelligence/2022/winnti-apt-group-docks-in-sri-lanka-for-new-campaign-final.pdf – Malwarebytes report referenced for Sri Lanka campaign
  • [File] DBoxAgent ISO file – Drop payload component delivered in Sri Lanka campaign
  • [File] Windows Shortcut LNK file – One of the three components dropped by the DBoxAgent ISO

Read more: https://www.attackiq.com/2024/06/20/emulating-winnti/