Datadog Security Research identified two unauthenticated credential-harvesting platforms, Loot and UltraVault, that inventory, validate, and operationalize stolen secrets, including AWS and AI service credentials. The activity shows AI-assisted attack workflows, active re-probing of credentials, and exploitation chains tied to vulnerabilities such as react2shell, wp2shell, xss2shell, and joomla2shell. #Datadog #Loot #UltraVault #AmazonBedrock #Anthropic #OpenAI #AWS #CVE-2025-55182 #CVE-2026-63030 #CVE-2026-60137 #CVE-2026-64638 #CVE-2026-48907
Keypoints
- Datadog monitored two exposed platforms, Loot and UltraVault, that organized and validated harvested credentials without authentication.
- Loot was a simpler plaintext credential catalog, while UltraVault added one-click validation, exploit recommendations, and post-exploitation operations.
- Both platforms re-probed stolen secrets and categorized credentials as live, pending, or dead, indicating active operator use.
- UltraVault tracked 42,286 secrets and showed only 2.7% as live, suggesting large-scale harvesting with limited validity.
- The platforms contained AI-related credentials, including OpenAI, Gemini, Anthropic, and Amazon Bedrock access, and operators were observed testing Bedrock with API calls.
- UltraVault grouped exploitation activity into chains such as react2shell, wp2shell, xss2shell, joomla2shell, and deep, with automated recommendations for local privilege escalation.
- The research highlights LLM-assisted âvibe codedâ attack infrastructure that combines reconnaissance, validation, credential minting, and persistence in a single console.
MITRE Techniques
- [T1082 ] System Information Discovery â The platform queried cloud and host details to understand what the compromised environment could access (âConfirm the identity works, enumerate what the account can reach, then start calling models.â).
- [T1580 ] Cloud Infrastructure Discovery â The operator checked AWS and cloud reachability, including account and region details, before further actions (âGetCallerIdentity, ListFoundationModels, ListInferenceProfilesâ).
- [T1528 ] Steal Application Access Token â The dashboards stored and displayed API tokens and minted credentials for later use (âIt lists relevant API tokens and minted credentialsâ).
- [T1110 ] Brute Force â Credential Stuffing â The system repeatedly re-validated stolen secrets and tested credentials across categories (âre-probe keys they have already stolenâ, âvalidate_categoryâ).
- [T1059 ] Command and Scripting Interpreter â Backend actions and one-click operations were used to drive exploitation and validation workflows (âdispatch of commands to web shells via its backendâ).
- [T1190 ] Exploit Public-Facing Application â The exploitation chains referenced WordPress, Joomla, XSS, and React-to-shell paths used to gain code execution (âreact2shellâ, âwp2shellâ, âxss2shellâ, âjoomla2shellâ).
- [T1068 ] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation â The LPE matrix recommended local privilege escalation vulnerabilities to expand access (âwalks through 14 LPE vulnerabilities and produces a final recommendationâ).
- [T1021 ] Remote Services â The panel supported one-click actions against services such as cPanel on port 2083 and WordPress targets (âattack targets port 2083, associated with cPanelâ).
- [T1105 ] Ingress Tool Transfer â The platform enabled persistence and operational actions by copying, minting, and exporting credentials (âcopy credentials the attacker minted on the hostâ, âEasy export functionalityâ).
- [T1649 ] Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates â The system reconstructed AWS access-key/secret-key pairs from separate dumps for account validation (âcorrelating and validating AWS secretsâ, â/api/pairsâ).
- [T1526 ] Cloud Service Discovery â The attacker enumerated available foundation models and inference profiles in AWS Bedrock (âListFoundationModelsâ, âListInferenceProfilesâ).
- [T1552.001 ] Credentials In Files â The dashboards aggregated secrets collected from dumps and displayed them in plaintext (âcategory-navigable index of credentials, all displayed in plaintextâ).
Indicators of Compromise
- [IP address ] Host used to validate and probe stolen credentials â the Loot/UltraVault server IP (not disclosed), AWS probing source IP (not disclosed)
- [CVE IDs ] Exploitation chains and LPE recommendations â CVE-2025-55182, CVE-2026-63030, and 2 more CVEs
- [API endpoints ] Credential validation and AWS pair processing â /api/credentials/validate, /api/credentials/validate_category, /api/pairs, /api/actions/aws_pair
- [AWS API actions ] Bedrock and STS validation activity â GetCallerIdentity, ListFoundationModels, InvokeModel, and ListInferenceProfiles
- [User agents ] Observed probing clients â Boto3/1.43.72 on Kali Cloud, Python-urllib/3.13
- [Credential types ] Harvested secrets across services â AWS access keys, AWS STS temporary credentials, and AI provider keys such as OpenAI and Anthropic
Read more: https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/attacker-infrastructure-but-vibe-coded/