Acronis TRU uncovered a Cambodia-focused campaign that uses phishing-style archives, DLL sideloading, PNG-embedded payloads, BYOVD, and process injection to deploy SparkRAT while impairing multiple security products. The activity shows similarities to SilverFox tradecraft but lacks enough evidence for direct attribution, so it is tracked as an unattributed cluster with possible Chinese-language development or deployment links. #SparkRAT #SilverFox #CVE-2026-36425 #ardrv.sys #OPSWATAppRemover #HuorongInternetSecurity #TencentPCManager
Keypoints
- The campaign targeted individuals and organizations in Cambodia using lure themes such as government notices, public health materials, dental records, and real estate documents.
- The initial delivery used a compressed archive containing an Inno Setup executable named as a Cambodian COVID-19 notice.
- The infection chain included DLL sideloading, anti-analysis checks, token manipulation, PNG-based shellcode decryption, process injection, and BYOVD.
- The malware created persistence through a Windows service and a scheduled task named TaskHandler.
- The campaign installed the vulnerable driver ardrv.sys, associated with OPSWAT AppRemover, and abused CVE-2026-36425 to terminate security processes.
- Final payloads injected into legitimate processes included SparkRAT, which communicated with sx.nuihuw.com:443 and had a backup C2 at nuihuw.top:443.
- Acronis assessed the activity as an unattributed cluster with low-confidence links to the broader SilverFox ecosystem.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1566 ] Phishing â The campaign used archive filenames and lure documents to entice victims (âtargeted-phishing delivery scenarioâ and âCambodian Government Notice on COVID-19 Prevention and Controlâ).
- [T1574.002 ] DLL Side-Loading â A signed Tencent binary loaded the malicious DLL (âused to sideload the malicious DLL WfoY.qfâ).
- [T1620 ] Reflective Code Loading â The final payload was reflectively loaded into memory (âreflectively loads SparkRAT into a legitimate Windows processâ).
- [T1055 ] Process Injection â The malware injected shellcode into vssvc.exe, ctfmon.exe, and svchost.exe (âinjects the decrypted shellcode into vssvc.exeâ and âinjected into ctfmon.exeâ).
- [T1562.001 ] Disable or Modify Tools â The loader impaired defenses by patching AMSI/ETW, adding exclusions, and weakening security processes (âattempts to patch AMSI and ETWâ and âadding exclusionsâ).
- [T1027 ] Obfuscated Files or Information â Encrypted payloads were hidden in PNG files and decrypted at runtime (âshellcode hidden in PNG filesâ and âtreats the concatenated IDAT data as the encrypted payloadâ).
- [T1068 ] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation â The campaign abused a vulnerable driver to gain privileged kernel capability (âCVE-2026-36425â and âpermits local users to submit process-termination requests without adequate privilege validationâ).
- [T1543.003 ] Windows Service â The malware created and started a service for persistence (âsc create TaskHandlerâ and âcreate a Windows Serviceâ).
- [T1053.005 ] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task â It also created an on-start scheduled task for persistence (âschtasks /create /tn âTaskHandlerââ).
- [T1112 ] Modify Registry â Microsoft Defender exclusions were added through registry entries (âconfigures Microsoft Defender exclusions by adding registry entriesâ).
- [T1134.001 ] Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft â The loader searched for winlogon.exe and impersonated its SYSTEM token (âaccesses winlogon.exeâs SYSTEM token for impersonationâ).
- [T1083 ] File and Directory Discovery â The malware enumerated files, directories, and PNG components during staging (âretrieves the directory and appends the following filenameâ).
- [T1518.001 ] Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery â It checked for Huorong and 360 security products before taking action (âprocesses related to Huorong Internet Securityâ and â360 Security processesâ).
- [T1012 ] Query Registry â The payload added Defender exclusions and likely checked system configuration via registry-related actions (âadding registry entriesâ).
- [T1003 ] OS Credential Dumping â Not observed directly; the campaign instead abused tokens and SYSTEM context, so no direct credential dumping was described in the article.
- [T1106 ] Native API â The malware used Windows APIs such as OpenProcessToken, NtCreateFile, NtReadFile, and TerminateProcess (âOpenProcessTokenâ and âTerminateProcess APIâ).
- [T1497.001 ] Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks â Timing-based anti-sandbox logic was used to detect analysis environments (âtiming-based anti-sandbox checkâ).
- [T1610 ] Deploy Container â Not observed; no container deployment was described in the article.
Indicators of Compromise
- [File names / paths ] staged payloads and lure archive names â Cambodian Government Notice on COVID-19 Prevention and Control (July 7).docx.exe, 56360VK1ES8.yvap
- [File names ] additional PNG-embedded payload containers â BssBfeFFoA3A.nz, d7zzQhzRglBv.es, cnV.rb
- [File name / driver ] vulnerable kernel driver used in BYOVD â ardrv.sys
- [Domains / C2 ] command-and-control infrastructure â sx.nuihuw.com:443, nuihuw.top:443
- [File hashes ] analyzed samples and dropped artifacts â 0a050e1d5338b936037f0928039c26893a553c3170b16b82bf75a9113b34a52f, 7504887e1e195ad585cffa5b6a5034161a7cc49f351123d60def79302bdb8326, and other hashes listed for the archives and payloads
- [Executable / loader ] signed sideloading binary â F7u00ex.exe, WfoY.qf