Cloudy With a Chance of Credentials | AWS-Targeting Cred Stealer Expands to Azure, GCP

An actor behind a cloud credentials-stealing campaign expands from AWS to Azure and Google Cloud Platform, introducing modular tooling, Docker-targeting propagation, and data exfiltration to AnonDNS. Research notes similarities to TeamTNT and highlights ongoing tooling evolution toward broader cloud targets and stealthier operations. Hashtags: #Cloud_Credentials_Stealer #Azure #GoogleCloudPlatform #AnonDNS #TeamTNT #Permiso #Docker #AWS

Keypoints

  • In June 2023, the actor expanded credential theft to Azure and GCP beyond AWS.
  • Exposed Docker services are targeted, with a worm-like propagation module added.
  • Tooling became more modular; AWS functionality is driven by run_aws_grabber, with new Azure and GCP logic (get_azure and get_google).
  • The campaign infrastructure moved from a Netherlands-based IP to AnonDNS (DDNS), using hardcoded credentials for C2.
  • System profiling and discovery were added (get_docker, get_prov_vars, Data.sh) to enumerate hosts, containers, and processes.
  • Credentials collection now targets numerous files across CSPs (Azure, GCP, Kubernetes secrets, Redis, etc.), with updated credential file arrays.
  • Exfiltration uses curl to send data to AnonDNS endpoints; multiple exfil URLs and SHA1s indicate evolving variants.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1059.003] Unix Shell – The campaigns rely on Bash scripts (aws.sh, Data.sh) and show modular function design;
    Quote: “The script uses the cred_files function to search for credentials files on the system, write them to a temporary file …”
  • [T1027.001] Obfuscated/Compressed Data – An embedded base64 blob is decoded to reveal a Bash script;
    Quote: “The main_main function decodes an embedded base64 blob, resulting in a Bash script that is written and then executed by the main_runCommand function.”
  • [T1046] Network Service Scanning – The actor uses masscan and zgrab to identify vulnerable targets;
    Quote: “Masscan scans the specified IP ranges then passes the results to zgrab, which looks for misconfigured Docker daemons running version 1.16.”
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – The attacker downloads tooling from their server to install dependencies;
    Quote: “downloads the dependencies from the attacker’s server, hosted at the URI: /bin/[bin_name].”
  • [T1071.001] Web Protocols – C2 communications and exfiltration use HTTP/S endpoints;
    Quote: “Exfil URL http[:]//everlost.anondns.net/upload.php”
  • [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Exfiltration of collected cred data to an AnonDNS server;
    Quote: “The credentials stealing scripts use curl to exfiltrate the contents of the $CSOF file to an AnonDNS-hosted server.”
  • [T1552.001] Credentials in Files – The campaign targets credential files across CSPs (Azure, GCP, AWS), including azure.json and various cloud-related artifacts;
    Quote: “The credentials collection logic in the new campaign’s samples targets the following services & technologies:”
  • [T1057] Process Discovery – System profiling includes examining running processes;
    Quote: “ps aux Details about all running processes”
  • [T1033] System Owner/User Discovery – Identity discovery via whoami and user listings;
    Quote: “Current user” and “List of users with active terminal sessions”

Indicators of Compromise

  • [SHA1] Cloud credential stealer hashes – 0e1805fd9efa6a1c3fe9adb3f34373a9dcc7fe19, 18d28ac44c5501f1768f0fc155ad38aa56610881, and other hashes
  • [Domain] Exfil/C2 domains – ap-northeast-1.compute.internal.anondns.net, everlost.anondns.net, silentbob.anondns.net
  • [Domain] Exfil/C2 domains – everfound.anondns.net, everlost.anondns.net
  • [IPv4] Command & control / exfil endpoints – 207.154.218.221, 45.9.148.108
  • [URL] Exfil and command URLs – http://silentbob.anondns.net/bin/chattr, http://silentbob.anondns.net/bin/a, http://silentbob.anondns.net/cmd/grab.sh, http://silentbob.anondns.net/cmd/clean.sh, http://silentbob.anondns.net/cmd/aws.sh
  • [FileName] Credential-related scripts – run.sh, aws.sh, g.aws.sh, data.sh
  • [Monero] Wallet address – 43Lfq18TycJHVR3AMews5C9f6SEfenZoQMcrsEeFXZTWcFW9jW7VeCySDm1L9n4d2JEoHjcDpWZFq6QzqN4QGHYZVaALj3U

Read more: https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/cloudy-with-a-chance-of-credentials-aws-targeting-cred-stealer-expands-to-azure-gcp/