Beware of Phishing Emails Urging Command Execution through Paste (CTRL+V)

Two sentences summarizing the content: ASEC researchers found phishing emails distributing HTML attachments that urge recipients to paste commands to run them, leading to a multi-stage infection that drops DarkGate via PowerShell, HTA, and AutoIt components. The campaign downloads payloads from C2, decodes commands from Base64, and uses clipboard manipulation to obscure execution. #DarkGate #PowerShell #HTA #AutoIt #ASEC #HTMLPhishing

Keypoints

  • The threat actor distributes phishing HTML attachments via email to prompt users to open them and take action.
  • The emails simulate legitimate topics (fee processing, operation instruction reviews) to coax recipients into opening attachments.
  • Opening the HTML leads to a background message mimicking MS Word and prompts the user to click a button to view content offline.
  • On consent, users go through a sequence: Win+R β†’ CTRL+V β†’ Enter, while the PowerShell command is Base64-encoded and saved to the clipboard.
  • The PowerShell script downloads an HTA file from a C2 and executes it, while clearing the clipboard to obscure the command.
  • HTA launches the PowerShell command from the C2, and AutoIt (inside a ZIP) runs a script (script.a3x) as part of the infection chain, culminating in DarkGate malware.
  • Detected file types and IOCs include multiple HTA/HTML/PowerShell artifacts and a list of download URLs linked to the campaign.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566.001] Phishing: Attachment – The attacker distributes phishing HTML attachments that prompt users to take action. β€œThe threat actor sent emails about fee processing, operation instruction reviews, etc. to prompt recipients to open the attachments.”
  • [T1204] User Execution – The recipient is guided to click through prompts to view content and run commands. β€œThe message tells the user to click the β€˜How to fix’ button to view the Word document offline.”
  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – The malicious PowerShell command is executed as part of the infection flow. β€œThe malicious PowerShell command (see Figure 4) … is decoded and saved into the user’s clipboard.”
  • [T1140] Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information – Base64-encoded PowerShell payload decoded during execution. β€œBase64-encoded by the JavaScript (see Figure 3) is decoded and saved into the user’s clipboard.”
  • [T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer – The payloads are downloaded from a C2 during the infection chain. β€œThe PowerShell command downloads an HTA file from C2 and executes it.”
  • [T1218.005] HTA – The download and execution flow leverages an HTA to run the PowerShell command from the C2. β€œHTA executes the PowerShell command in C2.”
  • [T1059] Command and Scripting Interpreter – AutoIt script execution via the ZIP-delivered tool (script.a3x) represents scripting interpreter use. β€œAutoit3.exe inside the ZIP file uses the compiled malicious AutoIt script (script.a3x) as an argument to be executed.”

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File hash] 8b788345fe1a3e9070e2d2982c1f1eb2 – html file used in the initial delivery
  • [File hash] 404bd47f17d482e139e64d0106b8888d – script.a3x detected in the payload chain
  • [File hash] 30e2442555a4224bf15bbffae5e184ee – dark.hta involved in the dropper chain
  • [File hash] 4d52ea9aa7cd3a0e820a9421d936073f – another HTML artifact in the campaign
  • [Filename] script.a3x – invoked by AutoIt component during execution
  • [Filename] dark.hta – HTA component downloaded from C2
  • [Filename] 1.hta – additional HTA artifact observed in IOCs
  • [URL] hxxps://jenniferwelsh[.]com/header.png – one of the download indicators
  • [URL] hxxp://mylittlecabbage[.]net/qhsddxna – another download indicator

Read more: https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/66300/