Attack Activities by Kimsuky Targeting Japanese Organizations – JPCERT/CC Eyes

JPCERT/CC confirms Kimsuky carried out targeted attack activities against Japanese organizations in March 2024, using spearphishing with a zip attachment and decoy documents to deliver a malicious payload. The infection chain downloads and runs VBScript and PowerShell components (PokDoc and InfoKey) to collect device information, check for analysis environments, and exfiltrate keystrokes and clipboard data. #Kimsuky #PokDoc #InfoKey

Keypoints

  • Targeted attack email impersonated a security/diplomatic organization and delivered a zip attachment with files that hide their true extensions.
  • Files included one executable and two decoy documents, with double file extensions to conceal their nature.
  • Execution of the EXE triggers a VBScript (VBS) download and launch via wscript.exe from an external source.
  • The VBS fetches and runs PowerShell, invoking a PokDoc function with a destination URL parameter.
  • Registry Run key is used to autostart a file via WScript, enabling persistence.
  • The downloaded PowerShell implements a keylogger (InfoKey) that collects system, process, network, and user data and writes it to a file before exfiltration.
  • Keystrokes and clipboard data are captured and sent to a remote URL, indicating data exfiltration through the C2 channel.

MITRE Techniques

  • [T1566.001] Spearphishing Attachment – The attacker sent a targeted attack email impersonating a security and diplomatic organization. A zip file containing the following files with double file extensions was attached to the email. β€˜β€¦the attacker sent a targeted attack email impersonating a security and diplomatic organization. A zip file containing the following files with double file extensions was attached to the email.’
  • [T1036] Masquerading – To hide the file extension, each file name contains a large number of spaces. β€˜To hide the file extension, each file name contains a large number of spaces.’
  • [T1059.005] VBScript – A VBS file downloaded from an external source and executed using wscript.exe. β€˜When the EXE file (1) is executed, a VBS file is downloaded from an external source and executed using wscript.exe.’
  • [T1059.001] PowerShell – The VBS file downloads PowerShell from the external source and calls PokDoc function with the following parameter. β€˜PokDoc -Slyer [Destination URL]’
  • [T1547.001] Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder – The Run key in the registry is used to configure β€˜C:UsersPublicPicturesdesktop.ini.bak’ to automatically start via WScript.
  • [T1056.001] Keylogging – PowerShell downloaded by the VBS file functions as a keylogger; when InfoKey is called, keystrokes and clipboard data are captured and saved. β€˜When the InfoKey function is called, the file C:UsersPublicMusicdesktop.ini.bak is created, and then the stolen keystrokes and clipboard information are saved.’
  • [T1041] Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – The collected data is sent to the URL provided in the parameter. β€˜the data is sent to the URL provided in the parameter.’

Indicators of Compromise

  • [File] Desktop.ini.bak – C:UsersPublicPicturesdesktop.ini.bak, C:UsersPublicMusicdesktop.ini.bak

Read more: https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2024/07/attack-activities-by-kimsuky-targeting-japanese-organizations.html