Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) reports a sharp rise in open source software supply chain compromise in 2025 and early 2026, including major campaigns tied to UNC6780, MIDNIGHT NEPTUNE, and UNC4899. The article also outlines detailed mitigation guidance for protecting ecosystems such as PyPI, npm, Docker Hub, GitHub Actions, and developer pipelines from package poisoning, credential theft, and workflow abuse. #UNC6780 #MIDNIGHTNEPTUNE #UNC4899 #axios #PyPI #npm #DockerHub #GitHubActions
Keypoints
- GTIG says open source software supply chain compromise grew significantly in 2025 and early 2026, with increasing volume and impact.
- Most major incidents involved compromise of code repositories, dependencies, and developer tools rather than classic source-code update channels.
- UNC6780 (TeamPCP) targeted PyPI, npm, and Docker Hub, used
pull_request_targetabuse, and deployed credential stealers such as SANDCLOCK. - A malicious dependency in axios was attributed to MIDNIGHT NEPTUNE, with the release weaponized to deploy the WAVESHAPER.V2 backdoor before removal from npm.
- GTIG warns that AI-assisted development may accelerate supply chain attacks, including malicious packages being inserted into MCP and AI coding workflows.
- Traditional supply chain compromise remains rarer, but notable cases included UNC4899âs exploitation of a web3 organization and UNC6863âs DAEMON Tools campaign.
- The article recommends layered defenses such as SBOMs, short-lived tokens, workflow restrictions, runner isolation, package cooldowns, and stronger vendor governance.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1195.001 ] Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools â Used to compromise code repositories, software dependencies, and developer tools in open source supply chain attacks (âcompromise of code repositories, software dependencies and developer toolsâ).
- [T1195.002 ] Compromise Software Supply Chain â Describes manipulation of source code or update/distribution mechanisms in traditional supply chain compromise (âmanipulation of source code or update/distribution mechanismsâ).
- [T1195.001 ] Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools â UNC6780 abused the
pull_request_targetGitHub Actions trigger to access secrets and write permissions (âabuse of the pull_request_target GitHub Actions trigger to obtain base repository secrets and write permissionsâ). - [T1566.002 ] Spearphishing Link â The axios maintainer account was compromised through social engineering, leading to malicious package publication (âthe maintainer account was compromised via social engineeringâ).
- [T1021 ] Remote Services â UNC4899 used social engineering to gain access to a developer machine and then operated within the victim environment to inject malicious code (âcompromise a developerâs machineâ).
- [T1059.004 ] Unix Shell â The article advises on detecting shell-escape characters and command-substitution patterns in untrusted input, indicating shell-based abuse paths (âshell-escape characters or command-substitution patternsâ).
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer â Malicious packages and droppers such as the axios dependency and SLICKDEMON/BADFALL delivered payloads into victim environments (âdeploy the WAVESHAPER.V2 backdoorâ, âdeliver the shellcoded loader BADFALLâ).
- [T1218 ] System Binary Proxy Execution â The article discusses malicious install scripts and package execution abuse via npm/pnpm lifecycle behavior (âdisable the automatic running of package install scriptsâ).
- [T1552 ] Unsecured Credentials â UNC6780 deployed credential stealers and the article focuses on token theft, static keys, and leaked credentials (âdeploy credential stealersâ, âharvest credentialsâ).
- [T1098 ] Account Manipulation â Package registry maintainer accounts were taken over and used to publish malicious code (âthe maintainer account was compromised and used to publish the updated versionsâ).
- [T1190 ] Exploit Public-Facing Application â Consumer-facing websites were compromised to serve ClickFix lures and web skimmers (âautomotive dealership websites served ClickFix luresâ, âeCommerce websites were infected with web skimmersâ).
Indicators of Compromise
- [Malware/Tool Names ] Malicious payloads and tools referenced in the campaigns â SANDCLOCK, WAVESHAPER.V2, SLICKDEMON, BADFALL, SHADOWLADDER
- [Threat Actor Names ] Actors associated with the supply chain incidents â UNC6780, MIDNIGHT NEPTUNE, UNC4899, UNC6688, UNC6863
- [Package/Repostory Names ] Compromised or targeted open source ecosystems and packages â axios, PyPI, npm, Docker Hub
- [Platform/Workflow Names ] Environments and triggers used or abused in the attacks â GitHub Actions, pull_request_target, Model Context Protocol (MCP)
- [Organization/Platform Names ] Organizations and services referenced in mitigation and incident context â Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), Mandiant, OpenSSF, Linux Foundation, Notepad++
- [Numeric/Exposure Context ] Scale of compromise and distribution impact â over 100 million weekly downloads, 15 industry verticals, 13 countries, 1.4B USD